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Climate and environmental changes are argued to increase the occurrence of conflict. 
In particular, two types of conflict seem to be driven by underlying environmental 
processes: food and fuel riots. Although research focussed on understanding the 
dynamics that cause food riots exists, the evidence is mixed and a solid quantitative 
analysis on the factors that cause these type of events is missing. Research on fuel 
riots is currently non-existent. The aim of this research was hence to identify, quantify 
and simulate the interconnections between scarcity of natural resources, international 
prices, political fragility and the occurrence of food and fuel riots. The approach 
implemented was mainly quantitative, with use of statistics, econometrics and Agent-
Based Modelling (ABM). These methods allowed a parameterisation of these 
relationships and inclusion of the results in three different version of an ABM: Food, 
Fuel and Food and Fuel ABMs. The findings show that national availability of 
resources does not significantly impact the occurrence of food and fuel riots, while 
international prices and national political fragility do. Thresholds above which riots 
are more likely to happen were identified for both the price of food and fuel. For food, 
volatility was found to have a bigger impact than absolute prices, while for fuel the 
evidence was mixed and more research is required. In addition, food and fuel riots 
increase the likelihood of one another. Although the introduction of these parameters 
in the ABMs did not add to the predictive power of the underlying statistical models, 
the ABMs form the basis for further developments, in particular as regards the 
evolution of shocks to the production of resources and consequences in terms of food 
and fuel riots. This is evidenced by the scenarios developed and implemented in this 
thesis. 
Keywords: food riots; fuel riots; environmental security; environmental conflict; 
agent-based model; scenarios 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. The Global Observatory Project 
This PhD was part of the Global Resource Observatory (GRO) Project at the Global 
Sustainability Institute (GSI), Anglia Ruskin University. GRO is a multi-model 
modelling project that brings together findings from different fields (economy, social, 
environmental and finance) to investigate and provide short-term forecasts for how 
scarcity of natural resources impact different dynamics and sectors of society, mainly 
conflict, economy and the finance sector. The team working on GRO involved two 
more PhD students (i.e. Roberto Pasqualino and Efundem Agboraw), one post-doc, 
one principal investigator, one project manager, one research assistant and several 
collaborators and the work presented here constitutes my original contribution. Figure 
1.1 represents the main societal structures whose dynamics were studied and modelled 
in the GRO Project, i.e. economy, political and finance. These structures were 
analysed within the framework of the natural environment.  
 
Figure 1.1 – The societal structures studied and modelled in the GRO Project, within 
the framework of the natural environment. The three different colours identify the 
topics studied within each PhD connected to the GRO project. The colour orange 
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relates to my PhD presented in this thesis, red relates to the work of Roberto 
Pasqualino and yellow to the work of Efundem Agboraw (own elaboration). 
The project’s main aim is to provide policy-makers and the wider public with clear 
and understandable findings related to this subject. The project established a set of 
principles the research team had to abide to: 
1. Short-term timeframe (5 years). Most of the models developed in this area of 
research provide long-term forecasts (e.g. Meadows, et al., 1972; Barney, 2002; 
Barker, et al., 2006), whereas policy and decision makers usually work with very 
short political mandates, i.e. 5-7 years. The decision to develop models with short 
timeframes was aimed at bridging this time gap between research and policy and 
provide politicians with actionable and timely information relevant to their 
political mandate, also highlighting the longer term risks connected to these topics 
2. Fully data driven. Chapter 3 explains that models can either be abstract or 
empirically grounded. Abstract models are usually easier to build, but their 
outcomes tend to be disconnected from reality and hence hard to interpret. To 
provide policy makers with actionable information, the models were based on 
empirical data, a principle that partly shaped how the models have been built 
3. Forecasts free to the public. Information about possible political fragilities and 
scarcity of natural resources are in the hands of those few that can afford to pay 
expensive assessments that are carried out by consultancies expert in the field. 
GRO’s mission was also to make the results freely available to the wider public to 
initiate a public dialogue on the matter and to popularise relevant information. For 
this reason the data collection focussed solely on free databases, still checking for 
their comprehensiveness and consistency 
4. Transparency, no black-box models. The majority of models developed to provide 
forecasts are black-box or similarly difficult to interpret. In order for GRO’s 
models to provide accessible information, the models had to be accessible and 
transparent as well. The principle coined was to ‘keep it sophisticatedly simple’, 
but not simplistic.  
All these principles have shaped the research being presented here and provided the 
starting point for some key methodological choices. In particular, the part of the 
project related to my PhD aimed at exploring and quantifying the interconnections 
between scarcity of natural resources, their international prices, national political 
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fragility and the occurrence of food and fuel riots, as shown by the orange-coloured 
spheres in Figure 1.1. The ultimate objective was to develop a fully data-led computer 
model that captured these dynamics and could provide short-term forecasts for these 
relationships. 
1.2. Rationale and scope of the research 
Climate and environmental changes are argued to affect different parts of society and 
different social structures. One of the possible consequences attributed to these 
environmental dynamics is an increased occurrence of conflict. In particular, two 
types of conflict seem to be driven by underlying environmental processes: food and 
fuel riots. 
The period 2008 – 2011 saw a large increase in the occurrence of these events, 
particularly in North Africa and the Middle-East. This period can largely be attributed 
to the Arab Spring, which started as a series of demonstrations against the high food 
prices and the lack of food, and subsequently turned violent. The demonstrations then 
escalated in a more generalised discontent with the current establishment in the 
region. However, this type of events was not confined to this region, as riots were 
reported in different parts of the globe. The pressing nature of the problem and the 
interconnectedness of the system makes this topic worth studying with a systemic and 
quantitative approach.  
Climate and environmental pressures are forecast to increase in the future, hence 
raising concerns for a potential increase in the occurrence of food and fuel riots. 
Although research focussed on the understanding of the dynamics that cause food 
riots, the evidence is mixed and a solid quantitative analysis on the factors that cause 
this type of events is currently missing. To the best of my knowledge, research on fuel 
riots is currently non-existent. 
This thesis will hence address these gaps in literature by using these events as a basis 
for the study. In particular, this thesis constitutes a first attempt to identify and 
quantify the interconnections between different parts of the food and energy systems 
and, in particular, the dynamics that lead from scarcity of resources to the occurrence 
of two specific environmental conflicts (food and fuel riots) and their mutual 
relationships.  
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The approach implemented was mainly quantitative, with extensive use of statistics 
and econometrics and computer modelling, in particular Agent-Based Modelling 
(ABM). I applied quantitative methods to the investigation of the links between 
scarcity of natural resources, international prices, political fragility and the occurrence 
of food and fuel riots. These methods allowed a parameterisation of these 
relationships and inclusion of the results in three different version of an ABM, i.e. the 
Food ABM, the Fuel ABM and the Food and Fuel ABM. All three models include all 
the countries of the world as agents and an international trade network. Their names 
specify whether they include the dynamics that lead to the occurrence of food (Food 
ABM), fuel (Fuel ABM) or both types of riots (Food and Fuel ABM). 
The research being presented here will answer the following research questions that 
will be further specified in Chapters 2 and 3: 
 Is there a linked environmental causal factor in the triggering of civil unrest in 
different countries around the world? 
o Do international prices have an impact on the occurrence of food and fuel 
riots? What has the biggest effect, absolute prices or volatility? Is there a 
threshold for prices over which food and fuel riots are more likely to 
happen? 
o How does availability of food and oil impact the occurrence of riots? 
o Does national political fragility have an impact on the occurrence of food 
and fuel riots? 
o Are food and fuel riots characterised by the same dynamics? Do they have 
an impact on the occurrence of one another? 
o What is the probability of food and fuel riots to occur according to these 
variables? 
 Which is the optimal method that can be used as a policy tool that can simulate 
these dynamics using a data-led approach? 
o Does adopting a fully data-led approach in developing an ABM generate a 
‘good’ model? 
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o Does the introduction of stochasticity and interaction between the agents 
and the feedback between food and fuel riots result in more accurate 
predictions than the underlying statistical extrapolation? 
 Can these models be used to predict future riots? 
1.3. Thesis overview 
This chapter summarised the main principles of the project that this PhD was part of, 
also outlining the scope and rationale for the research presented in the next chapters. 
Chapter 2 will introduce the current literature on the different topics involved in this 
research, that can largely be referred to the academic area of environmental and 
climate security. Chapter 3 will introduce the different modelling methods that can be 
applied to this subject. A justification for the choice of different statistical models and 
ABM as methods will be provided, alongside the modelling journey that I went 
through to complete my PhD. Chapter 4 will present different studies undertaken to 
parameterise some of the dynamics that lead to food and fuel riots, briefly discussing 
the results of the models. Chapter 5 will present the ABMs that were developed as 
part of this research alongside their calibration, validation and simple forecasts for 
future occurrences of food and fuel riots. Chapter 6 will introduce the possible next 
steps that could be taken to improve this research, particularly presenting further 
studies on prices that could not be implemented in the models due to their initial stage 
of development and different scenarios that show the forecasting potential of the 
models. Finally, Chapter 7 will bring together the findings from this research with the 
main literature, answering the research questions set out above and highlighting the 
policy relevance of this research. 
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2. The environmental, economic and political dynamics that drive 
conflict and riots 
This chapter will draw on existing literature to describe what is currently established 
and emerging knowledge about the different dynamics that lead to environmental 
conflict and, more specifically, to the occurrence of food and fuel riots. For the sake 
of clarity and organisation of the text, the link between the environment and conflict 
has been broken down in specific dynamics treated as pieces of a jigsaw that each 
section will describe singularly. This is obviously a simplification of the system that is 
the subject of this thesis, as will be described later in the text. This system is highly 
complex and the dynamics are interrelated and present feedback loops across multiple 
sectors and scales of analysis, with underlying trends and the presence of shocks and 
stressors.  
In particular, the first section will focus on the basic dynamics that drive human-
induced scarcity of natural resources and climate change. The second and third 
sections will report findings from literature about the connections between scarcity 
and abundance of natural resources and conflict. The fourth section will focus on the 
dynamics that lead from climate change and variability to conflict, whereas the fifth 
section will report literature on food and energy security and conflict. The sixth 
section will narrow the discussion to food and fuel riots, with the following section 
addressing the topic of food and fuel price formation. The eighth section will provide 
literature on systemic risk and, finally, in the conclusion section the gap in the 
literature that this research aims to address will be clearly identified and stated. 
2.1. Human drivers of scarcity of natural resources and climate change 
First and foremost it is important to distinguish between two main types of natural 
resources: renewable and non-renewable. The former are characterised by a 
continuous supply stream, which usually occurs naturally. The natural resources that 
are normally classified as renewable are water, sun, wind, biomass, soil and food. 
Non-renewable are instead extracted from natural reservoirs. These are mainly fossil 
fuels (e.g. coal, oil and natural gas) and mined materials (e.g. phosphates and rare 
earth elements). Groundwater is also widely considered a non-renewable natural 
resource due to the long time it takes for the deposits to replenish.  
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The concept of scarcity differs greatly according to which category of natural 
resources we refer to. Renewable resources are considered to be scarce (or their use 
unsustainable) when the exploitation rate is greater than the rate of natural 
replenishment or renewal. In the case of non-renewable resources, these are limited, 
scarce resources as their natural replenishment occurs at rates that are not compatible 
with human time scales (i.e. they replenish on a geological time scale). This chapter 
will account the dynamics that generally involve renewable and non-renewable 
resources, and the experimental part of this thesis will mainly focus on fossil fuels and 
food. 
The idea that we live in a finite world with limited availability of natural resources is 
not a recent discovery. Indeed, the highly contested report on the ‘Limits to Growth’ 
published in Meadows, et al. (1972) concluded that ‘If the present growth trends in 
world population, industrialisation, pollution, food production, and resource depletion 
continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime 
within the next one hundred years. The most probable result will be a rather sudden 
and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity’ (Meadows, et 
al., 1972, p. 23). Their report was based on a computer model that simulated the 
interactions between human and natural systems and that could shed light on what 
different futures may look like under different scenarios. Due to the limited 
technology and the scarce knowledge and data available on these dynamics at the 
time, their findings were contested by different academic fields. The report and the 
underlying model underwent several updates, the latest in Meadows, et al. (2004), 
reaching similar results. Despite the critiques aimed at this piece of work (e.g. Turner, 
2012; Castro, 2012) recent research found that the original predictions were indeed 
quite accurate and that global trends have so far closely followed the most 
unsustainable path identified by the researchers, which would eventually lead the 
world to collapse or ‘overshoot’ (Turner, 2008; Jones, et al., 2013; Pasqualino, et al., 
2015). Pasqualino, et al. (2015) recreated and calibrated the latest version of the 
original model whilst updating the data used to compare the results. The main 
difference between the standard scenario in Meadows, et al. (1972) and reality is the 
extraordinarily positive technological change, complemented by a high 
dematerialisation of human economy and its crystallisation in the services sector, 
which were underestimated in the original model (Pasqualino, et al., 2015). 
  
8 
Another milestone in the academic field of sustainability was the study on ‘Planetary 
Boundaries’, first published in Rockstrom, et al. (2009) and later updated in Steffen, 
et al. (2011). The researchers reinforce the idea that humanity has a limited, safe 
operating space characterised by complex dynamics that present thresholds. The final 
list contains nine planetary boundaries: i) climate change, ii) novel entities, iii) 
stratospheric ozone depletion, iv) atmospheric aerosol loading, v) ocean acidification, 
vi) biogeochemical flows, vii) freshwater use, viii) land-system change and ix) 
biosphere integrity. Their findings show that four of these have already been crossed, 
in particular i, vi, viii and ix. Similarly to Meadows, et al. (1972), the researchers also 
warn that the crossing of any of these thresholds could result in a regime shift with 
potential catastrophic consequences for humanity. 
Climate change is one of the most worrying dynamics. This is defined as ‘a change in 
the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g. using statistical tests) by changes in 
the mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended 
period, typically decades or longer. It refers to any change in climate over time, 
whether due to natural variability or as a result of human activity’ (IPCC, 2007, p. 
30). The main consequences of climate change are sea level rise, scarcity of natural 
resources such as food and water, increased losses of biodiversity and ecosystem 
services and increased occurrence of extreme events such as droughts and floods 
(IPCC, 2007). This dynamic is partly driven by human activities, which emit 
increasing levels of greenhouse gases (GHGs) and alter the concentration of these 
gases in the Earth’s atmosphere, causing the warming of the planet (IPCC, 2007). 
Indeed, the interactions between the environment and human activities and structures, 
commonly referred to as socio-ecological systems (SES) in social sciences, present all 
the characteristics of complex adaptive systems. Some of these are the presence of 
thresholds, non-linear behaviours and interconnectivity amongst different components 
of the system, or in this case between different SESs (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Ostrom, 
2009). These characteristics will be listed and explained in detail in the following 
chapter. 
Literature has widely explored the dynamics that characterise SESs and in particular 
the effects of human activities on the environment and their feedbacks on human 
activities. The fundamental drivers of scarcity of natural resources and human-made 
climate change have been identified as being population growth and economic 
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development (Sterman, 2012; Schäfer, 2014). The first driver can be associated with 
the Malthusian school of thought (Malthus, 1926), which was the first theory 
concluding that the world’s population would increase indefinitely alongside its use of 
natural resources – in particular food – ultimately resulting in famine and starvation. 
Although this theory has contemporary followers (Ehrlich, 1970; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 
2009) and is still at the centre of the debate (e.g. Neomalthusian model over scarcity 
of resources that leads to conflict), it was highly contested for being overly 
pessimistic (e.g. from the Cornucopian school of thought, see for example Boserup 
and Schultz, 1990). Since then, humanity and technology (e.g. agricultural revolution) 
have progressed alongside the social structures that we have put in place to thrive and 
regulate our development as a species, and the ‘Malthusian Catastrophe’ has not 
materialised yet (at the global level). The creation of human economy and economic 
development that benefited the now developed countries first and currently 
characterises the developing world played a relevant role in the increase of income 
per capita, which was vital in lifting whole populations from poverty. However, this 
process, coupled with exponential population growth, translated in an increase in 
consumption of fundamental natural resources used to create goods and consumables 
(Wackernagel and Rees, 1996), increasing urbanisation (due to shift from agricultural-
based systems to industry, which led to the migration of rural population to the cities), 
ultimately driving human-made climate change via changes in land use, increase in 
the use of energy by burning fossil fuels, increasing pollution and emissions of GHGs 
(IPCC, 2014). This is another important driver of how human activities affect the 
natural environment. 
Although these dynamics have been active for centuries, particularly since the first 
industrial revolution in the 19th Century, the size of world’s population and economy 
have not stopped growing. The United Nations (UN) most recent forecast for the 
world population is 9,725 millions by 2050 and 11,213 millions by 2100 (UN, 2013). 
In addition, the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) predicts a likely 
warming of the planet between 1.5 and 4 degrees by 2100 according to different GHG 
concentration levels (IPCC, 2014). The consequences of this scenario in terms of 
changes to the climate and its feedbacks on human activities would possibly be 
devastating. In particular, food security, the delivery of ecosystem services, sea-level 
rise and the occurrence of extreme events would likely be worsened (on average) by 
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the increase in global temperatures. Some of these dynamics are already occurring 
(King, et al., 2015). 
However, development and economic theories argue that economic growth will 
contribute to the slow down of population growth by positively affecting women’s 
education, which in turn decreases the birth rate of countries (e.g. Becker, 1960). In 
addition, economic theories such as the Economic Kuznets Curve (Kuznets, 1955) 
argue that economic growth also has a positive impact on populations’ environmental 
concerns and these dynamics should ultimately reduce the impact of human activities 
on the natural environment. In general, empirical research seems to agree on the 
inverse relationship between economic growth and population growth, whereas the 
link between economic growth and environmental impact remains an open debate 
(e.g. Meadows, et al., 1972; Meadows, et al., 2004; Randers, 2012). In particular, it is 
not known whether the limited availability of natural resources and the negative 
feedbacks from the natural environment on human activities will allow this process to 
complete. For instance, findings from Schäfer (2014) support the idea that 
technological advances and economic development contribute to a decline in 
depletion of natural resources. However, Barbier and Homer-Dixon (1999) argue that 
scarcity of natural resources hinders the potential for economic development of poor 
countries that are heavily resource-dependent by directly constraining growth, but 
also by indirectly affecting the potential of these countries to innovate. Another 
opinion is provided by Bagliani, et al. (2008) who empirically tested the 
environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis using data for the ecological footprint of 141 
countries, finding no evidence for the decoupling between economic growth and 
environmental impact.  
As mentioned above, climate change can result in negative consequences for 
economic growth. For instance, Burke, et al. (2015) explored the consequences of 
climate change in terms of productivity, finding that variations in temperature have a 
non-linear impact on economic activities by reducing productivity in both agricultural 
and non-agricultural sectors and both rich and poor countries. Their findings reveal 
that productivity peaks at an annual average temperature of 13 degrees. Since 
productivity in all regions and countries is coupled to global climate, warming of the 
planet can cause a 23% reduction in global incomes by 2100 and increase income 
inequalities due to areas affected differently from climate change. 
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2.2. Food, energy and water security 
The effects of the dynamics presented in the previous section can be better understood 
and represented by analysing each broad category of resources: food, energy and 
water. In general, the availability of these resources is affected by long-term social 
trends such as an increasing global population, global economic growth, 
environmental and climatic changes and international conflict, which are expected to 
increase in the future, hence worsening the conditions of security for these resources 
(IPCC, 2007). During the last few decades, research has increasingly focussed on the 
issue of security related to natural resources, which is notably different from their 
scarcity as security involves the notion of access. 
2.2.1. Definition and drivers of food security 
FAO (2006) defined global food security as: i) sufficient availability of quality food, 
either grown or imported, ii) access to food resources, iii) provision of adequate diet, 
clean water, sanitation and health care to meet the needs of populations and iv) a 
stable supply of food through time. A fundamental factor in the food security equation 
is the demand for food. Mitchell, et al. (2015) highlights the difference between 
simple demand and effective demand, especially valid in the case of food. Simple 
demand equates to the caloric intake needed by populations, whereas effective 
demand corresponds to the real access to food. The latter concept is the one truly 
important in the definition of food security and involves households’ income and 
price of food. On the same lines, Pinstrup-Andersen (2009) argues that, at the 
household level, food security does not necessarily equate to nutritional security. This 
is due to the intra-household food distribution, which is seldom based on the 
nutritional needs of the members, and to access to food with good nutritional quality. 
The specific drivers of food insecurity can be identified as i) decreasing availability of 
high-quality land, ii) decreasing marginal returns from agriculture intensification, iii) 
increasing climate change and water scarcity and iv) increasing demand for food 
(Homer-Dixon, et al., 2015). The first driver is mainly attributable to the fact that the 
land required to grow crops is in itself a limited resource, which is becoming 
increasingly scarce due to competing demand from different sectors (e.g. biofuels and 
food production), and its quality is degrading due to short-term oriented 
intensification practices. The second driver derives from the fundamental economic 
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law of ‘diminishing returns’, which postulates that the increase in one factor of 
production whilst maintaining the other factors unvaried will result in a marginal 
increase in output, which decreases with time. In this case, doubling the input of 
technology (e.g. the use of fertilisers or the addition of machinery to cultivate the 
land) without increasing the land cultivated will first result in an initial doubling of 
the output. Subsequent increases in technology will result in decreasing marginal 
increases that tend to zero with time. As for the third driver, climate change affects 
the production of food through increase in temperatures, change in precipitation 
patterns (impacting the availability of water), rising sea levels (causing the 
salinisation of agricultural lands), increased extreme events (e.g. droughts and floods) 
and increased pollution (e.g. ocean acidification). Although research has found that an 
increase in temperatures and higher CO2 concentrations due to climate change will 
initially benefit cultivations in particular regions of the globe, the overall effect is 
forecast to be negative, thus reducing global food production (Parry, et al., 2004; 
Wheeler and von Braun, 2013). Finally, the fourth driver can be brought back to the 
main general drivers listed before of increase in population and economic growth, 
which has an indirect effect on people’s diets. Indeed, higher-income households tend 
to consume more and in particular more processed food and red meat, which is a 
highly water-, land- and food-intensive product (Godfray, et al., 2010). 
2.2.2. Definition and drivers of energy security 
As for energy security, the International Energy Agency defines this concept as “the 
uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price” (IEA, 2014, p. 4). 
The specific drivers of energy insecurity can be identified as: i) increasing demand for 
fuels, ii) decreasing oil production and iii) decreasing Energy Return On Investments 
(EROI) 1  for fossil fuels (Homer-Dixon, et al., 2015). The first driver of energy 
insecurity can once again be brought back to the one of the general drivers listed 
before, i.e. economic and population growth. As economy grows incessantly, 
increasing amounts of high-quality energy is required to sustain the complex system 
                                                 
1 Note that in current literature the terms Energy Returns on Investments (EROI) and Energy Returns 
on Energy Invested (EROEI) are used interchangeably (e.g. Bardi, 2009). Seldom a definition is 
provided and when it is provided the definitions match (see for example Hammerschlag, 2006), where 
the definition for EROI is the same as that more commonly used EROEI). In this thesis the two terms 
will be used as reported by the original author being referenced, assuming them as synonyms. 
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that typify our social structures, which also are composed of an increasing number of 
people. (Different forms of) energy is used as a fundamental input in the production 
of every good we consume, and the larger an economy, the larger its production and 
the larger its energy requirements (Bardi, 2014). The second driver can be explained 
by introducing the theory of ‘peak-oil’: this theory argues that the production of non-
renewable resources – and more particularly oil – initially grows, then reaches a peak 
and then starts its descent towards zero. This relationship was first introduced by 
Hubbert (1956), and takes the form of a bell-shaped curve. According to this, the peak 
corresponds to the moment in time when half of the endowments for the resource 
have been extracted (Bardi, 2009; Bardi, 2014). Jevons was the first scientist to try to 
model resource depletion in 1895 (Bardi, 2014). This author focussed his theories on 
coal, arguing that the easy coal is extracted first, which is cheap and easy to locate and 
extract. Its production becomes increasingly more difficult and expensive with time, 
ultimately making the resource economically not viable (Bardi, 2014). In addition, 
Lasky’s law postulates an inverse relationship between the quality of the ore and its 
abundancy, i.e. lower-grade ores are more plentiful in the Earth’s crust than higher-
grade ones (Bardi, 2014). These two concepts cause the bell shape of the curve 
theorised by Hubbert and can be described by the Energy Returned on Energy 
Invested (EROEI), which is the ratio between the energy produced by the resource 
extracted and the energy required to extract that resource (through a Life Cycle 
Assessment) (Bardi, 2009; Bardi, et al., 2011; Bardi, 2014). Resources with EROEI ≤ 
1 are not economically profitable and not worth being extracted as the same amount 
of energy resulting from the extractive process is required as an input, although it is 
easy to imagine pathological cases where resources are extracted although their 
EROEI < 1 (e.g. when its production is being subsidised). For resources to be 
economically viable, their EROEI should be ≥ 3. Currently, only renewable resources, 
and in particular wind power and solar photovoltaic have a viable EROI of around 30 
(Cleveland, et al., 2006) and 10 (Bardi, 2009), respectively (Bardi, 2009). In other 
words, as the quality of the resources discovered decreases due to Lasky’s law, the 
investments (energy) required to extract increases, increasing the price of the final 
resource, until the resource becomes too expensive2 to extract and its production is 
                                                 
2 This is an over-simplification of the relationship between availability of resources and their prices. As 
it will be introduced later in this chapter, multiple factors influence the price of the resources, which 
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slowly abandoned, i.e. peak-oil. Research has found that some regions have already 
experienced peak-oil (e.g. USA in the 70s and USSR in the 90s), sometimes with 
catastrophic consequences for countries (Bardi, 2014). Global peak-oil has been 
forecast for the first half of the 2000s, whereas peak-oil discovery has already 
occurred around 1977 (Bardi, 2009). However, the theory of peak-resources is still 
currently highly debated. 
2.2.3. Definition and drivers of water security 
The United Nations (UN) defines water security as ‘the capacity of a population to 
safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for 
sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for 
ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for 
preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability” (UN, 2013, p. 7). 
Water is likely the most important resource for humanity, as it is central for the 
survival of our species, for the environment and for human activities (UN, 2013). The 
drivers that lead to water insecurity can once again be generally brought back to 
population increase and economic growth, which impact the availability of water both 
directly through water abstraction for personal use, agriculture and industry, but also 
indirectly through climate change, which can result in droughts and the salinisation of 
fresh water reservoirs (Mitchell, et al., 2015), and via international trade, through the 
concept of ‘virtual water’, i.e. the amount of water embodied in the traded goods and 
services. Water quality is another important factor, as domestic, industrial and 
agricultural practices can increase water pollution, with negative consequences for 
populations and ecosystems (UN, 2013).  
2.3. Scarcity of natural resources and conflict 
The literature that explored connections between the socio-environmental dynamics 
presented in the previous section and the emergence of conflict is large and highly 
interdisciplinary, and comprises studies undertaken with different approaches, which 
inevitably led to conflicting results. 
Once again, the neo-Malthusian and Cornucopian schools of thought are the two main 
opposing theories that underlie the debate on the link between scarcity and conflict. In 
                                                                                                                                            
makes them difficult to predict. 
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particular, in the 1960s and 1970s a new wave of concerns over the potential 
mismatch between population and availability of natural resources, commonly 
referred to as neo-Malthusians, emerged (Urdal, 2005; Bernauer, et al., 2012). These 
authors believed that population would soon outgrow the resource base of countries, 
triggering environmental degradation and scarcity of natural resources such as arable 
land, water, forests and fisheries and this would result in widespread hunger and 
violent conflict (Hardin, 1968; Ehrlich, 1970; Norman, 1993; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 
1996; Renner, 2002; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 2009). 
One of the most cited authors whose research can be associated to the neo-Malthusian 
school is Homer-Dixon. In Homer-Dixon (1991), for instance, the author identified 
seven, possibly interrelated, environmental issues that can lead developing countries 
to inter- and intra-state conflict: climate change3, stratospheric ozone layer depletion, 
acid deposition, deforestation, degradation of cultivated land, water scarcity and 
pollution and dwindling fisheries. The author argues that these environmental 
dynamics can be grouped under the term ‘global change’ and act on different spatial 
(e.g. global, regional, local) and temporal (e.g. millennia, years) scales. In addition, 
these dynamics have reached different levels of maturity (e.g. climate change and 
stratospheric ozone layer depletion). 
Homer-Dixon (1994) coined the term ‘environmental scarcity’, which includes three 
drivers of scarcity of renewable resources: environmental change, population growth 
and unequal resource distribution. The author hypothesised three dynamics that can 
lead to different types of violent conflict: i) decreasing availability of resources such 
as water and land can lead to “simple-scarcity” conflicts or resource wars; ii) 
migration caused by environmental stresses can result in “group-identity” clashes and 
iii) environmental scarcity leads to economic crisis and stress for institutions, which 
can result in “deprivation” conflicts. These dynamics often interact and give life to 
two patterns, resource capture and ecological marginalisation. The former results from 
the combination of scarcity and population growth, which translates in an unequal 
distribution of the resources in favour of elites. The latter results from the 
                                                 
3 The author originally wrote ‘greenhouse warming’. This term and ‘global warming’ were introduced 
in the 90s, but it was believed to be misleading, as not the whole globe would become warmer due to 
GHG emissions. This process is now more commonly defined ‘climate change’ due to its more 
objective connotation. In this thesis I will use this last term as a synonym to greenhouse warming to 
allow for consistency throughout the text.  
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combination of unequal distribution of resources and population growth that can lead 
to migration of the poorest sectors of the population to high-risk areas (e.g. sides of 
mountains and close to the sea). The author suggests two strategies that societies can 
implement to avoid environmental-scarcity-led conflict: i) by promoting policies to 
disincentivise the use of that resource and incentivise substitutes or ii) by decoupling 
their economies from the use of these resources and importing them from abroad. 
However, the author does not elaborate on the possible negative economic 
consequences of abandoning the production of the resource and of increasing imports, 
which can also lead to increased exposure to systemic risk. Both strategies require two 
types of ingenuity: social ingenuity to act as a buffer for the most vulnerable parts of 
society and to provide incentives for the development of new technologies and 
technical ingenuity to develop these new technologies to substitute for the 
environmental loss. The former is a precursor of the latter and the implementation of 
both requires strategic thinking by decision-makers in terms of when and where the 
need is the greatest.  
Cornucopians are once again opposed to the neo-Malthusian view that population 
pressure and resource scarcity can lead to conflict (Urdal, 2005; Bernauer, et al., 
2012). Although they acknowledge that environmental issues can sometimes 
constitute a risk for human wellbeing, their thought is structured around three main 
counter-theories: firstly, the natural resources whose availability is commonly thought 
to be low, are plentiful at the global level and will remain so even if global population 
continues to rise (e.g. Lomborg, 2001); secondly, humanity will adapt to these 
scarcities through market mechanisms and technological innovation (e.g. Simon, 
1996), with one author arguing that this dynamic of scarcity is necessary for 
agricultural innovation (Boserup and Schultz, 1990). Indeed, Cornucopians criticise 
neo-Malthusian arguments for being overly deterministic and ignorant of economic 
and socio-political factors (e.g. Gleditsch, 1998; de Soysa, 2002a; de Soysa, 2002b; 
Barnett and Adger, 2007; Salehyan, 2008; Koubi, et al., 2012); finally, Cornucopians 
believe that conflict is more likely to be triggered from abundance of natural 
resources, rather than scarcity, due to the wealth that these represent. This theory is 
commonly referred to as ‘Resource curse’. 
Empirical literature on the link between scarcity of natural resources and conflict 
seems to agree that environmental stresses contribute to the occurrence of conflict in 
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specific cases (Homer-Dixon, 1994; Bernauer, et al., 2012), although the evidence in 
both the qualitative and quantitative literature is mixed for larger studies (Böhmelt, et 
al., 2014; Bretthauer, 2014). For instance, Homer-Dixon (1999) qualitatively 
reviewed several case studies demonstrating that many of these support a model 
where climate leads to resource shortages, which in turn promote conflict. Ide (2015) 
undertook a qualitative analysis to establish the conditions necessary for conflicts 
over scarcity of resources to turn violent using a series of case studies from the global 
south. The author found that a mix of structural conditions – negative othering, i.e. the 
negative contrast between different collective identities and low power differences 
between competing political parties – and one triggering condition, i.e. recent political 
change, are sufficient for a violent escalation of conflicts over renewable natural 
resources and that there is no single sufficient condition. Other conditions generally 
regarded as necessary, i.e. high power differences between political parties and 
resource appropriation, or the exclusion of local groups from the use of scarce 
renewable resources, were not found to be significant. Bretthauer (2014) focuses her 
analysis on the impact of scarcity of arable land and water on conflict using a case-
studies qualitative approach. Her findings show that the combination of agricultural 
dependence, poverty and low levels of tertiary education leads to the emergence of 
conflict in case of scarcity of natural resources and that low levels of tertiary 
education is a necessary condition for conflict. Conversely, she found that the non-
dependence on agriculture is a necessary condition for non-conflict and that high 
levels of tertiary education help avoid conflict. The author recognises the limitations 
of the method used, i.e. fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis, as this does not 
prove a link between scarcity and conflict, but rather compares the conditions of 
different case studies analysed. 
Now exploring the quantitative literature on the link between scarcity and conflict, 
Urdal (2005) specifically tested the neo-Malthusian and Cornucopian theories by 
analysing global time-series for a series of social, political and conflict variables 
between 1950 and 2000. His results do not provide evidence for either theory. In 
particular, the author found that high population growth, urbanisation and large 
refugee communities do not significantly impact the risk of conflict within countries. 
However, land scarcity combined with high population growth increases the risk of 
armed conflict. The main bulk of research on scarcity of natural resources and conflict 
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focussed on water scarcity, with a few other examples. Studies from Hauge and 
Ellingsen (1998) and Gleick (1993) provide evidence that water scarcity can lead to 
armed conflict. Raleigh and Urdal (2007) also found a connection between water 
scarcity and land degradation and conflict and Lecoutere, et al. (2010) and Tir and 
Stinnett (2012) found similar conclusions. Other systematic empirical analyses agree 
that shared water resources can involve low-level conflicts, although the idea of 
‘water wars’ does not find support in these empirical studies (Toset, Gleditsch and 
Hegre, 2000; Gleditsch, et al., 2006; Hensel, et al., 2006; Brochmann and Hensel, 
2009; Dinar, 2009; Dinar, et al., 2011). Interestingly, other authors such as Kalbhenn 
(2012), Dinar, et al. (2007), Wolf (2002), and Yoffe, et al. (2003) found that 
cooperation is more likely than conflict between countries with shared water 
resources. Esty, et al. (1998) found no connection between environmental scarcity 
indicators for soil degradation and deforestation and state failure, whereas Bohmelt, et 
al. (2014) found a connection between population pressure, agricultural productivity, 
and economic development and risk of water conflict.  
In conclusion, the literature on scarcity and conflict is abundant and the findings 
mixed. Qualitative studies seem to agree on environmental roots for some conflicts, in 
particular the author Homer-Dixon, whose views I share due to his objective and 
exhaustive accounts of case studies. Findings from quantitative studies provide 
evidence both for and against this connection. 
2.4. Resource curse and conflict 
The term resource curse refers to the situation where countries with large endowments 
of natural resources fail to achieve a sustained economic growth (Barbier, 2005). This 
is due to the disproportionate investments in the extraction of those resources, whilst 
neglecting to promote investments in other sectors of the economy such as education 
and social security. Once the endowments of the country are depleted or no longer 
economically viable, the country is left in a state of deep poverty, since the whole 
economy was based on the extractive industry. The wealth generated during the 
extractive years, is usually appropriated by the elites, since these countries are usually 
characterised by high levels of corruption. These countries tend to be located in the 
southern hemisphere, where natural resources are still plentiful (Lopez, 2010). 
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Conflict in these countries tends to be aimed at resource appropriation or related to 
rent-seeking behaviours (Carbonnier, et al., 2011).  
Research has been focussing on searching for evidence for the resource curse and on 
identifying the factors that distinguish resource-wealthy countries that achieved 
economic growth with low conflict (e.g. Canada) and those that struggle to achieve 
the same (e.g. Nigeria). Van del Ploeg (2006) and Frankel (2010) provide two 
comprehensive literature reviews of the resource curse. In particular, Frankel (2010) 
highlights five channels that can generate the resource curse and that find some 
support in the literature: i) when the price volatility of commodities is high, which can 
be detrimental to the country’s economy; ii) specialisation of a country in the 
extraction and production of natural resources can concentrate wealth and labour in 
this sector, neglecting the manufacturing sector, which carries positive externalities; 
iii) abundance of mineral resources can lead to civil war, which in turn can hinder 
economic development; iv) abundance of mineral resources and some crops can lead 
to corruption, social inequality, class structure, chronic power struggles, absence of 
rule of law and property rights and finally it can hinder democracy; v) ‘The Dutch 
Disease’, which is due to a country’s specialisation in the export of natural resources, 
resulting in an increased monetary flow in the extractive sector, increased public 
spending and debt, the appreciation of the national currency. Consequently, the 
country’s exports become relatively more expensive, which benefits the extractive 
sector and is detrimental to the other sectors of the economy. When the prices of 
national commodities decrease, the legacy of this process will be an economy relying 
mainly on the export of natural resources, with under-sized other sectors of the 
economy, in particular manufacturing. Collier and Goderis (2008) add ‘lack of 
education’ as a potential further cause of the resource curse and Carbonnier, et al. 
(2011) highlight four critical variables related to a country’s institutions: i) constraints 
to the executive power, ii) level and type of corruption present in the country, iii) the 
country’s type of regime and iv) the presence of armed violence and conflict. 
Authors that found evidence of the resource curse are Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001), 
Gylfason and Zoega (2006), Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Kaldor, et al. 
(2007), Ross (2001) and Smith (2004). For instance, Collier and Goderis (2008) use 
an econometric approach to explore global data between 1963 and 2003, finding 
strong evidence for the resource curse hypothesis. In particular, the authors found that 
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commodity booms, i.e. price spikes in commodities, have positive effects on output in 
the short-term that translate in negative long-term effects, particularly for mineral 
resources. The authors also found that good institutions (i.e. countries that have a high 
score for the International Country Risk Guide) are sufficient to avoid the resource 
curse and that the resource curse process is explained by real exchange rate 
appreciation, public and private consumption and, less importantly, from external 
debt, manufacturing and services. These findings support literature on the importance 
of the Dutch disease in countries with large endowments of natural resources and also 
the literature that identifies scarce redistribution as the root of the curse. 
Carbonnier, et al. (2011) reached similar conclusions by analysing a panel dataset to 
evaluate the relationships between extraction of natural resource, governance and 
development in developing countries. In particular, the authors found an inverse 
relationship between resource extraction and Adjusted Net Savings (ANS), which is a 
measure of a country’s wealth that takes into account the depletion of natural 
resources (Barbier, 2005). However, they also highlight that this negative effect can 
be avoided by nurturing government and institutions. 
Other authors focussed on specific countries, finding evidence of the resource curse in 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria and highlighting 
as the main causes the Dutch disease, the government’s focus on producing revenues 
through the extraction of natural resources and armed violence (Mehlum, et al., 2006; 
Collier and Goderis, 2008; Carbonnier, 2011). Further on this, the civil wars in 
Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone support the 
argument that countries with large endowments of natural resources are more likely to 
experience conflict (Le Billon, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Le Billon, 2005; 
Rosser, 2006). Other authors focussed on specific types of regime, for instance 
Andersen and Aslaksen (2008) found that the resource curse is more likely to involve 
presidential rather than parliamentarian democracies. 
Authors who found a positive relationship between endowments of natural resources 
and economic growth are, amongst others, Alexeev and Conrad (2009) and 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), even in Africa (Deaton and Miller, 1995) and low-
income countries (Raddatz, 2007).  
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Other countries like Nigeria experienced both economic growth and conflict due to 
the resource curse (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) note that most of the income generated from the country’s oil 
endowments was appropriated by the establishment, without increasing the living 
standards in the country.  
Other authors such as Van der Ploeg (2011), Heinrich (2011), Di John (2011), 
Delacroix (1977), Davis, et al. (2003) and Herb (2005) argue against the existence of 
a resource curse. 
2.5. Climate change and variability and conflict 
The review of the literature on climate change and variability and conflict presents a 
complex landscape, with authors that found a direct or indirect connection between 
these two phenomena (Homer-Dixon, 1991; Miguel, et al., 2004; Barnett and Adger, 
2007; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Nel and Righarts, 2008; Burke, et al., 2009a; 
Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012; Hsiang, et al., 2013b; Salehyan, 2014; Maystadt and 
Ecker, 2014; Raleigh, et al., 2015; Hsiang, et al., 2015; Chen, et al., 2016; Carleton, et 
al., 2016), authors that reject a connection between the two (Besley and Persson, 
2011; Gartzke, 2012; Slettebak, 2012; Bergholt and Lujala, 2012) and finally authors 
that report findings that back this relationship only in specific circumstances 
(Bernauer, et al., 2012; Bretthauer, 2014), or that found little evidence (Buhaug, 2010; 
Benjaminsen, et al., 2012; Theisen, et al., 2013; Forsyth and Schomerus, 2013). 
Salehyan (2014), attributes the mixed findings in the literature as subjective bias of 
the researchers, whereas Scheffran, et al. (2012) argues that the main difference in 
findings is related to the temporal scale used in the studies and the methodology 
implemented where long-term, historic studies find a link between climate variability 
and conflict and more recent, data-based studies find mixed results. 
Importantly, Seter (2016) distinguishes between ‘climate change’ and ‘climate 
variability’. The first term refers to the long-term (i.e. persistent) change in climate 
temperatures and dynamics driven by natural and human impacts, whereas the second 
refers to short-term variability in climate conditions (e.g. occurrence of extremes). 
The author argues that these two terms are often confused or used as synonyms, 
leading to confounding results and literature, since arguing that climate variability is a 
cause for conflict is different from arguing that climate change is a cause of conflict. 
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Seter (2016) argues that climate variability affects the occurrence of conflict by 
inducing both favourable and unfavourable economic conditions and migration driven 
by economic factors. 
Other authors argue that climate change affects conflict through increased migration 
(Findley, 1994; McLeman and Smit, 2006; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Nordås and 
Gleditsch, 2007; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007; Raleigh, et al., 2015; Burrows and Kinney, 
2016). In particular, Mitchell, et al. (2015) state that climate change promotes the 
migration of populations, forcing them to move to areas that are either more at risk 
(e.g. hills and sea front) or that already experience environmental stress, which puts 
further pressure on the local environment and availability of resources such as food 
and water. This can erode the legitimacy of governments, resulting in intra- and inter-
state tensions and conflict. In addition, Burrows and Kinney (2016) argue that, in 
general, literature agrees on the importance of climate and migration for conflict, 
however different authors disagree on the relative importance of these variables as 
compared to other causes of conflict. 
Several studies found large associations between climate and conflict at the local 
(Miguel, 2005; Fjelde and von Uexkull, 2012; O'Loughlin, et al., 2012; Hsiang, et al., 
2013a; Harari and La Ferrara, 2013), national (Levy, et al., 2005; Burke, et al., 2009a; 
Hendrix and Salehyan, 2012), continental (Hsiang, et al., 2011) and global (Hsiang, et 
al., 2013b) scales. Hsiang, et al. (2013b), is one of the large quantitative studies and 
one of the most robust and comprehensive in the field. The authors found that 
deviations from precipitation patterns and changes in temperature cause a systematic 
increase in the risk of different types of conflict, with changes in rainfall having a 
larger effect than the changes in temperature. The effect on large scale conflict is 
larger than that on interpersonal conflict. In addition, the authors found that these 
relationships are non-linear and hold for different sets of spatial and temporal scales. 
The authors list six theories explored in literature that explain the connection between 
climate change and conflict and that are, in their opinion, empirically supported: i) 
when climate change causes an economic decline, society’s trade-off between 
engaging in conflict and operating normally is reduced; ii) economic decline caused 
by climate change erodes the strength of governmental institutions, which lose 
legitimacy and the ability to control and repress rebellions; iii) when climate change 
increases inequalities, societies will protest to restore the balance; iv) when climate 
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change causes migration or urbanisation, conflict can emerge over geographically 
stationary resources that were not scarce before; v) climate change can alter the way 
conflicts are exacerbated by, for instance, changing the landscape and vi) climate 
change can result in conflict by altering people’s cognitive abilities or attribution (e.g. 
heat wave). 
Theisen, et al. (2011) empirically tested the link between climate variability and 
conflict by analysing data on postcolonial Africa. The authors found little evidence of 
the drought-conflict connection, arguing that socio-political and geographic factors 
such as politically marginalized population, high infant mortality, proximity to 
international borders, and high local population density are better descriptors of risk 
of civil war in Africa. Hsiang, et al. (2015) discredited these results arguing that the 
approach used by Theisen, et al. (2011) was fundamentally flawed and showed that 
the approach used was ‘statistically underpowered in this context’ (Hsiang, et al., 
2015, p. 3). 
Carleton, et al. (2016) constitutes the most up to date review of the relationship 
between climate and conflict. The authors argue that although initial studies 
concluded that the link between climate and conflict was inconclusive, the availability 
of new and more reliable data improved both the techniques implemented and the 
findings from research, essentially proving a link between these two topics. In this 
paper, the authors re-analyse and summarise the findings from 56 empirical studies on 
the link between climate and conflict. The aggregated results show that, generally, 
intergroup conflicts (e.g. wars) are significantly affected by both positive temperature 
and negative precipitation shocks, whereas interpersonal conflict (e.g. homicides) 
reports a smaller significant effect for temperature. The authors identify two pathways 
that lead from climate shocks to conflict that gained wide support in the empirical 
literature: i) the decrease in productivity due to the climate shock decreases the 
opportunity cost for conflict. This thesis is supported by Chassang and Padro-i-Miguel 
(2009) and Miguel, et al. (2004); ii) physio-psychological causes, i.e. warmer 
temperatures influence the bodily production of hormones, neurotransmitters and 
neuromoderators, resulting in a more aggressive behaviour. This thesis is supported 
by Ranson (2014), Card and Dahl (2011) and Jacob, et al. (2007). Other authors that 
focussed on the connections between temperature and conflict are Burke, et al. 
(2009a), who found that warmer temperatures promote civil wars in Africa, and 
  
24 
Gartzke (2012) who conversely did not find a causal relationship between 
temperatures and interstate conflict.  
Barnett and Adger (2007) argue that climate change threatens human security by 
impacting the availability of natural resources, which in turn can affect conflict in 
certain circumstances. This view is also shared by Bächler (1999), Homer-Dixon 
(1999) and Kahl (2006). The case studies that support this connection are Rwanda 
(André and Platteau, 1998), Kenya (Kahl, 2006), the Philippines (Homer-Dixon, 
1994; Kahl, 2006), and Bangladesh (Swain, 1996), but other case studies identified 
different factors leading to conflict such as corruption or group marginalisation (e.g. 
Turner, 2004; Benjaminsen, 2008; Benjaminsen, et al., 2012). However, even for the 
case studies where support for this link was found, the literature found contrasting 
results, Rwanda being an example (Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1995).  
A series of authors focussed instead on rainfall patterns (proxy for climate change) 
and conflict. Miguel, et al. (2004) focussed on rainfall patterns and civil war in Africa 
finding a significant, inverse relationship, between rainfall and conflict, findings 
which are shared by Hendrix and Glaser (2007). Ciccone (2011) criticises these 
conclusions by arguing that the authors’ approach in accounting for rainfall patterns 
may be flawed, but Miguel and Satyanath (2011) illustrate that Ciccone’s (2011) 
critique lacks theoretical support. Hendrix and Salehyan (2012) found that extreme 
rainfall patterns (e.g. droughts and floods) increase the probability of conflict and 
Maystadt and Ecker (2014) found similar results for droughts and conflict in Somalia. 
Other studies used natural disasters as proxy for climate change and its relationship 
with conflict. Nel and Righarts (2008) found a positive relationship between natural 
disasters and conflict, especially in low- and middle-income countries. These findings 
are contrasted by Slettebak (2012), who found that natural disasters decrease the 
likelihood of civil war.  
Notwithstanding the conflicting findings presented by the literature, most authors 
agree on considering climate and environmental change and scarcity of resources as a 
stressor or catalyst for conflict (e.g. Gaub, 2012; Bleischwitz, et al., 2014). Whether 
countries and population will react violently to these pressures, will likely depend on 
social and political variables such as regime type and the perceived legitimacy of the 
government. For instance, Schleussner, et al. (2016) is a large quantitative study that 
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implements event coincidence analysis and tested the relationship between climate-
related disasters and conflict in countries with ethnic divisions. The study found no 
direct connection between climate calamities and conflict, however these events 
exacerbate the conflict potential in ethnically fractioned countries. 
2.6. Food and energy security, prices and conflict 
Previous research explored the interconnections between food security and conflict, 
with some authors arguing about the existence of a vicious cycle between food 
security, food prices and conflict (Devereux and Maxwell, 2001; Auyero and Moran, 
2007; Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Raleigh, et al., 2015). Indeed, research has 
highlighted a positive relationship between global scarcity of food and increases in 
international food prices (Godfray, et al., 2010; Raleigh, et al., 2015; Puma, et al., 
2015), with some authors arguing that this relationship is a self-reinforcing feedback 
in itself (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011). However, price spikes are not the only 
consequence of food insecurity: research has shown the existence of a positive 
relationship also between global scarcity of food and increased probability of conflict 
(Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Raleigh, et al., 2015). Indeed, Brinkman and Hendrix 
(2011) argue that food insecurity increases the chances of a democratic breakdown in 
politically fragile countries and that the feedback between food insecurity and conflict 
is self-reinforcing. At the same time, high international food prices can impact food 
security (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Hendrix and 
Brinkman, 2013; Bellemare, 2014; Smith, 2014; Raleigh, et al., 2015) and the 
political stability of countries (Seddon and Walton, 1994; Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; 
Bates, 2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013), also causing political changes at the national 
level (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011).  
Raleigh, et al. (2015) explored these interconnections by analysing data for African 
countries and found that climate variability indirectly affects the occurrence of 
conflict through food prices. Indeed, the authors found that low levels of rainfall can 
cause an increase in the prices of food, which can give life to a self-reinforcing 
feedback between price of food and violent conflict. The authors add that, due to the 
high levels of financial aid present in conflict-affected regions, food price volatility is 
more likely than price increases in these instances. Finally, the authors argue that 
climate variability and prices affect countries differently. This adds to the theory that 
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political and economic characteristics of countries are critical in whether states 
experience conflict, a view that is shared by other authors (Nordås and Gleditsch, 
2007; Raleigh and Urdal, 2007; Theisen, 2008; Barnett, 2010). 
Similarly, Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) argue that food insecurity is neither a 
sufficient nor necessary condition for conflict and that countries are more likely to 
experience conflict if already politically fragile, an opinion which I share. However, 
Mitchell, et al. (2015) argue that fragile countries tend to be those most at risk of food 
insecurity. Indeed, Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) argue that fragile states are usually 
characterised by high imports of food, which exposes them to high international food 
prices and price fluctuations. Finally, authors such as Reenock, et al. (2007) and 
Østby (2008) observe that in the conflict equation, the critical variable is not absolute 
food insecurity, but rather how this is distributed within and between groups. 
Interestingly, some authors disagree on the hypothesis that positive shocks in world 
prices (i.e. increase in prices) are a trigger for conflict, arguing that whether this 
results in higher levels of conflict depends on the social group taken into account. 
Positive price shocks have positive effects on farmers and food producers, whilst 
negatively impact the income of consuming households. Negative price shocks mirror 
these effects. The findings from McGuirk and Burke (2016) endorse this hypothesis: 
the authors evaluated the effect of shocks in world prices on the occurrence of civil 
conflict in Africa distinguishing between food producers and consumers and found 
that positive price shocks reduce conflict in areas that produce food and increase the 
likelihood of violence from net food consuming areas. The authors use their findings 
to distinguish between two types of conflict related to food price shocks: factor and 
output conflict. The first type involves struggles to control territories, whereas the 
second refers to conflict over the appropriation of surplus. In case of a positive price 
shock, the first type of conflict is discouraged in food producing areas, whereas the 
second type increases. In net food consuming areas, both types of conflict increase. 
The authors also warn that food price projections to 2050 suggest an increase in both 
types of conflict. 
Weezel (2016) is also critical of the connection between international food prices and 
violence. The author undertakes a quantitative analysis on African countries between 
1990 and 2011 and finds a significant relationship between high food prices and 
increase in violence, using a country-specific food price index based on a country’s 
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food-import pattern. However, the effect of food prices is relatively small, consisting 
in an additional violent event in a country in a month for two standard deviation 
increase in the food price index. In addition, when trying to use his model for 
predictions, the addition of the food price index as independent variable does not 
improve the model’s prediction greatly, immediately questioning the validity of the 
relationship between international food prices and violence. This is a clear example of 
the subjective bias mentioned by Salehyan (2014) in the authors’ interpretation of 
their own results, as the presentation of the author’s results suggests that he expected 
to find the opposite result, i.e. a non-significant relationship between food prices and 
conflict. Similarly to Weezel (2016), Weinberg and Barker (2014) evaluated the 
relationship between national food prices and social unrest coming to similar, 
although less critical, conclusions: the authors find a positive, significant relationship 
between the two variables, recommending the inclusion of food prices in any study on 
conflict. 
As for the connection between energy resources, energy prices and conflict, these 
dynamics are underexplored in the current literature. In fact, specific literature mainly 
focussed on oil resources. For instance, Le Billon and Cervantes (2009) found a 
positive relationship between oil scarcity, oil prices and the occurrence of conflict. 
Their findings agree with the larger literature on scarcity of resources and conflict that 
supports a positive connection between the two topics. However, the authors argue 
that this literature fails to account for oil prices, tensions between countries over oil 
reserves and international geopolitics, which need to be included in future studies to 
capture the full picture. Similarly, Cotet and Tsui (2013) quantitatively analysed oil 
availability and connections with conflict. By analysing data on world oil explorations 
and discoveries, they evaluate how oil availability affects the incidence of violent 
conflict. Their results show no trace of this connection, rather, oil-abundant 
nondemocratic countries have larger defence expenditures, which the authors explain 
as the increasing cost of these countries to defend their natural endowments from 
external appropriation. The authors admit the presence of a large amount of noise in 
their data. Elaborating further on their findings, these perfectly fit with the resource 
curse hypothesis and the idea of conflict over the abundance of natural resources, 
which, in the cases analysed by the authors, were possibly prevented by the large 
expenditures in defence.  
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Bruckner, et al. (2012) focussed their analysis on oil prices and democracy. By 
analysing the effects of oil price shocks on democracy between 1960 and 2006, the 
authors found that increases in international oil prices result in higher levels of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for countries that are net oil exporters, which in turn results 
in more democratic institutions in these countries. However, the effects are rather 
small. Ebel and Menon (2000) through a careful analysis of the power relationships in 
the Caspian area with its natural endowments of energy resources such as natural gas 
and oil, warn that revenues from sales of energy resources is the critical factor that 
could destabilise the region, sparking conflict. Particularly, the authors point out that 
the misuse of these revenues could increase tensions and conflict between and within 
countries located in this area, where borders are highly disputed, both for the 
appropriation of resources, but also for discontent in populations when the revenues 
are employed to cause shifts in the balance of power rather than being invested in 
social support. However, their analysis is solely theoretical and descriptive. 
Literature that explores the impact of the price of commodities more generally also 
applies to energy resources. For instance, Besley and Persson (2008) found that 
increases in the prices of exported and imported commodities can result in a higher 
incidence of conflict within countries. However, the authors acknowledge the 
limitations of the data and method they use. Conversely, in their study on Sub-
Saharan Africa between 1981 and 2006 Brückner and Ciccone (2010) found that a 
drop in the price of commodities exported to OECD countries increases the risk of 
civil war in African countries. Dube and Vargas (2013) tested two theories on how 
commodity price shocks affect the occurrence of conflict: i) the ‘opportunity cost 
effect’, i.e. positive price shocks can lower conflict by increasing labourers’ pay, 
which reduces the push to appropriate resources violently and ii) the ‘rapacity effect’, 
i.e. an increase in the contestable income results in an increase in gains from 
appropriation, which in turn can result in increased violence. By analysing data on 
Colombia’s exports of oil and coffee, evidence shows that a negative price spike for 
coffee in 1990 is consistent with the opportunity cost effect, since it decreases 
labourer’s pay thus lowering the opportunity cost of people joining armed forces, and 
results in different levels of conflict as a demonstration of malcontent in the zones 
where coffee was cultivated. Conversely, a positive price spike for oil is consistent 
with the rapacity effect, with increased conflict in the oil-producing regions for 
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appropriation of the resource. The authors add that these patterns remain valid for 
other agricultural and natural resources and conclude that price shocks affect the 
incidence of conflict in different directions according to the type of commodity.  
Bazzi and Blattman (2014) argue that previous literature came to different 
conclusions due to differences in the timeframe covered in the studies, but also due to 
theoretical and methodological issues, such as the non-disaggregation of the shocks 
and the failure to account for the dependence of data typical of time-series. With their 
study the authors also found evidence of the opportunity cost effect, but challenge the 
rapacity effect. The authors analyse the effect of exports price shocks for different 
commodities in developing countries and find that price shocks have no influence on 
the outbreak of new conflicts, thus challenging what they call the ‘state-prize theory’4: 
rather, they find that rising prices of different commodities lead to shorter and less 
deadly (on-going) wars. Their findings also support the ‘opportunity cost effect’. 
2.7. Definition and dynamics of food and fuel riots 
The previous section showed different types of conflict. One of the main distinctions 
is between inter-state and intra-state conflicts and, as highlighted in the paragraphs, 
both can be environmentally driven. Recent research has found that since the 
dissolution of the USSR, political analysis increasingly focussed on intra-state rather 
than inter-state conflicts (Carment, et al., 2011; Carment and Samy, 2012), probably 
in response to an increasing trend in this direction (Evans, 1994; Hensel, 2002). For 
this reason, this research focussed on two specific types of environmentally driven, 
intra-state conflict: food and fuel riots.  
2.7.1. Definition of food and fuel riots 
Several studies have tried to understand the dynamics that lie behind the occurrence 
of food riots and some tentatively quantified them. However, as frequently happens in 
research, one of the key differences between these studies were the definitions used to 
classify these episodes, i.e. food riots, hence leading to databases whose length varied 
widely and whose analyses led to very different results. The main distinction between 
the different definitions is whether the events need to involve the use of violence. 
                                                 
4 Referred above as the ‘rapacity effect’. 
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Arguably, the motivation behind this choice was very much due to the desired size of 
the database as, fortunately, violent protests related to scarcity or price of food are 
uncommon. The inclusion of non-violent forms of protest allowed authors to compile 
larger databases, hence allowing the use of more robust quantitative analyses (e.g. 
Bellemare, 2014). Other differences in the definition used to collect data on food riots 
related to the number of people involved and the reason behind the social upheaval, 
i.e. scarcity of food or high food prices (e.g. Cuesta, 2014). The definition used 
throughout this work was coined by a recently-published report from the Food Price 
Watch: “a food riot here is defined as: a violent, collective unrest leading to a loss of 
control, bodily harm or damage to property, essentially motivated by a lack of food 
availability, accessibility or affordability, as reported by the international and local 
media, and which may include other underlying causes of discontent” (Cuesta, 2014, 
p. 1). I chose this definition because of its comprehensiveness and for the reputation 
of the organisation that published the report, i.e. World Bank (WB).  
The term ‘fuel riots’ was, as frequently happens, coined by the media, and the 
definition of this type of events is unclear. In addition, there is no mention of fuel riots 
in academic literature, which makes the research provided in this thesis completely 
novel. Based on the newspaper articles reporting of the occurrence of fuel riots (see 
Appendix 2), the term fuel riot refers to a violent upheaval related to scarcity, price or 
policy affecting fuel subsidies, i.e. both pledge of their institution or demonstration 
against their removal. The term ‘fuel’ is deceptively broad, which makes it difficult to 
identify which energy resource is the subject of the grievance. Amongst the 
newspaper articles reviewed for this thesis it was found that this term was mainly used 
to refer to petrol and its synonyms (e.g. gasoline for American English), natural gas in 
one case (Russell, 2011) or simply fuel. The simplest definition of fuel cites: “any 
substance burned as a source of heat or power, such as coal or petrol” (Collins, 2016), 
which can include any type of fossil fuels, i.e. coal, oil, natural gas. Since a clear 
definition of fuel riots was missing, this research adapted the definition given of food 
riots to define fuel riots replacing the word ‘food’ with ‘fuel’. In the first instance, this 
research will interpret fuel riots as ‘oil riots’ because, as it will be explained in 
Chapter 4.2.2, oil is the only energy resource with a truly international market and 
prices which, as will be presented in that section, is a key variable in explaining the 
occurrence of fuel riots. 
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2.7.2. Drivers of food and fuel riots 
Violent uprisings related to the price of food or scarcity thereof have been occurring 
for the past four centuries (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Berazneva and Lee, 2013; 
Smith, 2014; Bellemare, 2014; Demarest, 2014). However the latest wave of food 
riots occurred in 2008 triggered increased research on this type of event. O’Brien 
(2012) compared the 2008 food riots with the other most prominent food riots 
occurred in Britain during the 18th Century, trying to identify key differences and 
similarities. The main difference noted by the author regards the target and 
motivations of the riots: historical riots in Britain tended to target people in charge of 
food management and distribution, whereas the more recent wave targeted the 
government establishment more generally. In particular, O’Brien (2012) argues that 
the 2008 food riots may have initially been motivated by issues around lack of access 
to food, to then transform in a generalised dissent and discontent with the current 
establishment. 
Since 2008 research has thus been focussing on the drivers of food riots, which 
notably are food insecurity (Lagi, et al., 2011; Crawley, et al., 2012) and high 
international food prices (Hendrix, et al., 2009; Lagi, et al., 2011; Gaub, 2012; 
Crawley, et al., 2012; Bellemare, 2014; Smith, 2014; Bleischwitz, et al., 2014).  
Starting from the connection between food availability and the occurrence of food 
riots, several authors argue that countries are more likely to experience food riots in 
case of food production shocks (e.g. King, et al., 2015) or if a country is a net food 
importer (e.g. Lagi, et al., 2011). However, these arguments are challenged by part of 
the literature. For instance, Buhaug, et al. (2015) analysed the indirect effects of food 
production shocks on the occurrence of food riots in Sub-Saharan Africa. The authors 
found no evidence of a link between reduced agricultural output and an increase in the 
incidence of food riots. This opinion is shared by several other authors who believe 
that scarcity of food is not a direct cause of food riots, but rather a catalyst (e.g. 
Sneyd, et al., 2013).  
A different perspective is provided by Legwegoh, et al. (2015) who focus on diets and 
hence food security. The authors note that most of the countries struck by food riots in 
2008 did not experience food shortages and by implementing a mixed method study 
on Cameroon, they found that people’s propensity to riot is conditional to their diets, 
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i.e. when the price of a staple that they consider essential increases making it 
unaffordable, this may exacerbate the households’ willingness to riot. However, 
different willingness to riot was associated to different food groups. The authors thus 
echo Demarest (2014) and Hossain and Kalita (2014) in arguing that to achieve a 
better understanding of the reasons why some countries rioted, future research needs 
to take into account people’s diets (what staples are central for a certain culture) 
and/or society and local political, economic and social factors as to what are the most 
important responsibilities that populations attribute to the government. Finally, the 
authors do not find any significant relationship between food riots and demographic 
variables such as age and unemployment, at least for this case study.  
As for the relationship between international food prices and food riots, previous 
studies such as Hendrix, et al. (2009) and Berazneva and Lee (2013) found a 
significant positive relationship between these two variables. In particular, Hendrix, et 
al. (2009) found that this relationship is non-linear, with the distribution of these 
events skewed towards the extremes of the price distribution, and bidirectional, with 
both price increases and decreases causing these events.  
Lagi, et al. (2011) is one of the most widely cited pieces of literature on food prices 
and food riots. The authors compiled a database of food riots for North Africa and 
Middle East covering the period of the Arab Spring and calculated a threshold for the 
international price of food over which food riots are more likely to occur. This 
threshold is set at 210 of the nominal Food and Agriculture Organisation Food Price 
Index (FAO FPI). Notwithstanding the merits of this paper, a careful review of the 
methodology implemented by the authors posed questions about the robustness of 
their findings. In particular, the authors fail to provide a definition of food riot used to 
compile their database, which also included entries (newspaper articles) that regarded 
generalised Arab Spring protests against the government rather than food riots. 
Finally, the method implemented by the authors to calculate the threshold for the FAO 
FPI is unclear and the paper was never published in a peer-reviewed journal, which 
leads to question the robustness of their results. 
Bellemare (2014) investigates both food price increases and food price volatility as 
possible causes of food riots, offering a more in-depth perspective. The author uses 
monthly data at the global level for the period 1990 – 2011, econometrically testing 
the relationship between these two price variables and the occurrence of food riots. 
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His results show no significant connection between food price volatility and the 
occurrence of food riots, whereas food price increases significantly affect this type of 
event, also providing causal evidence between the first two dynamics. In fact, the 
author’s findings show a decrease in the likelihood of food riots when the volatility in 
the international price of food is high, which he justifies as an increased revenue for 
the rural, food producing areas, which are usually the most fragile and the most likely 
to take the streets. However, an in-depth review of the article raised concerns on the 
author’s database on food riots, in particular, this could not be reproduced as it was 
collected through newspaper search engines that require an academic subscription, 
and, in addition, these databases add and remove entire newspapers at their own 
discretion, making the reproduction of the author’s database (and hence results) 
difficult. 
Berazneva and Lee (2013) specifically analysed the 2007 – 2008 food riots in African 
countries and compared the economic, social and political characteristics of countries 
that experienced food riots against those that did not. The authors found that the 
African countries that did experience food riots were characterised by higher levels of 
poverty, larger populations, lower food production, were heavily impacted by a 
negative food production shock, fewer political rights, lower levels of civil liberties, 
less foreign aid and located on the coast.  
Some authors argued that international prices for food rarely translate perfectly into 
national prices for the same commodities (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Smith, 2014; 
Raleigh, et al., 2015). Indeed, this depends on structural factors such as the country’s 
level of dependency on imported food and the competitiveness on the market (WFP, 
2009), but also, as will be presented later in the text, governments use different 
instruments to shield domestic markets from international prices, such as trade 
barriers, taxes and subsidies, and government interventions (WFP, 2009). 
Notwithstanding these factors, Smith (2014) still found a positive relationship 
between a sudden increase in domestic food prices and urban unrest. 
Hendrix, et al. (2009) highlight the importance of the type of regime: in their study on 
data between 1961 and 2006 for 55 African cities, the authors found that autocracies 
experience fewer food riots than democracies, although hybrid regimes experience 
more food riots than democracies. The explanation provided by the authors is that 
autocracies are more successful at repressing protests, which are tolerated in 
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democracies, whereas hybrid systems usually show weak accountability processes, 
which leads their populations to protest. Indeed, several authors have found that food 
riots are more likely to occur in countries with low income (Von Braun, et al., 2008; 
Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; Lagi, et al., 2011) and with low government effectiveness 
(von Braun, 2008; Lagi, et al., 2011). In a more recent paper with a longer time-frame 
(1961 – 2010), Hendrix and Haggard (2015) confirm their preliminary results on the 
difference between democracies and autocracies, with the former experiencing more 
food riots than the latter. The authors also add to their previous arguments for why 
democracies see more food riots than autocracies the different set of policies 
implemented by these two types of regimes: democracies are more likely to 
implement policies that favour rural areas, which are often detrimental to the urban 
populations (Hendrix and Haggard, 2015). This last argument is supported by Carter 
and Bates (2011): in their research the authors found an initial connection between 
food prices and the occurrence of food riots, which however disappears once 
accounting for countries’ agricultural policies. According to their models, countries 
that implement policies that favour the urban population in case of a food price shock 
are less likely to experience food riots. Crawley, et al. (2012) challenge the evidence 
that sees democracies more prone to food riots than autocracies. In their research they 
found that democratisation reduces the likelihood of food riots. In addition, these 
authors found that poverty and income inequality directly and positively affect the 
occurrence of food riots. 
Some authors argue that another main cause of food riots, particularly during the 2008 
global food crisis, was the effective or prospected removal of food subsidies 
(Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011). Government price subsidies are defined as ‘policy 
interventions engendering a deviation of consumer or producer prices from 
appropriate benchmark levels’ (IMF, 2008, p. 5). Developed, developing and low-
income countries normally subsidise the prices of food and energy resources to ensure 
their affordability, especially when the prices increase (IMF, 2008; Hendrix, et al., 
2009). However, these constitute an onerous expenditure when the price of imported 
goods spikes, especially for poor countries5. As will be presented in Chapter 4, the 
                                                 
5 See IMF (2008) for an in-depth explanation of food and energy subsidies and a review of subsidies 
currently in place. 
  
35 
newspaper articles gathered to compile the databases of food and fuel riots used in 
this research often mentioned as one of the causes of the violent protests either the 
effective or threatened removal of food or fuel subsidies. 
Other authors focussed instead on the consequences of food riots. Food riots are 
widely believed to negatively affect the political stability of countries (Crawley, et al., 
2012) and that the political instability and unrest created can spread to neighbouring 
countries (Lagi, et al., 2011) and through networks (Puma, et al., 2015). Goldstone 
(2011), for instance, argued that these events can trigger larger grievances such as 
civil wars, like in the case for the French Revolution and the Arab Spring. According 
to the author, these events usually take place in urban areas that experience fast 
urbanisation, where underlying pressures and malcontents are exacerbated by rising 
food prices, which are simply a demonstration of the population’s disapproval of an 
inept government. The idea that food riots are simply a trigger for larger grievances is 
shared by other authors (e.g. O'Brien, 2012). On the same line, Gaub (2012) 
developed a theoretical framework based on the events of the Arab Spring. The author 
focuses on the importance and interplay between three main elements: (i) root causes 
or conditions for conflict; (ii) catalysts of conflict; and (iii) triggers of conflict. The 
author argues that the presence of structural conditions for instability (e.g., scarcity of 
natural resources, unequal income distribution or large population growth) is not 
sufficient to produce conflict. Indeed, the author’s main argument is that the 
identification and analysis of “catalysts of instability” is key to understanding conflict 
potential. These can be seen as sudden changes in the above-mentioned conditions 
(e.g., a rapid increase in the unemployment rate of a country or spikes in food prices). 
Once a situation has reached conflict potential by adding a catalyst to one or more 
root causes, there is still the need for a trigger to boost the conflict likelihood. These 
could be natural disasters, new elections or, as in the case of the Arab Spring, an 
isolated event of social distress, like the episode that is commonly known as the 
starting point of the Arab Spring, when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire as a 
protest for too high prices of food. This type of analysis is becoming mainstream as 
other authors define climate change, resource scarcity, a rapidly increasing population 
and volatility in prices as “stressors” or “stress multipliers” (OECD, 2012; 
Bleischwitz, et al., 2014; Cuesta, 2014). Moreover, the presence of thresholds and 
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tipping-points in the fragility spectrum has increasingly been acknowledged in the 
recent literature (OECD, 2012).  
2.8. Formation of international prices for food and fuel 
As presented in the previous section, the international price of food is a critical driver 
of social unrest and, in particular, of food riots. Despite the lack of literature on fuel 
riots and their drivers, it is credible to believe that the same dynamics that characterise 
and drive food riots also apply to fuel riots. For this reason, this section will also 
explore the drivers of fuel prices. 
Literature on the drivers that led to the recent food price spikes seems to agree on a 
few key factors. However, different authors disagree about the importance of each 
factor in the lead up to the price spikes. Literature on price formation generally 
disaggregates drivers of food prices into long- and short-run drivers, with the former 
driving the underlying trend and the latter determining short-term volatility. For 
instance, Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) identify as demand-side long-run drivers – or 
what the authors call structural factors – of international food prices i) higher income 
levels and demand, ii) population growth and iii) demand for biofuels. The supply-
side long-run drivers they identify are i) scarce investments in the agriculture sector 
and low levels of productivity growth and ii) low national food stocks. Amongst the 
short-run factors that determine international food prices, the authors note on the 
demand side i) low exchange rates for US$ and ii) speculation, whereas on the supply 
side we find i) energy prices, i.e. which influence the prices of key agricultural inputs 
such as fertilisers, mechanisation and transport, ii) low exchange rates for US$, iii) 
food production shocks due to climate variability, iv) export restrictions and v) violent 
conflict. Several different authors (e.g. Roache, 2010; Trostle, 2011; Tadesse, et al., 
2014) generally agree on the importance of most of these factors. 
Now explaining some of the less intuitive factors, one of the most widely cited drivers 
of the 2008 food price spike is the Australian drought occurred in the same year. Lagi, 
et al. (2015) debunked this common belief by correlating Australia’s and global food 
production. Australia’s food production only constitutes around 1.8% of global grain 
production, which is insufficient to explain the magnitude of the price shock 
registered. However, the authors neglect to comment on the fact that such a shock 
could be enough to bring an already fragile system over the edge. Similarly, Coulibaly 
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(2013) and King, et al. (2015) cite the unfavourable weather in Eastern Europe and 
Russia as one of the factors of the 2011 international food price spike. However, to 
the best of my knowledge, the impact of these droughts on prices have not been 
formally evaluated. 
Changing diets is another widely cited factor that may drive food prices. In particular, 
developing countries such as India and China have achieved higher incomes due to 
economic development, which resulted in an increased demand for meat (Brown, 
1995). A shift from grains- to meat-based diets could heavily affect the demand for 
specific grains, since livestock is fed specific crops. However, authors are sceptical on 
the relevance of this factor (e.g. Bobenrieth, et al., 2013). For instance, Lagi, et al. 
(2015) argues that this increased demand was mainly met internally by the countries, 
as they remained net food exporters throughout the period. 
Headey (2011) fundamentally agrees with the long- and short-run drivers of 
international food prices listed by Brinkman and Hendrix (2011). The author provides 
an in-depth account of the events that led to the 2008 international food price spike. 
Amongst the demand-side long-run drivers of food prices, the author cites demand for 
biofuels, which during 2007 – 2008 absorbed 30% of US’ maize production. The 
notion of biofuels as long-run drivers of international food prices is however highly 
contested. Gilbert (2010) is one of the authors that did not find this variable critical 
for the 2008 food price spike. Lagi, et al. (2015) is the most recent and, in my opinion, 
robust study on drivers of food prices. The authors successfully modelled the price 
trends between 2004 and 2011. The model highlights that the underlying upward 
trend in international food prices is due to an increasing production of biofuels, which 
is due to an increasing demand for this alternative fuel and to US policies promoting 
their production. This trend effectively reduces the share of agricultural output 
destined to human consumption both by redirecting the production of current crops 
suitable for the production of biofuels and by replacing the cultivation of crops 
destined to human consumption, which are not as profitable. This causes an imbalance 
between supply and demand of food destined for human consumption at the 
international level, which causes prices to increase.  
The model developed by Lagi, et al. (2015) also successfully recreated the 2008 and 
2011 price spikes by introducing a variable that represented speculation in the food 
futures markets. These markets function as insurance on crops: food producers and 
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buyers agree a price at which future crops will be sold, in order to insure the goods 
against possible negative future price shocks. The scarce regulations that characterise 
these markets allowed the development of ‘index funds’ that enable investors 
(speculators) to place bets on future commodities price spikes (Worthy, 2011). These 
findings suggest that the elimination of restrictions to investments in commodity 
markets and governmental policies in support of biofuels (ethanol) are the two main 
factors that directly concurred to generate the 2008 and 2011 food price spikes. 
Robles and Cooke (2009) and Gilbert (2010) also found that speculation on futures 
markets could have contributed to the price spikes. Irwin, et al. (2009), instead, found 
contradictory evidence and Sanders and Irwin (2010) and Headey and Fan (2008) 
noted that commodities with lower speculative capital showed higher price spikes 
than commodities with large speculative capital. 
Headey (2011) agrees with Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) that rising oil prices was a 
critical factor that contributed to the food price spikes. Oil prices also registered 
higher levels6, which caused further pressure on food prices by rising costs of trade 
and transport. Lagi, et al. (2015) also elaborate on this factor, arguing that it may have 
played a part. However, a careful analysis of the time-series showed the peak in oil 
prices occurring after that in food prices, which led the authors to believe that both 
peaks were a result of the same dynamics, i.e. speculation on commodity markets.  
On the supply side, Headey (2011) cites the mismatch between production and 
consumption of food during the 80s and 90s as a possible factor contributing to the 
food price spikes. This was due to the low real prices, which hindered investments in 
increasing food production, which showed slack for the following two decades. 
During this period, countries used their national stocks of food as a buffer, which 
avoided price increases, leading the author to consider low food stocks as a short-run 
factor of prices. Countries use these resources as a buffer to cover short-term food 
shortages, but also tend to use these stocks strategically by either releasing them onto 
the markets when the price is high to gain revenues and, simultaneously, control 
prices, but they can also decide to accumulate them in case of future food shortages or 
to push prices up. Whether food stocks have an impact on international prices is 
indeed a highly contended issue. Headey and Fan (2008) argue that in the run up to 
                                                 
6 See later in the text for an account of the dynamics that drive fuel prices. 
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the 2008 price spike, China’s decision to reduce excessive food stocks at the 
beginning of the decade was critical. When the food price spiked, low stocks meant 
that there was no buffer that countries could use. Lagi, et al. (2015) provide a different 
perspective on food stocks: the authors found that a price model based on food stock 
dynamics predicts well the trend in food prices up to the year 2000, but not 
afterwards. The authors explain that food stocks followed different dynamics during 
the price spikes due to speculation rather than interaction between supply and 
demand. Similarly, Tadesse, et al. (2014) found the role of stocks not significant in 
explaining food price volatility and price spikes. Bobenrieth, et al. (2013) provide 
further insights: the authors argue that a food production shock is not sufficient to 
create a price spike, but needs to be coupled with low stocks of food as the buffer that 
these normally provide does not exist. Although the authors agree that stocks are 
endogenous and do not drive prices, they found that the Stock-to-Use Ratio (ratio 
between national stocks and national consumption) is a good indicator of a country’s 
vulnerability to price shocks. 
Another supply-side factor cited by Headey (2011) is the low-exchange rates for the 
US$. Indeed, the low-interest rates that characterised the housing and stock markets, 
particularly in the US could have redirected investments to futures on commodity 
markets and foreign currencies. This could have resulted in the depreciation of the 
US$, which could have in turn boosted exports, causing higher prices in the US and 
lower prices everywhere else. The incidence of this factor is unclear in the current 
literature: Mitchell (2008) found that the depreciation of the US$ concurred to the 
development of the price spikes by 20%, whereas Abbott, et al. (2011) argued that 
this figure is around 50%. Lagi, et al. (2015) found a correlation between peaks in 
prices and exchange rates, but their analysis suggests that this is probably due to both 
dynamics depending on the same factors, rather than causality. 
As mentioned above, export restrictions is one of the factors that several authors cite 
as critical in determining the 2008 and 2011 food price spikes. Indeed, during both 
peaks countries implemented trade policies to protect national markets from rising 
international food prices. These took the form of export quotas or higher export taxes, 
export bans, reduction or removal of import tariffs, and higher national subsidies 
(Trostle, 2011), with export restrictions being the most impactful. Indeed, in the wake 
of the rising food prices countries such as India, Thailand and China implemented 
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trade restrictions, which contributed to generate panic behaviours in the international 
market (Yang, et al., 2008; Headey, 2011; Martin and Anderson, 2011). The 
successfulness of these measures in shielding internal markets from high international 
prices is contested (see Tadesse, et al., 2014; Puma, et al., 2015 for two contrasting 
opinions) and most authors also point to the negative effects on the international 
markets: the main effect is a curtailed supply and the trigger of a chain reaction of 
panic behaviours, such as aggressive buying and other countries implementing export 
bans. These promote uncertainty and push prices even further (Tadesse, et al., 2014), 
developing what Puma, et al. (2015) call a ‘multiplier effect’. 
Now focussing on fuel prices, fossil resources are, as mentioned earlier in the text, 
non-renewable. The most famous system implemented in environmental economics to 
define prices of non-renewable resources is the ‘Hotelling’s Rule’ (Perman, et al., 
2003). The rule is derived by its inventor, Harold Hotelling, and postulates that the 
price of a non-renewable resource needs to increase by the same amount as the 
interest rate to cover for the opportunity cost of the lost revenue that would result 
from the extraction and sale of the resource (Hotelling, 1931). The price behaviour 
resulting from this rule is an exponential growth of prices, which, in its most basic 
form, does not find evidence in the real world. More realistic economic theories such 
as those presented in Section 2.1 of this chapter have tried to develop models that 
could explain the prices of non-renewable resources. In particular, it is common 
knowledge that prices of non-renewable resources should, in theory, reflect the 
scarcity (or abundance) of the resource. Simply put, this is due to the finite nature of 
these resources and to the diverse quality and accessibility of ores present in the 
Earth’s crust. The increasing scarcity of the resource and the idea that accessible 
deposits are those discovered and exploited first, should result in a cost of extraction 
which increases linearly with time. Coupling this with basic neoclassic economics, the 
price should have a balancing action between supply and demand, increasing when 
production cannot meet supply, which results in a decrease in the demand and thus in 
an excess of supply, which should bring the price back down. This should bring the 
market to the equilibrium price, which, in case of perfect competition, should equal 
the cost of extraction of the resource. Obviously, this is another oversimplification of 
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reality7 and, as we will see shortly, the prices of non-renewable resources have not 
been following a clear and consistent path.  
Now focussing on the empirical literature, oil is the only energy resource whose 
market is effectively global and for which international prices are available, which is 
why this thesis will focus on oil prices. Several authors have tried to empirically 
identify the drivers of oil prices, also attempting to develop models to predict oil price 
fluctuations. The common opinion shared by the literature is that oil prices are 
difficult to predict and seem to follow an erratic path (Hamilton, 2009). This is mainly 
due to the complexity of the economic relations that characterise the energy system, 
but also by the several organisations and institutions involved, which all work towards 
different self-serving agendas (e.g. OPEC, national governments, etc.). In particular, 
several authors (e.g. Hamilton, 2009; Kilian, 2009) attribute the 2008 oil price spike 
to the increased oil demand from developing countries and global peak oil.  
To describe the 2008 peak, Kilian (2009) distinguishes between three types of shocks 
that can have different consequences for international prices: i) oil supply shocks, i.e. 
temporary disruption to oil supply; ii) aggregate demand shocks, i.e. shocks involving 
global demand for oil due to fluctuations in the global business cycle and iii) 
precautionary demand shocks, i.e. a change in the expectations about future 
availability of oil that induces countries to accumulate stocks. The author argues that 
the main consequence of the first type of shocks is a small and temporary increase in 
international oil prices during the first year, whereas the other two have a large and 
sustained impact on oil prices, which is immediate in the case of precautionary 
demand shocks and delayed in case of aggregate demand shocks. The author argues 
that historical and recent oil price shocks have been mainly driven by a combination 
of the last two types of shocks, which is contrary to what the main literature seems to 
indicate.  
Hamilton (2009) discussed a variety of factors such as speculation on commodity 
prices, increasing global demand for oil, time delays and physical limitations to oil 
supply, OPEC’s monopoly in setting global oil prices and scarcity rents (the cost of 
exhausting a non-renewable natural resource), arguing that all these possibly had an 
                                                 
7 For a more in-depth explanation of prices of non-renewable resources and for different economic 
models that have been proposed see Perman (2003). 
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influence on the price spike. However, the author identified three of these as key 
factors: i) low price elasticity of demand (the change in demand due to a change in 
prices), ii) increasing demand for oil from developing countries and iii) the inability 
of global supply to increase. These caused an initial pressure on prices, which in turn 
triggered increased speculation. The author also argues that scarcity rents will be 
permanently factored in future prices, which will ramp up and remain high once 
global peak oil will be reached.  
However, these hypotheses fail to explain the sudden crash of oil prices after the 
shock and the low price regime registered recently. Part of the reason for this recent 
lower price regime seems to have been political rather than driven by physical or 
social dynamics. Indeed, several journalistic pieces (e.g. Ahmed, 2015) point to Saudi 
Arabia as the main actor whose actions are keeping oil prices low. Speculating on the 
reasons behind its behaviour, the country has been engaging in a dumping action by 
keeping its production at record levels perhaps with the aim of driving other oil 
producers (e.g. Russia) who cannot sustain production with such low margins of 
revenue out of business. Another speculative hypothesis involves policies to tackle 
climate change and the increasingly affordable renewable energies. Saudi Arabia 
seems bound to reach peak oil in 2028 (Ebrahimi and Ghasabani, 2015) and the 
country may be trying to sell as much oil as possible in sight of a future ruling out of 
fossil fuels and the rise of renewable resources. In addition, by keeping international 
oil prices low, the investments in other sources of energy such as renewables and non-
conventional oil (e.g. through fracking) are effectively disincentivised. 
2.9. Systemic risk and cascading effects 
The dynamics presented in the previous sections have important consequences for the 
stability and resilience of the global system, both when considered singularly and in 
association. These can be localised, such as conflict between tribes, or a fully-fledged 
global multi-system crisis such as that occurred in 2008 (see below). What emerged 
clearly from the previous sections is that there is not one single cause or driver for 
each of the dynamics presented, rather multiple drivers can be responsible for 
triggering a specific dynamic. In addition, different dynamics can interact due to the 
high connectivity of the system, giving life to an extremely complex system where 
single drivers of specific dynamics are hard to identify. These conditions constitute 
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fertile ground for systemic risk and cascading effects: this term identifies the risk 
related to the whole system, due to the high interconnectivity between its components. 
For instance, a climate shock such as a prolonged drought could heavily affect the 
production of food of a region. As we have seen in the previous paragraph, if this 
region is key to the global food supply, this could start a chain reaction that could lead 
to high international food prices and social unrest. 
The concept of systemic risk is relevant for different disciplines such as finance (e.g. 
May, 2013), economics (e.g. Schweitzer, et al., 2009) and socio-ecological systems 
more in general (e.g. Filatova and Polhill, 2012). Recent literature developed different 
frameworks that try to capture and analyse systemic risk (e.g. Ostrom, 2009; Liu, et 
al., 2013). The most relevant and recent conceptual framework is that developed by 
Homer-Dixon, et al. (2015). In their paper, the authors argue that the events of 2008 
were part of an unprecedented set of crises, known as ‘Synchronous Failures’ (SF). 
This type of crisis originates within different singular SESs and is mainly driven by 
human interaction with the natural environment. The reasoning behind this conceptual 
framework is that the natural environment sustains humanity and its activities, which 
in turn affect the natural environment negatively by exhausting natural resources and 
driving environmental and climate change. These dynamics in turn feed back 
negatively on human activities. The authors identify three global trends that 
contribute, either in combination or isolation, to the development of SFs: i) the 
incessant increase in size of human activities as compared to the natural resources and 
processes on which they rely; ii) increasing connectivity between different 
components of human technological, economic and social systems and iii) rising 
homogenisation between different human cultures, practices and technologies. These 
drivers contribute to the development of SFs in three main ways: i) although these 
dynamics build up slowly in the system, these are potentially very powerful over time 
and generate simultaneous stresses for human societies; ii) these dynamics increase 
the likelihood of systemic risk and also help to synchronise different SESs, allowing 
for shocks to propagate farther and faster in the global network; iii) the higher 
connectivity generated results in less transparent systems and processes, whose 
dynamics and reactions are harder to predict. This in turn results in a lower adaptive 
capacity of societies. These ‘deep causes’ (Homer-Dixon, et al., 2015, p.3) translate 
into SFs through three processes: ‘long fuse big bang’, simultaneous stresses and 
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ramifying cascade. The first process regards the slow accumulation of the multiple 
stresses in one SES, which eventually results in a sudden, non-linear shift in the 
system’s behaviour. The second process regards the simultaneous occurrence of more 
than one stressor and, finally, the third process entails the shock to one of the nodes in 
the network, which, due to the high connectivity, generates cascading effects and 
propagation to neighbouring and distant countries. In SFs, these processes never 
appear singularly, but always as a combination of at least two or more. 
In other words, once the drivers of a crisis that have been developing within an SES 
have reached a critical tipping point by interacting with human structures (such as the 
economy) by affecting key dynamics (like prices), the crisis breaks out in that system. 
If the same happens in more than one SES, these can interact, speeding up the failure 
process and resulting in a globalised, systemic crisis. This generalised crisis can then 
translate in widespread political instability and deadly conflict, which then feeds back 
negatively on the environment and other human institutions that sustain our society 
(our political systems, for example), locking humanity in a never-ending vicious 
cycle. The notion of SF is a conceptual framework that can help to identify the 
environmental root causes and dynamics of this type of crisis. Homer-Dixon, et al. 
(2015) tested the framework on the 2008 global crisis and found that, in their opinion, 
this crisis was an interaction between three different crises that had slowly been 
building in three different SESs: food, energy and financial systems. These were 
driven by food and energy security-related issues and closely followed the three 
stages proposed by the authors to eventually translate in a generalised multi-system 
crisis. However, this framework is only theoretical and the same authors call for more 
empirical research in this matter. 
Another framework, which is now widely implemented in UK academia, is the 
‘Water, Energy, Food Nexus’. The Nexus approach simply entails the consideration 
of the interrelationships between the different natural resources, i.e. food, energy and 
water, whilst undertaking research in sustainability. As presented throughout this 
chapter, there exist synergies and trade-offs in the exploitation of natural resources 
and reinforcing feedbacks between society and the natural environment, which a 
nexus approach can help account for and/or study (De Laurentiis, et al., 2016). 
Now moving to the empirical literature, few authors assessed the potential systemic 
risk connected to different sectors of society. Zhang, et al. (2011) provide some 
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insights on the connections between past climate changes and societal crises. The 
authors quantitatively established that climate change was the main underlying cause 
of societal crises in preindustrial societies, which resulted in economic crises for the 
world. Indeed, their analysis highlighted that natural and social factors such as climate 
and environmental change, uncontrolled population and consumption growth and 
disparity in the distribution of resources, due to several interlinkages already 
highlighted in the previous paragraphs, can result in a generalised crisis. 
Puma, et al. (2015) focussed instead on the global food system, implementing social 
network analysis to evaluate its resilience. Their findings show that the high 
interconnectivity of the global food system makes it vulnerable to self-propagating 
disruptions in case of a climate-related extreme event and that interconnectivity on the 
trade network is increasing, with countries relying more and more on food imported 
by a few large producers. These dynamics are consistent with the view that greater 
connectivity in networks such as international trade make the system overall more 
robust to shocks that impact a random node, but also more fragile when the node 
impacted is at the centre of the network. Similarly, Suweis, et al. (2015) found that 
due to the increasing reliance of countries on food imports, the global food system is 
becoming less resilient and simultaneously more sensitive to external perturbations 
(e.g. shocks). 
Another example of empirical research involving systemic risk is Bleischwitz, et al. 
(2014), who implement a Nexus approach to map countries at risk of Nexus-driven 
conflict and who are central for the global supply of natural resources. The study 
identified 15 countries located in both Africa and Asia that are key supplier of natural 
resources for the global market, who also are at high risk of Nexus-related conflict. In 
the eventuality that any of these countries’ current fragilities was exacerbated by 
water or food crises, this could translate in a socio-economic breakdown due to their 
centrality in the international trade of key resources. 
2.10. Conclusions 
This chapter presented theories and evidence from literature on the different topics 
explored with this research. In particular, there seems to be an understanding of the 
finiteness of natural resources available on the planet. However, whether conflict 
could be one of the possible consequences of scarcity of natural resources is still an 
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open debate. Evidence of the connection between climate change and variability and 
conflict is overwhelmingly mixed, although the argument of subjective interpretation 
of the results by the researchers is compelling. However, there seems to be an 
agreement on a role of scarcity (Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; Baechler, 1999; Homer-
Dixon, 1999; Bocchi, et al., 2006; Kahl, 2006; Hendrix and Glaser, 2007; Urdal, 
2008; Burke, et al., 2009b; OECD, 2012; Raleigh, et al., 2015), climate change 
(Carty, 2012; FAO, 2013; Wheeler and von Braun, 2013; Zezima, 2014) and 
variability and price of food (Nomura, 2010; Lagi, et al., 2011; Zhang, et al., 2011; 
Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; Carter and Bates, 2011; OECD, 2012; Hsiang, et al., 
2013a; Barrett, 2013; Bellemare, 2014) as catalysts for conflict and increased 
fragility.  
As for food riots, literature overwhelmingly identified food prices (whether 
international or domestic) as the major driver, although the different effect of 
volatility and absolute values of (international) prices on food riots remains unclear. 
Research showed that the political conditions of countries play a critical role in the 
exacerbation of distress in reaction to high food prices, with mixed findings for 
different political regimes and the urban/rural narrative. In particular, the political 
fragility of countries seems to be both cause and consequence of food riots. Literature 
on fuel riots is instead non-existent. 
The challenges ahead of humanity are multiple and complex. Climate change is 
expected to increase global food insecurity (Rosegrant and Cline, 2003; Schmidhuber 
and Tubiello, 2007; Maxwell, et al., 2010; Godfray, et al., 2010; Huang, et al., 2011; 
Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Wheeler and von Braun, 2013) and international food price 
spikes are likely to become more common (Berazneva and Lee, 2013), with negative 
consequences for geopolitical stability through the occurrence of more frequent food 
riots (Smith, 2014). Currently, international trade helps feed 16% of the world 
population and this figure is bound to increase due to the growing world population 
(Fader, et al., 2013). This raises further concerns for the systemic risk related to 
international trade that can be exacerbated via trade restrictions and spikes in 
international prices, which requires further analysis (Wheeler and von Braun, 2013). 
In addition, the consequences for countries’ political fragility of a global peak-oil 
forecast for the first half of the 21st century are currently unknown. 
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Studies on global food security usually focussed on solutions to provide future 
balance between consumption and supply of food (Rosegrant and Cline, 2003; 
Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; Godfray, et al., 2010; Anderson, 2010; Calzadilla, 
Rehdanz and Tol, 2011) and a comprehensive account of how shocks to the global 
production of food propagate through the international food system to generate 
political instability and food riots is missing. The same is true for energy resources. In 
addition, the link between food and fuel resources and prices is currently 
underexplored.  
The study of the interconnections between scarcity of natural resources, their prices 
and the occurrence of riots was mainly undertaken with econometric techniques (e.g. 
Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Raleigh, et al., 2015), which lack the possibility of 
introducing and evaluating the effects of feedbacks between resource security, the 
international economy and the occurrence of riots. The interconnectedness of the 
dynamics highlighted throughout this chapter make these interactions worth exploring 
with a systemic approach to test the consequences of what-if scenarios and possible 
policy interventions to avoid a violent escalation. Several authors call for further 
research in the dynamics of the system and systemic risk through a modelling 
approach (Schweitzer, et al., 2009; Wheeler and von Braun, 2013; Raleigh, et al., 
2015; Puma, et al., 2015). One effective method that can start to disentangle the 
several relationships that characterise the complexity of the global food and energy 
systems is computer modelling. Previous literature has implemented this methodology 
to explore specific dynamics, which will be presented in the following chapter. 
Although different modelling techniques have been applied, a dynamic assessment of 
the processes that lead from food and energy insecurity to the occurrence of food and 
fuel riots is currently missing. The applications of different modelling techniques 
along with examples from the literature will be presented in the next chapter. 
The dynamics highlighted in this chapter classify this as a complex system and as 
such is characterised by non-linear behaviours and the presence of thresholds. The 
aim of this thesis is therefore to parameterise the global food and energy systems and 
study dynamics and interactions between scarcity of these two resources, their prices 
and the occurrence of food and fuel riots. Also, through the implementation of 
scenarios this thesis will explore the consequences of trade restrictions for prices and 
riots. This thesis will therefore contribute to the fields of environmental security, 
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global food and energy security, international economics and political science by 
exploring and quantifying dynamics related to the occurrence of food and fuel riots 
and, remarkably, opening a completely novel stream of research in fuel riots. 
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3. Methodology and methods implemented 
The literature review of the environmental security field presented in the previous 
chapter clearly identified a research gap: a lack of a holistic, systemic view of how the 
physical environment drives human conflict. In particular, this research addresses the 
lack of knowledge on how scarcity of natural resources affects the occurrence of food 
and fuel riots by interacting with human structures such as international trade of 
natural resources, their international prices and national political fragility. 
Due to the clear interconnectedness of these different systems and dynamics, a 
modelling approach was the most appropriate methodology to investigate these 
relationships. This chapter will explain in detail why a modelling approach was 
suitable as a methodology to approach these issues, whilst reviewing different general 
modelling approaches and more specifically simulation model paradigms. In addition, 
the ‘modelling journey’ will detail the fundamental steps that I went through to design 
my research. In conclusion, the architecture of the models developed in the following 
chapter will be introduced, detailing the single methods that were implemented and 
the reasons why these were chosen.  
3.1. Why modelling at all?  
Quantitative models are usually perceived by non-experts as complex and a high level 
of maths skills seems to be required to understand the assumptions and dynamics on 
which they are based. The same concern is experienced in relation to complexity 
itself: people in general feel incapable of dealing with this concept (Vester, 2007). 
This can sometimes be true, but what people usually fail to take into account is that 
models surround us in our everyday life and that we thrive in a huge complex system 
that is the world and to which we are interrelated. People use models in their everyday 
lives when shopping, when making decisions or simply when compiling schedules for 
the day. People make their decisions and act on them based on their mental image of 
the world, precisely because the real world is too complex to understand (Sterman, 
1991). 
“A model is a simplification – smaller, less detailed, less complex, or all of these 
together – of some other structure or system” (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005, p. 2). The 
authors Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005) and Epstein (2008) list the possible uses of 
simulations and, more generally, of models: i) increase the understanding of a specific 
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behaviour, entity or system; ii) make predictions of the future state of a system or a 
dynamic; iii) develop tools to substitute for human (in)capabilities; iv) guide data 
collection processes; v) suggest dynamics analogies; vi) formulate new questions; vii) 
support a methodology; viii) discover ranges of validity for specific outcomes; ix) 
highlight uncertainties in a system’s processes; x) investigate a system’s possible 
responses to crises; xi) highlight trade-offs and identify areas where efficiency gains 
can be achieved; xii) inform policy-dialogue; xiii) exogenously perturb a system to 
challenge the robustness of extant theories; xiv) demonstrate inconsistencies between 
common psychological constructs and real data; xv) reveal complexities in apparently 
simple systems; xvi) educate the general public; xvii) train and introduce novices to 
familiarise with a new subject; xviii) entertain with simulation-based videogames. 
Investigating the dynamics of a complex system is a complex task in itself. Complex 
systems are usually too big and complicated to ‘fit a human brain’ and are associated 
with specific properties (Waldrop, 1992; Ladyman, et al., 2013): 
1. Nonlinearity and numerosity. A simple system is a description of a process where 
its components, their interactions and outcomes are known. In a simple system a 
process can be tracked with accuracy from where it originates to where it ends, 
also being able to define how it operates. For instance, a perfectly linear 
relationship between two variables can be defined as a simple system, represented 
by a straight line. Complex systems usually consist of several components 
characterised by a high level of interaction, where relationships between the 
different variables included is non-linear and can be approximated with different 
types of function (e.g. power law or logistic). Often these relationships and their 
outcome are not fully known or understood.  
2. Feedbacks. A complex system is usually characterised by complex interactions 
among its components. A feedback can be defined as the reaction from a 
component or variable of the system that follows an action from a different 
component of the same system. Feedbacks can either be negative or positive. 
Negative feedbacks generate a balancing effect between two variables or 
components of the system and represent an inverse relationship. Conversely, 
positive feedbacks generate a reinforcing effect and represent a positive 
relationship (Forrester, 1971; Sterman, 2000; Mollona, 2008). 
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3. Indeterminacy of action. Complex systems are usually characterised by “a large 
number of uncoordinated interactions between [their] elements” (Ladyman, et al., 
2013, p. 39). The order in which these interactions occur is neither completely 
casual (random) nor follows a set schedule (Holland, 1995; Holland and Mallot, 
1998). 
4. Robustness and lack of central control. In complex systems, the order is said to be 
robust because, even if the system is perturbed by endogenous forces, it still 
remains stable. The exposure to internal perturbations of a centrally controlled 
system is higher. 
5. Emergence. In complex systems, the presence of a large number of components 
interacting with each other in a spontaneous order and with a lack of central 
control gives life to emergent patterns. Emergent patterns are those characteristics 
or behaviours resulting from a complex system that could not be captured by 
merely studying its single components in isolation (Holland, 1995; Holland and 
Mallot, 1998).  
6. Rigid but flexible structure. Complex systems are typically not decomposable – 
removing or changing one element may completely alter the behaviour of the 
system. However, a system can persist even after an alteration of its components, 
simply the system will undergo a reorganisation of its components and dynamics. 
7. Hierarchical organisation. A complex system is usually formed by several 
different sub-systems and components all interacting one with the others. These 
can be nested across a range of levels and can be organised in a hierarchical 
structure. 
The aim of this research was to investigate the interconnections between the scarcity 
of natural resources, their price on international markets, how they are traded 
internationally and how these dynamics, coupled with national political fragility, 
contribute to increasing the occurrence of food and fuel riots in countries. The process 
just described clearly fits the definition of a complex system, where the interaction 
between the several different components of the system, i.e. feedbacks, results in non-
linear relationships and emergent patterns. The main system, i.e. the world limited by 
the definition of the complex system subject of this study, consists of multiple 
subsystems organised in a hierarchy (e.g. for countries to be able to trade natural 
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resources they have to have produced them first), where the elements act in a 
spontaneous order without being controlled centrally. 
Starting from the complex system ‘world’ and its dynamics, the complexity was 
reduced by defining the boundaries around the subject of this research to include only 
five components: i) scarcity of natural resources, ii) prices of natural resources, iii) 
international trade of natural resources, iv) national political fragility of countries and 
v) how these components interact to affect the occurrence of food and fuel riots in 
countries. Although these limits have reduced the complexity involved in this 
research, the system that it aims to analyse is still too complex to ‘fit a human brain’. 
For this reason and because modelling allows the development of scenarios and the 
possibility to provide predictions for the system subject of the analysis, modelling 
constitutes one of the most effective approaches to undertake this research. 
3.2. Critical review of modelling paradigms 
As mentioned in the previous section, models are naturally embedded in our everyday 
lives. However, these models are usually a simple and informal representation of 
reality that exists in our minds. When models are subject of research and 
investigation, this picture of reality needs to be translated in a more formal 
formulation through the use of mathematical equations and/or with the help of 
statistics and computer modelling. 
3.2.1. Broad categories of models 
Independently from the type of model being developed, the quantitative formalisation 
of a system or its dynamics always implements mathematical statements. The most 
basic version of quantitative models are hence mathematical models, which can be 
defined as “an abstract, simplified, mathematical construct related to a part of reality 
and created for a particular purpose” (Bender, 2012, p. 2). These models describe the 
system in simple mathematical terms using a concise language. They comprise a 
system of (differential) equations that describes each component of the system, their 
change and how these are interrelated. This type of purely mathematical models is 
commonly used in the study of scientific subjects such as physics and biology.  
Other types of models build on mathematical models by expanding them to include 
different characteristics. One of the most useful classifications of some of the 
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different models used in economics is that proposed by Sterman (1991), who divides 
models in three broad classes: optimisation models, simulation models and 
econometric models. The main difference between these is the purpose of the model 
itself. The first ones are normative models, i.e. their purpose is to prescribe the best 
path (e.g. policy) to obtain the optimal outcome (e.g. rate of adoption for a new 
technology). One of their applications is in the industry sector, where their 
introduction helped developing methods to increase efficiency in production (e.g. The 
Kanban method, Price, et al., 1994). By modelling the production process through a 
set of equations, these models can determine the best values for various system 
parameters such as the number of machines required to execute a particular operation.  
The main limitations of this type of models are the fundamental assumption of the 
existence of linear relationships between the variables (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005), 
and the lack of interaction between them. Several studies have tried to overcome these 
limitations, hence developing a new set of modelling approaches: fuzzy models 
(Nelles, 2001); probabilistic non-linear models for optimization processes (Das and 
Dennis, 1998); optimisation and non-linear equations (Smyth, 1998) and Stochastic 
kernel (Quah, 1997). Although these recent methods introduced non-linearity in 
optimisation techniques, this brought along the characterising challenge of this type of 
dynamics: in non-linear systems there may be many local optima, and finding the 
global optimum, if it exists, can be difficult. Neoclassical economic theories generally 
rely on there being a single optimal state, which may not be the case in many real-
world systems. More generally, optimization models are static, and what is optimal 
for one set of actors may not be optimal from the point of view of another set – so 
optimization of what and for whom is a problem. 
Econometrics is a branch of statistics, which was developed and applied to economic 
studies and includes other techniques such as multivariate analysis. Econometric 
models shape and test the causal relations between one (or more) independent and one 
(or more) dependent variables by specifying the system with a set of equations. They 
do so by assigning values to the parameters using real data as input then assessing the 
impact of one unit change in the independent variable(s) on the dependent one(s), 
keeping all the rest constant. The magnitude of the impact is represented by the 
estimation of its associated coefficient. Every effect not explicitly formulated in and 
measured by the model is summarised in the error term. The accuracy and validity of 
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the model are tested by providing a forecast for the system. The main components of 
an econometric model are: i) specification, this formalises the model structure by 
identifying the relationships between the variables and expressing them in formal 
equations; ii) estimation, this identifies the statistical analyses needed to inform the 
parameters and weights of the different components of the model; iii) testing, this 
tests the relationships between the dependent and the independent variables; iv) 
forecasting, this allows the modeller to make predictions for the system based on the 
model specification and estimation. Econometric modelling presents important 
limitations: firstly, since econometrics heavily relies on statistical techniques to 
estimate parameters and functions included in the model, it suffers from the same 
drawbacks, such as the fact that everything that the model is not able to capture is 
summarised by an error term included in the main equation, or that the observations 
are usually assumed to be normally distributed (Johnson and Wichern, 2002; Grafen 
and Hails, 2002; Dekking, et al., 2005; Mazzocchi, 2008; Gujarati, 2012; Coolidge, 
2012). Finally, econometric models do not allow any dynamic representation of the 
feedbacks between the different variables and components of the system, which 
makes the analysis static and partial. Therefore, future predictions rely on the system 
being statistically stationary. During the years, efforts have been made to overcome 
some of these limitations, in particular focussing on clarifying the composition of the 
error term of the models through the development of additional tests. Despite these 
important limitations, econometric models are still widely used and implemented in a 
variety of sectors, the reason probably being their practical approach and the language 
they use (e.g. significance of the results), which is very common across different 
academic disciplines. 
Simulation models partially overcome some of the most important drawbacks of 
econometric modelling. In particular, these allow the introduction of dynamic 
feedbacks between the different components of the model. The purpose of a 
simulation model is to represent and mimic the real system that is the subject of the 
study. The key specifications of simulation models are: 
1. A simplified representation of reality (as all models). The structure being included 
in the model resembles the structure of the system in the real world (if known), 
but simpler, which allows a better understanding of the processes involved 
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2. Level of detail. This specification is of utmost importance because it can make the 
difference between a model that is clear, understandable and able to answer its 
research question and a model that is overly complex and whose results are 
difficult to interpret. The right level of detail depends on the research question the 
model is built to investigate. If the model includes too much detail, its final 
outcomes will be difficult to interpret because the subject of interest is lost in a 
large amount of data. Conversely, not enough detail could jeopardise the 
simulation of the system, resulting in a model that is simplistic, and not just 
simple 
3. Simple representation of the behaviours of key actors. The same argument said for 
the system in general can be applied to the representation of the behaviours of the 
key actors in the system. The level of detail has to be ‘granular’ enough to allow 
the investigation of the subject of the model, while avoiding broadening the level 
of analysis beyond the scope of the research. 
Some of the limitations of simulation models are somehow similar to those of 
econometric models. As mentioned above, simulation models are based on 
assumptions that simplify reality, and as Sterman (1991) states “any model is only as 
good as its assumption” (Sterman, 1991, p. 20). Uncertainty is another major issue in 
simulation and any other type of model. Since every component of the model is a 
simplified version of reality, each of them factors in a certain degree of uncertainty. 
Unless the further complexity is coupled with more constraints, uncertainty builds up 
as the complexity of the system increases, making the predictions of the model less 
certain. 
All these modelling approaches are and have been used to study complex systems, 
either in isolation or integrated. For instance, optimisation models find their main 
application in the industry and engineering sectors (e.g. Price, et al., 1994), whereas 
econometrics and simulation are more widely used in the fields of economics and 
social science (e.g. Meadows, et al., 1972; Bellemare, 2014). Although classifications 
are useful, the difference between these types of models is less clear-cut in reality. In 
particular, the field of simulation is ever developing and hybrid models are becoming 
more common (Teose, et al., 2011; Vincenot, et al., 2011; Swinerd and McNaught, 
2012; Monasterolo, et al., 2013). 
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The analysis of a system as complex as the one being studied here required a mix of 
methodologies that could represent and disentangle complexity while respecting the 
principles dictated by the GRO project. As detailed above, optimisation models were 
too simplistic for the research questions posed in this research. As for the other 
modelling techniques, both econometrics (e.g. Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; Bellemare, 
2014) and simulation modelling (e.g. Meadows, et al., 1972; Cioffi‐Revilla and 
Rouleau, 2010) have been used to investigate similar research questions. Due to the 
complementarity of these two approaches, these have both been implemented in 
different parts of this research. 
In conclusion, notwithstanding the drawbacks that characterise simulation models, 
there seems to be an increasing realisation that "all models are wrong, but some are 
useful” (Box and Draper, 1987, p. 424), the point being that some models are a better 
approximation of reality and are therefore more helpful in the study of specific 
dynamics. The reason for modelling is not to recreate reality, but to make it simpler, 
pinpointing the key components of the system that is the subject of the study, 
including them in the model and investigating how they interact, with the aim to find 
out the systematic behaviours of the system and to distinguish what is important from 
what can be neglected for a given problem or to test and challenge assumptions.  
3.2.2. Different simulation modelling paradigms 
Within the field of simulation modelling we can distinguish between different 
modelling paradigms, which Gilbert and Troizsch (2005), Gilbert (2008) and 
Squazzoni (2012) classified differently. Below is a comprehensive list. 
3.2.2.1. System Dynamics (SD) 
This modelling paradigm finds its roots in Control Engineering, a discipline that 
analyses dynamic systems by summarising them as systems of difference and 
differential equations (Forrester and Senge, 1980). SD was originally developed as a 
tool to study complex systems (Forrester, 1961) through the concept of stocks, flows, 
feedbacks and delays, which are mathematically formalised along with parameters 
and relationships in a system of equations. The main advantage of using SD is its 
macro-level perspective in the analysis of systems because it treats the part of the real-
world subject of the analysis as an undifferentiated whole (Brauer and Castillo-
Chavez, 2012). The properties of the target system that can be described with an SD 
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model are its whole state and its variations: the former is represented with state 
variables in the form of ‘levels’, whereas the latter is represented with ‘rates’ (Gilbert 
and Troitzsch, 2005). 
Any given variable of the system can change since its value depends on the behaviour 
of the other variables. Therefore SD allows for interdependence, also including 
nonlinear interaction. Although this modelling paradigm allows the modelling of 
heterogeneous aspects of the system’s behaviours, its macro-level perspective of the 
system does not typically focus on individual-level heterogeneity. The hypothesis on 
which it grounds is that “the system behaviour is the result of circular and time-
delayed relationships between structural components, factors or variables” 
(Squazzoni, 2012) and thus requires full ex-ante knowledge and description of the 
system’s structures (Randers, 1980; Hanneman and Patrick, 1997; Gilbert and 
Troitzsch, 2005; Grüne-Yanoff and Weirich, 2010). In other words, SD is not 
appropriate to model a system whose structure changes over time. 
The main implementation of SD is as a support to policy evaluation and analysis and 
as a tool for improving management in both public and private sector (Forrester, 
1971; Sterman, 2000; Mollona, 2008; Squazzoni, 2012). Examples of the 
implementation of SD in analyses of sustainability include climate dynamics 
(Sterman, 2013), ecology (Norling, 2007), socio-environmental issues (Meadows, et 
al., 1972; Meadows, et al., 2004) and consumption paradigms (Bianchi, et al., 2009).  
3.2.2.2. Microsimulation 
Microsimulation was developed to overcome the limits of SD in analysing the 
dynamics of systems. As mentioned above, SD models are used to investigate and 
forecast global patterns, but do not capture individual behaviours. These two 
approaches are complementary, since microsimulation is used to forecast the potential 
effects of a given policy on individuals and groups. Indeed, microsimulation operates 
at the level of individual units, which are given a set of rules to shape changes in their 
state or behaviour. Rules can either be stochastic or deterministic and will determine 
the outcomes of the simulation (Figari, et al., 2014).  
This approach is particularly recommended when the policy being tested applies 
differently to different groups. Another difference between SD and microsimulation is 
that the former provides a deterministic approach, whereas microsimulation 
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introduces an element of stochasticity in the model, in order to assess the overall 
impact upon a number of given aggregate variables. Microsimulation does not 
contemplate behavioural heterogeneity of the agents, but it does contemplate 
individual heterogeneity in the distribution of the parameters. Although this represents 
an improvement from its predecessor, microsimulation is of no use when trying to 
analyse social interaction, since it does not include interaction between units (Gilbert 
and Troitzsch, 2005; Squazzoni, 2012). In addition, this modelling technique is based 
on statistical data and therefore is limited in not being able to simulate novelty, i.e. the 
future is assumed to be the same as the past. Microsimulation has mainly been applied 
to the fields of medicine to simulate past and future trends of the spread of diseases 
(e.g. Draisma, et al., 2009; Edwards, et al., 2010), urban and traffic modelling (e.g. 
Helbing and Tilch, 1998; Blue and Adler, 2001) and is more generally used by 
government departments to investigate the effect of policies on specific sectors of the 
population. 
3.2.2.3. Queuing or discrete event models 
Queuing or discrete event models are a representation of a system “in terms of its 
entities and their attributes, sets, events, activities and delays” (Kheir, 1988, p. 98). 
This modelling paradigm differs from the others for its ‘discrete’ properties. 
Differential equation models (SD and microsimulation) and the other approaches that 
will follow, assume a continuous distribution of time. They work in time steps as 
queuing models, but unlike the latter they are equidistant. This means that when an 
event takes place in a model built with the other approaches, the variables are 
simultaneously updated in the same time step. In queuing models, instead, there are 
no set times at which the whole system is forced to update, rather events are put into a 
queue and may occur at arbitrary times. In addition, most of the variables are usually 
assumed to be constant (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). However, any one event could 
lead to a change in the system macro-state by triggering a chain of other further 
events in other parts of the system. For instance, traffic model systems (e.g. Di 
Febbraro, et al., 2004) or resource use in computing (e.g. Buyya and Murshed, 2002) 
can be based on this modelling technique.  
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3.2.2.4. Multilevel simulation models 
Multilevel simulation models analyse systems by applying different levels of analysis 
to different objects included in the simulation of the system. This approach best 
applies to situations where a homogenously distributed population of individuals is 
considered, with applications in a wide variety of fields such as medicine (e.g. 
Beckmann, et al., 2003) and psychology (e.g. Krull and MacKinnon, 2001). The 
system properties are then constituted by the simple aggregation of individual ones. 
The issue with this modelling technique is that for computational reasons it only 
allows for an indirect interaction between individuals. Indeed, a cyclic dependence 
within the same time step is forbidden, hence each subject evaluates the previous 
(step) macro-situation to inform its decision-making process. The subjects cannot 
base their decisions on the behaviours of others (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). 
However, multilevel models mostly tended to be statistical fitting ones. One type of 
multilevel model, i.e. random effects model, will be introduced later in the text. 
3.2.2.5. Cellular Automata 
Cellular Automata (CA) consists in a regular grid composed of identical cells. Every 
cell has a property that defines its state (e.g. “on” or “off”; “alive or “dead”) and its 
state changes according to that of its neighbouring cells. The simulation time is 
divided in step units, and at each time step the state of a cell changes according to the 
rules of the system. The rules are homogenously applied to every cell in the grid. 
Squazzoni (2012) describes the main advantage of using CA as “[CA] reduces the 
problem of interaction between dispersed micro entities to a single homogenous 
parameter” (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 19). However, the same author also argues that “the 
idea of synchronous updating of agent behaviour is a poor approximation to 
understanding complex social interactions” (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 20), an opinion that 
is also shared by Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005). Indeed, although synchronous 
updating is a good representation of reality as people make different choices all at the 
same time, it is the differences in their circumstances that drive those choices and that 
creates complexity in the system. However, this perspective is challenged by other 
experts who argue that complex social interactions can also be simulated by a 
synchronous system as different agents need not be repeating the same behaviour at 
each update. In addition, the grid structure that characterises CA can be a useful 
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approximation of space. Since CA finds its most suitable application in the analysis of 
macro-level outcomes starting from the simulation of micro-level interactions 
between units, this modelling approach is mainly implemented in areas such as 
physical science, biology, mathematics and social science (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 
2005; Squazzoni, 2012). 
3.2.2.6. Agent-based models 
Agent-based models (ABMs) were developed in the 1990s, with the spread of 
artificial intelligence technology and the spread of object-oriented software. Gilbert 
(2008) defines ABMs as “a computational method that enables a researcher to create, 
analyse, and experiment with models composed of agents that interact within an 
environment” (Gilbert, 2008, p. 2). Squazzoni (2008) gives a more detailed definition 
of ABMs: “an ABM is a computational method that allows the use of computer to 
investigate a given macro-level social phenomenon through the representation of 
micro-level behavioural rules. These will be followed by a group of agents which 
interact inside a bounded macro-environment limited by either geographical, spatial, 
structural and/or institutional boundaries” (Squazzoni, 2008, p. 8) 8. ABM has also 
been defined as an “aid-intuition” (Axelrod, 2003), as a “magnifying glass” (Terna, 
2009) and as a “mindset”, where a system is described from the perspective of its 
components (Bonabeau, 2002). The first two terms derive from ABM’s transparent 
modelling structure, which allows the modeller to infer where a specific pattern 
originates from, isolate it and run further analysis. Furthermore, both Squazzoni 
(2008) and Gabbriellini (2011) identify ABM’s valuable contribution to the modelling 
field in being “a virtual or artificial laboratory”, where “generative experiments” can 
be carried out. 
ABMs are widely acknowledged as an instrument especially appropriate to simulate 
SESs (Gilbert and Terna, 2000; Gilbert, 2008; Thiele, et al., 2011; Railsback and 
Grimm, 2012; Filatova, et al., 2013) because they include the following elements 
(Bravo, et al., 2013): i) an environment, i.e. a set of objects the agents can interact 
with, ii) a set of interactive agents, iii) a set of relationships linking objects and/or 
                                                 
8 Note that this quote was translated from the author of this thesis. 
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agents and finally iv) a set of operators that allow the interaction between the agents 
and the objects. 
The main characteristics of ABM that distinguish this from other modelling 
techniques is that they allow to: i) have an ontological correspondence between model 
and real world dynamics as a result of the simulation. This is possible due to the 
opportunity of grounding agents’ cognitive and social characteristics on real 
behaviours (Squazzoni, 2012); ii) shape heterogeneous agents, all with a specific set 
of properties distribution (Bonabeau, 2002; Swinerd and McNaught, 2012); iii) 
analyse nonlinear agent interaction at the micro-level, which results in macro-level 
patterns (Grimm, 2008). These outcomes can also be studied “as bottom-up emergent 
properties from local interaction” (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 11); iv) recreate a highly 
detailed representation of the environment in which agents interact (geographical 
boundaries, institutional rules, and/or social structures) and how these affect agents’ 
behaviour and interaction; v) clearly visualise the on-going simulation as well as its 
results, allowing the researcher to analyse the dynamics of agents’ interactions 
(Gilbert, 2008; Squazzoni, 2012); vi) introduce an element of stochasticity to the 
behaviours of the agents instead of using a noise term added to the equations of the 
system (Bonabeau, 2002). 
3.2.3. Abstract vs Empirical (or applied) models 
Another important general distinction between different types of models is that of 
abstract and empirical or applied models. Abstract models are theoretical models built 
to investigate a general phenomenon and do not rely on empirical data. This type of 
models is generally used to formulate a theory or to generalise one (Squazzoni, 2012). 
The way data is introduced in this type of models is mainly based on the concept of 
relative change and abstract values of variables. Conversely, empirical or applied 
models constitute a highly detailed replica of a real system and require real data as an 
input. The main use of this type of models is to inform decision-making processes 
(Squazzoni, 2012).  
In extreme situations, empirical modelling may simply constitute a statistical fit to 
data raising a whole different set of concerns about the reliability of data, whereas an 
abstract model might hypothesise a mechanism (e.g. Schelling’s segregation model, 
Schelling, 1969) based on some notional ideas about how a system is constituted. 
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However, a mechanistic model without data, and a data-based model without 
mechanism might both be seriously in error. In either case there are typically sets of 
(possibly hidden) theoretical assumptions built into the model structure which need to 
be taken into account while presenting the results from the model to facilitate 
understanding. 
The increasing importance of impact in academic research has driven academics to 
engage on a more frequent basis with policy- and decision-makers. At the same time, 
a new generation of policy- and decision-makers search for science and research to 
inform their decisions. However, there is often a mismatch between these two groups 
which involves the language used by research and the expectations for ‘solutions’ 
from the policy side. A change is needed: academics need to provide scientific results 
that can be easily understood and related to and policy-makers need to engage with 
terms such as ‘uncertainty’ and ‘variability’. The ultimate aim of the research being 
presented here is to influence and inform decision-making as related to possible 
challenges involving the scarcity of natural resources and conflict, mainly to 
investigate and provide evidence for this connection. For this reason, the empirical 
approach was preferred to the abstract. Another reason for this choice was the great 
availability of empirical data. The GRO Project compiled a database of country-level 
annual data for several fields of information (social, economic, environment and 
finance) by gathering data from freely available sources such as the FAO, WB and the 
United States Energy Information Administration (EIA) (GSI, 2015). In addition, this 
choice was led by Principle 2 of the project, that required all the models to be data-
led. 
3.2.4. Selection of a modelling paradigm 
The previous sections outlined the different methods that could be (and have been) 
used to model complex systems. As mentioned in Section 3.2.1 of this chapter, “The 
analysis of a system as complex as the one being studied here required a mix of 
methodologies that could represent and disentangle complexity, while respecting the 
principles dictated by the GRO project”. Indeed, all the methods that have been listed 
so far are characterised by both advantages and drawbacks, which is why different 
methods have been implemented to undertake different parts of the research. In 
particular, statistical and econometric techniques have been implemented to explore 
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the data that were either collected or sourced from the GRO database and other 
respected organisations. The results from these analyses were used to inform some of 
the relationships between the different variables included and to build estimates for 
some of the key parameters of the ABMs. 
The most important choice concerned the modelling approach to use. From the brief 
review of modelling paradigms presented in Section 3.2.2 it appears clear that the two 
approaches that were most suitable for the study of this complex system were SD and 
ABM. These are the only modelling paradigms well suited to study complex 
dynamics of big systems, where the focus is on the patterns that result from the 
simulations.  
Bonabeau (2002) lists instances when ABM is recommended as a modelling 
approach: i) when the behaviours of the components of the system are non-linear, 
present thresholds and when the system is suitable to being simplified with if-then 
rules; ii) when the behaviours of the individuals in the system present learning and 
adaptation capabilities; iii) when individuals are heterogeneous in their preferences 
and behaviours and when interaction is a key component of the system. 
The research questions that this study proposed to investigate perfectly applied to the 
list of instances reported by Bonabeau (2002): firstly, as described in the previous 
chapter SESs are characterised by non-linearities and thresholds. Moreover, this 
research involved the study of national fragilities and how countries react to scarcity 
of natural resources and the increase in their price. Heterogeneity was thus another 
condition that the modelling approach selected needed to be able to simulate. Finally, 
the interaction between individual behaviours and non-linear dynamics made it clear 
that the emergent properties that characterise ABMs were critical for this research, 
making this modelling technique the most suitable.  
One of the main advantages of using ABMs to study complex systems is their 
generative approach: these models recreate the system from the bottom-up, which 
allows them to provide insights on the emerging properties of the system (Bonabeau, 
2002). In ABMs the dynamics of the complex system are recreated by shaping the 
individual processes and entities it is known to rely on, which can result in non-linear 
aggregated behaviours different from those of the individuals’ (Pourdehnad, et al., 
2002; Janssen and Ostrom, 2006). Their structure is in line with Aristotle’s quote 
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“The whole is greater than the sum of its parts” [Aristotle, 384 BC - 322 BC]. As 
opposed to bottom-up approaches, in top-down (e.g. SD) the focus is on averaged and 
general patterns that are broken down in rough estimates for the singular entities of 
the system. ABM’s attention to detail also constitutes one of its major limitations. It is 
indeed easy to lose focus of the research and add too many components to the system, 
hence building complex simulation models whose outcomes are difficult to interpret 
(Bonabeau, 2002). This attention to detail also entails the need for large 
computational power, which sometimes could constitute a drawback of this modelling 
approach (Bonabeau, 2002). Another consequence of this is the challenging 
calibration and sensitivity analysis that characterises this type of models: the higher 
level of detail used by ABM likely translates in a larger number of components and 
behaviours captured by the system. These need to be ‘fitted’ to reality, which may 
prove challenging and time-consuming (Filatova, et al., 2013). Finally, Bonabeau 
(2002) suggests caution in the interpretation of the results from ABMs. This is due to 
the characteristics of the systems that are subject of the research. Indeed, SESs 
involve decisions made by human agents, who implement complex, sometimes 
irrational, subjective behaviours, which are difficult to model and simulate. Although 
this constitutes one of the possible challenges posed by ABM, this modelling 
approach is one of the methods that can deal with these issues (Bonabeau, 2002). 
Uncertainty in the model results is hence key, both how it is accounted for and 
communicated. It is in fact important to highlight the purpose of the model: 
quantitative results generated from an ABM whose purpose is to qualitatively 
describe a behaviour or demonstrate a theory, should be handled with caution and vice 
versa. 
Another reason to prefer an ABM approach to SD was because part of this research 
involved the aggregation of findings from different fields, i.e. geopolitics, 
environmental economics, macroeconomics and international economics, and hence 
interdisciplinarity was a fundamental condition for the modelling approach that would 
finally be chosen. Because of its characteristics, ABM is most useful when studying 
interdisciplinary subjects, as it can promote integration and interaction between 
different fields of study (Jager, 2000; Voudouris, et al., 2011). ABM has been applied 
to a wide variety of sectors (Bonabeau, 2002; Balbi and Giupponi, 2009; Garro and 
Russo, 2010). For instance, in the agricultural sector ABM has been applied to model 
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technology diffusion (e.g. Berger, 2001), micro-scale market dynamics (e.g. 
Arsenault, et al., 2012), scenario and policy testing (e.g. Bastardie, et al., 2010), land 
use change (e.g. Zhang, et al., 2013), decision-making (e.g. Ng, et al., 2011) and land 
price dynamics (e.g. Filatova, et al., 2009). In addition, this modelling approach has 
also been applied to social dynamics (e.g. Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005; Bravo, et al., 
2013), political systems (e.g. Cioffi-Revilla and Rouleau, 2009), transport (Jin and 
Jie, 2012; Natalini and Bravo, 2013), change in land use in agriculture (e.g. Matthews, 
et al., 2007; Polhill, et al., 2013), ecology (e.g. Bousquet and Le Page, 2004), finance 
(e.g. Tesfatsion, 2002; Cincotti, et al., 2010), product-service sustainable business 
model (e.g. Bianchi, et al., 2009) and industrial sustainability (e.g. Tonelli, Evans and 
Taticchi, 2013), just to name a few. 
However, as highlighted above and in the previous chapter, to the best of my 
knowledge an ABM fully empirically grounded aimed at investigating the connection 
between scarcity of food and fuel and conflict has never been developed before. This, 
in addition to the lack of a systemic view of how scarcity of natural resources can 
translate in an increased probability of the occurrence of riots in the world, constitutes 
the gap in literature that this research aims at addressing. The novelty of this research 
consists in the questions addressed and the results obtained, the methodological 
framework and the systemic approach used to understand and quantify the 
relationships between the different variables considered, in addition to the ABMs 
developed. 
3.3. The modelling journey 
For scientific research to be academically sound, this has to be consistent, rigorous, 
transparent and replicable (Martensson and Martensson, 2007). Academic rigor can be 
achieved through the implementation of methodological standards. This is particularly 
important in ABM since, as Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005) argued “All research should 
be theoretically informed, methodologically sophisticated and creative. These 
qualities are especially necessary when doing simulations because the field is only 
about 20 years old, so there are no well-established traditions to rely on […]” (Gilbert 
and Troitzsch, 2005, p. 1). A methodological standard is defined as "a constructive 
framework that provides a socially shared system of principles, rules and practices 
which defines how research should be performed [...]" (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 131). In 
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the modelling field, following a methodological standard can make the difference 
between building a model that is correctly coded and achieves its objective and one 
that does not, and can produce models that are more transparent, manageable, testable 
and replicable. 
Different methodological frameworks have been proposed by the ABM literature. In 
particular those of Squazzoni (2012), Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005) and Grimm and 
Railsback (2005) provide a reiterative list of steps to build consistent and reliable 
models. These methodologies were very general and have hence been adapted to fit 
this research, in particular to incorporate the work that went into developing different 
databases that have been used to inform the models. A brief description for each point 
in the list will follow. 
3.3.1. Formulate a research question 
As mentioned before in this chapter, the correct formulation of the research question 
is of utmost importance towards building a ‘good’ model (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 
2005). This step allows the definition of boundaries for the research to improve clarity 
and focus the research effort. As stated above, the research questions that this research 
aimed to address regarded the investigation of how scarcity of natural resources, their 
international prices and national political fragility affect the occurrence of food and 
fuel riots, also taking into account trade of natural resources. In addition, this research 
aimed at developing three fully data-led ABMs, one focussing on food, one on fuel 
and an integrated version of the two, which will be called Food ABM, Fuel ABM and 
Food and Fuel ABM, respectively.  
3.3.2. Building a conceptual model 
Building a conceptual model is a key step in building any model (Wilson, 2001) 
because it visually formalises the key variables, connections and feedbacks present in 
the system. A conceptual model is a simplified version of the system that is the target 
of the simulation. Usually it is represented with a flowchart or similar simple 
visualisation techniques. For reasons of space and synthesis Figure 3.1 provides a 
simplified version of the conceptual model for the Food and Fuel ABM. 
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Figure 3.1 – simplified version of the conceptual model for the Food and Fuel ABM. 
The green boxes identify the variables that have been estimated via trend-lines (as 
will be explained in the following chapters) and the red boxes identify the final 
variables. The rectangular boxes identify processes that take place at the ‘global’ 
level, whereas round boxes represent national processes (own elaboration).   
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3.3.3. Specification of the properties of the model 
The specification of the properties of the model clearly identifies the theories on 
which the model relies. This research was approached as constituted by building 
blocks, i.e. the main components of the ABMs. These were identified as: i) 
consumption and production of natural resources, ii) international prices for natural 
resources iii) national political fragility, iv) international trade of natural resources, 
and, finally, v) the occurrence of food and fuel riots as related to the previous 
dynamics. These dynamics will be investigated and analysed in the following chapter. 
3.3.4. Data collection 
Collecting the data needed to build a model can prove to be challenging. The data 
used have to be consistent and sourced from a reliable institution if not produced as 
part of the research through surveys or alternative methods. In this case, the data that 
have been used to develop the ABMs was both collected ad-hoc (data for the 
occurrence of food and fuel riots) and the remainder was sourced from internationally 
acknowledged institutions (e.g. WB, FAO, UN) that made them freely available on 
the institution’s websites and from the database compiled as part of the GRO Project. 
This step is particularly important when building an empirically grounded model: the 
lack of data or its low accuracy can sometimes result in having to edit the conceptual 
model or even to having to reformulate the research questions. This occurred to be 
true for this research and led me to edit my conceptual model in a few instances. 
3.3.5. Data analysis 
Analysing the data collected is again particularly important when building empirically 
grounded models. This step can provide initial findings that could better specify some 
parts of the model or their development. Econometric techniques have been employed 
to explore the data to inform the ABMs and these will be listed in the next section. In 
addition, the data collected from the GRO Project included some gaps across the years 
that were filled using simple interpolation and are part of a larger database held and 
kept up-to-date by the GSI. The techniques that have been applied to the data are 
summarised in Jones and Phillips (2015).  
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3.3.6. Model implementation, execution and verification 
During this step the theoretical basis, the conceptual model and the outcomes from the 
data analysis are translated in the language of the chosen software (Squazzoni, 2012). 
Previous experience in building models of complex systems taught me that the best 
way to approach the development of the model was that of building blocks. Firstly, 
the components that would constitute the final ABM were identified and built in 
isolation, subsequently adding complexity to the main model as new parts were 
developed separately. In addition, standard repeatable tests for each component were 
built to detect code errors possibly introduced with subsequent additions. The 
outcomes of these tests are known, to ensure the software is performing as expected. 
This process is also called ‘unit testing’ (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). This process 
also helps to distinguish emerging patterns from anomalies once the final model is 
built and run. In particular, this research first focussed on food riots and the dynamics 
that cause these events, subsequently incorporating the knowledge produced in the 
development of the Food ABM. Then the same analysis was applied to the study of 
fuel riots, which led to the development of the Fuel ABM. Finally, the analysis 
focussed on the interaction between the two types of riots, subsequently integrating 
the two versions of the ABM whilst including the knowledge generated from the data 
analysis.  
3.3.7. Model calibration and sensitivity analysis of the parameters 
When the purpose of the model is to replicate and investigate real world phenomena, 
the model needs to be calibrated using reported data to ensure it is a good 
representation of reality. Two important approaches during this phase are sensitivity 
analysis and calibration or parameter fitting (Thiele, et al,, 2014). Sensitivity analysis 
tests the sensitivity of the model outputs to changes in the parameters in order to 
investigate and report the robustness of the model outcomes as relates to uncertainty 
in the definition of the parameters (Thiele, et al., 2014).  
Calibration is the process of defining boundaries for the values of selected parameters 
in the model and organise a series of model runs to explore these ranges and select the 
values for these parameters that better fit the data. The use of these practices is still 
relatively low in ABM (Thiele, et al., 2014). The reasons probably being: i) lack of 
data; ii) uncertainty in the theories applied; iii) more abstract than empirical models; 
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iv) the complexity of the agents’ decision making; v) scarce familiarity of a large part 
of the modelling field with computer science; indeed, non-experts are increasingly 
interested in computer modelling, although not being familiar with the standard 
practices and processes required, which hence are often overlooked; vi) agent-based 
modellers dedicate more attention to the explorative aim of ABM rather than to its 
explanatory potential, for which empirically soundness is key (Lorscheid, et al., 2012; 
Thiele, et al., 2014). Recently published books and academic papers (e.g. Kleijnen, 
1997; Saltelli, 2000; Saltelli, et al., 2004; Helton, et al., 2006; Kleijnen, 2007; Saltelli, 
et al., 2008; Cournede, et al., 2013; Gan, et al., 2014; Thiele, et al., 2014) try to 
address the scarce methodology on how to implement these methods. As it will be 
detailed in Chapter 5, the development of a fully data-led model results in very 
deterministic outcomes. In this case sensitivity analysis could not be implemented in 
the ‘common’ fashion. As will be explained in Chapter 5, sensitivity analysis of a 
model is usually performed by varying key parameters within certain ranges, thus 
analysing the sensitivity of the results to changes in the parameters. The deterministic 
nature of the main dynamics that lead to the estimates for production and 
consumption of natural resources calculated in the model and the fact that there is no 
free parameter included, meant that the standard procedure could not be implemented 
in this case and an alternative procedure was implemented. The calibration of the 
ABMs will also be presented in Chapter 5. 
3.3.8. Analysis of the outcomes of the model 
The model runs generate a large amount of data that then needs to be analysed using 
statistical software to extrapolate the results. The software selected for the 
development of the ABMs was NetLogo (Wilensky, 1999), a piece of software 
originally designed for teaching, but now increasingly used for research (Thiele, et al., 
2014). NetLogo is increasingly used in combination with R (R Core Team, 2013), 
which was used both to analyse the data that was then used to inform the models, as 
well as to analyse the results from the ABMs. 
3.3.9. Model validation 
The validation process is aimed at ensuring that the results of the model match the 
system that it simulates to test its consistency and facilitate its replicability 
(Squazzoni, 2012). Squazzoni (2012) lists three types of validation techniques: i) 
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internal validation; ii) cross-validation; iii) empirical validation. He defines internal 
validation as “the process by which the coherence between explananda and 
explanandum is scrutinised, possibly also by peers” (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 137). In this 
case empirical data is not required to validate the model and this approach is hence 
more suitable for abstract or theoretical models. Cross-validation, is defined as “the 
process by which the explanatory power of models which look at the same or similar 
issue is tested comparatively according to a given criterion, for example, 
simplification or empirical adherence” (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 137). Empirical 
validation is defined as “the process by which model results are confronted and 
corroborated with empirical data” (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 139). To improve the 
validation power of this technique, the author introduced the concept of multilevel 
empirical validation, which he defines as “the process by means relevant model 
parameters are informed by and simulation findings are evaluated against empirical 
data” (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 139). According to this last approach, empirically 
grounded models can use databases to both inform their simulations and to validate 
their results. To do this, the database being used must be split either horizontally 
(using a given number of records as inputs for the model and the remainder to test the 
model results) if the data is time-independent (when the time variable is not included 
in the model and/or does not affect the simulations and/or its results) or vertically 
(using a given number of time-series to inform the model and the remainder to test the 
model results) if the data is time-dependent (when the model uses time-series time-
series).  
Another methodology that can be used to validate ABMs is Pattern Oriented 
Modelling (POM) (Wiegand, et al., 2003; Grimm, et al., 2005). This is particularly 
indicated to address the two main challenges that characterise the bottom-up 
modelling nature of ABMs, i.e. complexity and uncertainty. POM is aimed at 
unpacking the information relative to the internal organisation of the system. To do 
so, this procedure focusses on identifying and validating specific, multiple patterns 
that are simulated in the system, which highlight the underlying assumptions and 
dynamics incorporated in the model. This method can reduce the uncertainty related 
to the model results by developing a realistic simulation of the structure of the system. 
Grimm et al. (2005) prescribe that to implement this method, the patterns that will be 
eventually validated need to be identified ahead of the model’s development. For this 
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reason, the authors recommend the development of a conceptual model before coding. 
In the case of this research, the development of the ABMs was preceded by a detailed 
preparation process, which will be presented in the following chapter. 
As mentioned before, the ABMs developed as part of this research were fully data-
led, i.e. reported time-series were analysed and used as input for the behaviours and 
parameters included in the models. This means that the ABMs are already internally 
validated, also through the unit testing process mentioned above (Squazzoni, 2012). 
Both POM and multilevel validation had features that could help validate the ABMs, 
hence the two techniques were combined and tweaked to better meet this research’s 
needs. As for multilevel validation, differently from the procedure specified above, 
due to the short time frame that was used for this analysis and scarcity of data, it was 
decided to validate the different versions of the ABM on the same database used to 
calibrate them, although focusing on different variables to check the validity of the 
models’ results. This research could have taken into account a longer period, however 
the food and fuel riots were concentrated in 2008 and 2011 because of the global 
crisis that occurred in this time frame, which was unique in its genre (Homer-Dixon, 
et al., 2015). The only crisis of similar proportions goes as far back as 1929, for which 
data is scarcely available for the variables analysed in this work. The procedure 
implemented to overcome this methodological issue will be better detailed in the next 
chapter. The assumption underlying this procedure, which is common practice in the 
modelling field, is that if the model was able to recreate part of the past, then it will be 
able to ‘tell a story’ about the future. Another important part for the validation of the 
ABMs was the recreation of specific patterns. For instance, the Food ABM needed to 
be able to recreate politically fragile situations like the Arab Spring, which saw a 
period of high international food prices coupled with an increased occurrence of food 
riots. For this, the data produced by the model was analysed, checking for a 
correspondence between the countries that actually experienced food riots in the 
period 2008-2011 (the Arab Spring) and those that recorded a food riot in the model 
simulations. I appreciate that the data that was used as input in the model to allow it to 
recreate Arab-Spring-like events referred to the very events happened in 2008-2011, 
i.e. the data used as input and to calibrate the model were the same data used to 
validate its results. However, a model that is ‘mechanistically correct’ should be able 
to recreate future events, but only to the extent that the mechanisms that drive the 
  
73 
dynamics observed in reality have been correctly identified and are sufficient for the 
future cases. The validation techniques implemented evaluated the accuracy of the 
ABMs at reproducing past patterns. As for whether the past patterns will be similar to 
future ones, only time will tell. 
3.3.10. Reporting and publication 
Documenting and publishing the model and its results is critical both for 
communicating the model results and for its replication. In order to allow peers in the 
field to replicate and further analyse a model, the publication of its theoretical basis 
and results has to be undertaken in the most transparent and methodologically sound 
way. Recently, high-impact ABM journals stressed the need for the development and 
use of standards to document and publish this type of studies and the most famous in 
the field of ABMs is the Overview, Design concepts and Details (ODD) protocol 
(Polhill, et al., 2008; Grimm, et al., 2010), which was implemented in Chapter 5 to 
present the ABMs.  
3.3.11. Replication 
Replication is another critical step to ensure the soundness of a model. Squazzoni 
(2012) defines this procedure as a “process by means a given model is independently 
scrutinised by peers by re-running it” (Squazzoni, 2012, p. 140). Moreover, as 
Squazzoni (2012) argues, replication is critical for verification, internal validation and 
cross-validation. In other words, the real importance of this step is the contribution 
that it may give to theoretical progress: if several scholars replicate the same model 
obtaining the same results from diverse simulations, they may be facing a progress in 
science that they could formalise in a new theory. 
Although in research the trend is to categorise, formalise and provide steps to improve 
research practices, rarely the modelling process is as clear-cut as described above. In 
fact, the list of steps just described could be represented as a conceptual model in 
itself and as such the modelling process can be outlined with a flowchart as shown in 
Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2 – Flow-chart of the modelling journey. The green boxes identify the GRO 
principles outlined in the introduction to this chapter (own elaboration).  
3.4. Architecture of the models 
As mentioned before, this research produced three versions of an ABM, one 
modelling the global food system, one focussed on the fuel system and finally a 
model integrating the dynamics of the previous two ABMs. The aim of the models 
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was to simulate how scarcity of natural resources, i.e. food for the Food ABM, oil for 
the Fuel ABM and both resources for the Food and Fuel ABM9, their international 
prices and national political fragility influence the occurrence of food and fuel riots in 
countries. Since the models are empirically grounded, the first step was to collect data 
for these variables and analyse them. The results were subsequently implemented in 
the model to inform the dynamics. Although the analysis on riots that informed the 
models will be presented in detail in the following chapter, it is important to briefly 
introduce the methods that have been applied during this initial phase and why these 
have been chosen.  
In particular, the methodological steps applied in the analyses on riots are the 
following: 
1. Creation of databases of riots 
2. Random effects logistic linear regression (RE) to test the relationship between 
international price of the resource and riots 
3. Calculation of a threshold for the international price of the resource beyond which 
riots are more likely to occur in countries, based on the previous point 
4. Hazard model (survival analysis) (HZ) on periods above the price threshold to 
evaluate the relationship between whether a country is a net importer or exporter 
of the resource, national political fragility and the occurrence of riots in countries 
5. Regression tree with random effects for longitudinal (panel) data (REEM) to 
operationalise international price threshold and categories of fragility to calculate 
probability of riots. Results were compared with RE models on the same variables 
6. Evolutionary Tree (ET) to predict the formation of international prices of natural 
resources in the ABMs starting from the availability of resources. 
The analysis of the data on riots required (a mix of) methods that could deal with 
sparse, longitudinal data. Longitudinal or panel data is characterised by a set of 
individuals as the subject of the study i ϵ {1, ... , n} and whose observations are 
recorded at times t ϵ {1, ... , m}. Therefore an observation is (i, t). Longitudinal data 
hence observes the same subjects over a period of time, rather than different 
observations for different individuals as in cross-sectional analyses. This type of study 
                                                 
9 The Food and Fuel version of the ABM also includes production and consumption dynamics for coal 
and natural gas, as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 5. 
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can help to understand and predict specific patterns and behaviours in the subjects 
(Sela and Simonoff, 2012). In this case, the subjects of the study were the 213 
countries of the world, which have been modelled as agents in the different versions 
of the ABM. Time in the analyses was either represented in years or months. All the 
most common methods usually applied in statistics could not be applied in this case as 
panel data violates a fundamental assumption these all share – that the observations 
and the errors for each individual are statistically independent between different data 
points. Indeed, data for prices and other national variables investigated in this study is 
usually autocorrelated over time, hence the need for a method that could deal with this 
property. Failure of accounting for this would have led to a bias in the analysis by 
either overestimating the strength of the relationship between dependent and 
independent variables or choosing the wrong model. In conclusion, the methods that 
were needed for this study had to be able to handle statistical dependence of the data, 
autocorrelation and that could generate predictions based on time series. Econometric 
and machine learning methods were hence the most appropriate methods that were 
explored.  
3.4.1. Random effects logistic linear regression 
As for the second study10 between prices and riots, the method that was to be selected 
needed to be able to quantify the relationship between international prices of natural 
resources and the occurrence of riots, whilst being able to identify a threshold for the 
price over which the probability for these events to happen is significantly higher. In a 
situation where the data was of cross-sectional type and non-panel, this study would 
have used classic regression. A similar method for panel data exists and it is called RE 
linear regression. 
In a RE model (also called multilevel model) RE are estimated for every observation 
to account for the presence of relevant subgroups. This model assigns, for example, a 
different intercept for each group to try to capture the variation due to the different 
groups within the sample. These are different from Fixed Effects (FE) models that 
look for systematic connections between dependent and independent variables: RE 
refer to either variables that are not themselves modelled or measured (and thus can 
                                                 
10 The first study consisted in the gathering of data for food and fuel riots and did not require the use of 
any specific method. This collection procedure will be presented in the following chapter. 
  
77 
only be modelled as randomly varying), or parameters kept constant amongst different 
groups. Literature is rather confusing about when to use either RE or FE, however 
Gelman and Hill (2006) recommend to always use RE models for their specific 
characteristics.  
In particular, Gelman and Hill (2006) recommend this method when the aim of the 
study is: i) to account for variation both at the individual- and group-level while 
estimating the regression coefficients at the group-level, ii) to model the variation 
between regression coefficients at the individual-level and across groups, providing 
predictions for new groups and accounting for the variation in the uncertainty at the 
group-level for individual-level coefficients and iii) estimate coefficients for the 
regression on specific groups returning acceptable estimates even with small sample 
sizes. 
The characteristics of RE models were in line with the study on the relationships 
between international prices and the occurrence of riots. Indeed, the possibility of RE 
models to account for autocorrelation and provide estimates for different groups (in 
this case the countries), was suitable for this study. In addition, the maximum-
likelihood function resulting from the model could be used to estimate a threshold for 
the international price, which was the aim of the third study. This method was hence 
selected and implemented by using the pglm() R package (Croissant, 2013). 
3.4.2. Hazard models (survival analysis) 
The aim of the fourth study was to capture the information generated from the 
previous study on prices and riots and add another level of complexity by testing the 
effect of national food scarcity and political fragility on the occurrence of riots. In 
particular, the method to be selected needed to be able to statistically ascertain the 
time it takes for a riot to occur according to conditions set at different scales of 
analysis, i.e. at the global (for international prices) and national (for availability of 
food and political fragility) levels. 
The method deemed most suitable for this task was Hazard Models (HZ). The name 
of this method varies greatly according to the academic field of implementation. 
Other examples are Survival Analysis or Event History Analysis (Vermunt and 
Moors, 2005). HZ is a type of statistical regression that implements the maximum-
likelihood estimation method (like the others presented in this section) aimed at 
  
78 
predicting the risk for an event to occur given a set of covariates. In particular, these 
models estimate how long it takes for a particular event to happen, also explaining 
why some individuals are more at risk than others (Vermunt and Moors, 2005). HZ 
analyse the rates of occurrence for a particular event that can affect all the subjects of 
the study, who are all in the same state during a risk period (Vermunt and Moors, 
2005). 
In this analysis, the countries were the subjects of the study and the rate of occurrence 
of the event being ascertained was the riots. The condition that countries all shared 
was the international price of the natural resource being above the threshold and the 
duration of this condition constituted the risk period of the analysis. As mentioned in 
the previous chapter, countries greatly subsidise the price of natural resources to allow 
their populations to enjoy reasonable prices. The reasoning behind the implementation 
of this type of models relies on the dynamic that was identified as the main cause of 
food and fuel riots 11 : whenever the price of the resource crosses the threshold 
calculated in the previous study, governments’ expenditures to control prices increase. 
When this condition is sustained for a prolonged period, wealthy countries – or 
countries that have access to credit or other monetary sources – can afford to maintain 
the subsidies in place, whereas poorer countries are forced to cut the subsidies, hence 
causing discontent in the population and subsequent riots.  
HZ allows estimation of survival and hazard functions, i.e. the probability of an 
individual to survive to time t or the instantaneous rate of ‘death’ at time t (Kleinbaum 
and Klein, 2006). In the study, the HZ model implemented was the Cox Proportional 
Hazards Model (Cox PH) with the R package survival() (Therneau and Lumley, 2016) 
which focuses on the hazard function. The Cox PH model is a class of HZ and it 
allows to compare the risk experienced by different individuals and to test the effect 
of continuous covariates (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2006).  
3.4.3. Regression trees with random effects for longitudinal data  
For the fifth study, the method that was to be selected needed to be able to quantify 
the probability of a country to experience a riot according to different conditions, i.e. 
whether the international price of the resource was either above or below the 
                                                 
11 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed explanation. 
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threshold and the category of political fragility the countries belonged to, and provide 
probabilities for each condition for direct implementation in the ABMs, i.e. 
operationalise the results. For this reason, both RE and REEM models were explored.  
REEM models are a machine learning method that allows the exploration of panel and 
clustered data whilst accounting for autocorrelation and can deal with missing data. 
These are a version of regression trees and represent a generalisation of linear models 
with mixed effects (Sela and Simonoff, 2012).  
Tree models generally look similar and use the same jargon. They identify breaks in 
data for the predictors which are called decision nodes with a true/false condition that 
lead to either further decision nodes or a leaf. The very first decision node is called 
‘root node’. A specific combination of conditions identified by the decision nodes in 
the model leads to a leaf, which represents a specific value for the target variable. 
Generally, this is an iterative process applied recursively to each node identified as 
significant by the tree, which stops if a certain condition or threshold is met.  
Regression trees are machine-learning methods that generate prediction models from 
data and are implemented to estimate or predict a response. This type of tree-based 
method applies to cases where the target variable is quantitative. 
Regression trees were clearly particularly suitable for the research being presented 
here. This is because the dependent variables used in the analysis, i.e. food and fuel 
riots, were discrete ordered variables and the aim was to estimate the odds for each of 
the possible values taken by the response variable. 
Sela and Simonoff (2012) developed REEMtree, which is a regression tree estimation 
method that uses a tree structure to estimate mixed effects models and that 
incorporates individual-specific RE. With this method, the nodes can split on any 
attribute and, as a result, observations for the same individual can be included in 
different nodes. Since this method integrates RE with an algorithm similar to 
expectation maximisation (EM) using regression trees, this is called RE-EMtree 
(REEM). EM is an algorithm employed to estimate parameters in probabilistic models 
with incomplete data (Do and Batzoglou, 2008).  
In general, the use of tree methods is recommended when coupled with simulation 
models such as ABM (Sánchez-Maroño, et al., 2015). This is because the breaks 
(nodes) that identify splits in the data that lead to a specific leaf correspond to ‘if’ 
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clauses with a ‘true’ or ‘false’ response, which are widely implemented in any 
programming language. In addition, REEM models were particularly suitable for this 
particular study as the results from the models were already implementable in the 
ABMs. This is because REEM returns the probability for each value of the target 
variable to occur in relation to specific clauses, i.e. nodes. The implementation of this 
method and the comparison of its results with RE models will be presented in the 
following chapter.  
3.4.4. Evolutionary Trees 
Another tree-based machine learning technique that was implemented in this research 
was ET. The sixth study undertaken on riots involved the prediction of the regime of 
international prices, i.e. either above or below the threshold identified in the second 
study, according to a set of variables relative to the natural resource the price referred 
to. Once again, a tree-based method was preferred to other techniques due to its 
convenient applicability to computer models.  
ETs have been developed by Grubinger, et al. (2011), who operationalised this 
technique in the R package evtree() (Grubinger, et al., 2014). This method implements 
evolutionary algorithms to predict specific values in the target variable. Evolutionary 
algorithms are a type of stochastic optimisation method and ‘are inspired by 
Darwinian evolutionary theories for the natural environment, implementing concepts 
such as inheritance, mutation and natural selection’ (Grubinger, et al., 2011, p. 2). By 
applying an evolutionary algorithm to the partitioning procedure, ETs allow a 
comprehensive exploration of the tree’s parameters space, leading to global optima if 
only one exists. This is accomplished by considering all the nodes further down the 
tree to identify splits in the data. 
By implementing evolutionary algorithms, ETs should yield globally optimal results 
and can be more effective at optimising the trade-off between accuracy and 
complexity as compared to other partitioning methods.  
ETs are characterised by several limitations. Firstly, the global exploration of the 
tree’s parameters can be computationally intensive, affecting computation time and 
the memory required and hence can only be effectively applied to small datasets. 
Secondly, the evtree() R package cannot handle missing values, hence forcing to 
shrink further the size of databases that present gaps in the data. The last limitation of 
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ETs is related to the random nature of the algorithm on which these are based. When 
applied to large databases, different model runs can yield trees whose structure can 
differ greatly, which is acceptable when the purpose of the study is only to predict the 
target variable, although less so when the interpretation of the tree is important 
(Grubinger, et al., 2011). 
Although these limitations are generally important, these did not apply to the study on 
international prices as the database used was very small. In fact, the database used 
contained one record per year between 2005 and 2013 (8 records in total), one target 
variable and two predictors and did not present missing values. Most likely, any tree-
based partitioning method could have been applied effectively to such a small 
database. Although the interpretation of the tree resulting from the model was an 
important factor, the aim of the study was mainly to predict the international prices of 
natural resources. In addition, as it will be explained in Chapter 5, the structure of the 
trees was stable across different runs. Possible alternatives were the implementation 
of an existing study on price formation of the resources or the exogenous introduction 
of the prices in the ABMs. However, the first alternative was excluded due to the high 
complexity involved in the prediction of prices (see Chapter 2.8) and as for the second 
alternative, an endogenous generation of prices was preferred. For all these reasons, 
ET was the method implemented in this study. 
This chapter provided a detailed outline of the methodology and methods that have 
been used to structure and undertake this research. This will form the basis for the 
following chapters that will delve deeper into the structure of the model and its 
components. 
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4. Parameterisation of the agent-based models 
As outlined in Chapter 1, one of the principles this research had to follow was that the 
research needed to be mainly data-led, i.e. Principle 2 of the GRO Project. This 
implies that the relationships between the different variables needed to be empirically 
based and grounded in real data. To do so, a range of different techniques were 
applied to explore and quantify the dynamics that lead from food and fuel scarcity to 
the increased probability of experiencing food or/and fuel riots for countries. The 
knowledge and the numerical outcomes of the analyses have subsequently been used 
to inform the ABMs. 
Moreover, to satisfy principle 3 of the GRO Project, i.e. delivering free scenarios and 
forecasts, the analyses only used open-source and free to use data. When this was not 
possible or data was not available, new databases were collected and managed. This 
research used different sources for data. The main one is a database created within the 
framework of the GRO Project and maintained by colleagues at the GSI. The GRO 
database holds a collection of data sourced from trusted open-access databases such as 
WB and FAO (i.e. institutions that implement robust methodologies in the collection 
and manipulation of data they release) and further manipulated by researchers from 
the GSI to improve consistency and to complete the gaps (e.g. missing data for years 
and/or countries). The full database is freely available on the GSI’s website (GSI, 
2015). As part of this research, three more databases were compiled to allow the 
econometric analysis that will be described in the next sections of this chapter, two 
recording the number of food riots, i.e. one was created for an earlier version of the 
study on food riots and a second for an updated version of the same study, and 
another on fuel riots. 
The next section of this chapter will present the statistical analyses undertaken to 
parameterise the drivers of food riots. In particular, it will present an early version of 
this analysis that was published in Natalini, et al. (2015b) and subsequently updated in 
a paper submitted to the 2015 BHP Billiton Sustainable Communities/UCL Grand 
Challenges Symposium on Global Food Security and accepted for presentation 
(Natalini, et al., 2015a). The PowerPoint presentation related to the talk can be found 
on the website of the Symposium (Natalini, 2015). The analysis from this last paper 
will not be presented here as the second part of this section constitutes a further 
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update of Natalini, et al. (2015a) and is submitted to the journal Food Security in 
Natalini, Bravo and Jones (TBP). The second section of this chapter will present the 
same analysis on the parameterisation of the drivers for fuel riots, whereas the third 
section will present the results from the analysis of the interactions between food and 
fuel riots. The quantitative analyses presented in this chapter used a combination of 
software: Excel was used to carry out basic statistics, tables and figures. R (R Core 
Team, 2013) was used for the more complex statistics and to generate relevant output 
and figures. 
4.1. Parameterising the food system and drivers of food riots 
The analysis on food riots started by reviewing different databases containing records 
for these episodes, which eventually led to the decision of developing a new more 
comprehensive one. Subsequently, this database was used to evaluate with 
approximate calculations the relationship between scarcity of food and its 
international price, also testing the hypothesis of the existence of a threshold for the 
international price of food which, if surpassed, could contribute to the increase in the 
probability of food riots. These tests have been subsequently backed up with formal 
statistical tests. The same database has been used to evaluate the accuracy of several 
aggregated measures of national political fragility, which allowed identification of 
one as best performer. In addition, approximate calculations have been used to test 
whether a country being a net food importer contributes to that country’s probability 
of experiencing a food riot, which was subsequently tested with formal statistical 
tests. Finally, these results have been integrated with approximate calculations to 
estimate different probabilities of food riots for when international prices are above or 
below the threshold and for different categories of fragility. After the release of a key 
database of food riots published by WB and an update of the database of food riots 
used here, the whole analysis has been updated and the results operationalised with 
the implementation of REEM models.  
4.1.1. Compiling an initial database of food riots for the Arab Spring 
This initial analysis covered a time frame that can be attributed to the Arab Spring, i.e. 
2005 – 2011, as this period saw an unusually large occurrence of food riots, which 
have been widely acknowledged to be due to high prices of food (Lagi, et al., 2011; 
Gaub, 2012; Bleischwitz, et al., 2014) amongst other causes. This analysis started by 
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reviewing different databases for food riots. The only database available at the time 
when this research was undertaken was included in Lagi, et al. (2011). A careful 
consideration and review of the paper carried out as part of this research concluded 
that this database was not accurate. In particular, some of the food riots included in 
the study lacked a clear connection to any food-driven cause and/or any form of 
violence used in the protest. In addition, the method used to calculate a threshold for 
the FAO FPI over which food riots are more likely to occur was not reported, casting 
doubts about the validity of the authors’ findings. Hence this research compiled a 
database of monthly food riots occurrences in African, Middle-Eastern and Asian 
countries during the period between 2005 and 2011, which largely corresponds to the 
Arab Spring. The definition of food riots used to compile the database was provided 
in Chapter 2.7.1 12 . Data was collected by carrying out a simple search using 
combinations of different keywords to find newspaper articles in English that clearly 
stated the occurrence of violent demonstrations in response to the increase of the price 
of food or its scarcity, i.e. food riots, in African, Middle-Eastern and Asian countries. 
The countries resulting from this research are organised in Table 4.1.  
Country 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Burundi 
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2005) 
 
     
 
Somalia  
June (USA 
TODAY, 
2007) 
May (NBC 
News, 
2008) 
  August 
(Pflanz, 
2011) 
 
 
India  
October 
(Majumdar
, 2007) 
August 
(Mukherje
e, et al., 
2008) 
    
 
Mauritania  
November 
(Mail and 
Guardian, 
2007) 
     
 
                                                 
12 This definition was sourced from a WB report. Through personal correspondence with the main 
author of the report I discovered that himself and his team of research were using this definition to 
compile a database that would be used by the WB and its Food Price Observatory, which was 
undergoing internal review before being released on their website. Aligning the definition used for my 
research to that used by WB increased the chances of this research being used by the institution and 
potential collaborations with its researchers. The Food Price Observatory database of food riots, i.e. 
Food Riot Radar, (WB, 2015a) was only released after the first publication related to this PhD was 
published in Natalini, et al. (2015b), which led to an update of the analysis at a second time. However, 
as it will be discussed in the next section, aligning the definition of food riots to that of the report from 
the WB did not result in identical results for the episodes included. In fact, my database, once updated, 
included more records, which have been notified to the main author of the report and editor of the Food 
Price Watch Newsletter, but there has been no response from the team of researchers. 
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Cameroon   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Burkina 
Faso 
  
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Senegal   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Ethiopia   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
  
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2008b) 
    
 
Haiti   
April 
(Christie, 
et al., 
2008) 
    
 
Yemen   
March 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Morocco   
February 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Lebanon   
February 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Egypt   
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2008a) 
  January  
(Rianovost
i, 2011) 
 
 
Tunisia   
June 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
  January 
(Aburawa, 
2011) 
 
 
Sudan   
August 
(Sanders, 
2008) 
  January 
(McDoom, 
2011) 
 
 
Mozambiq
ue 
  
  September 
(Mangwiro
, 2010) 
  
 
Algeria   
   January 
(The Daily 
Telegraph, 
2011) 
 
 
Oman   
   February 
(Aljazeera, 
2011) 
 
 
Iraq   
   February 
(Al-Salhy, 
2011) 
 
 
Uganda   
   April 
(Kron, 
2011) 
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Syria   
   September 
(Asian 
Correspon
dent, 2013) 
 
 
Banglades
h 
  
February 
(The 
Times of 
India, 
2008) 
    
 
Guinea   
June 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Kenya   
May 
(Schoen, 
2011) 
    
 
Table 4.1 – Database of food riots from Natalini, et al. (2015b). Each cell contains the 
month(s) during which each country experienced a food riot during the year listed in 
each column.  
Each year therefore experienced the following number of food riots: 2005 (1), 2007 
(3), 2008 (17), 2010 (1), 2011 (9) that amounted to a total of 31 food riots and 2008 
and 2011 as the years that saw the highest number of food riots throughout the period 
considered.  
4.1.2. Calculating an initial threshold for international price of food 
Using the database for food riots presented in the previous section, Natalini, et al. 
(2015b) evaluated and estimated a threshold for the international price of food beyond 
which countries are more likely to experience food riots. The relationship between 
food price and food riots can already be seen in Figure 4.1, which plots the FAO FPI 
in both its nominal (blue line) and deflated (red line) versions against the number of 
food riots recorded in the database (green columns). Data for the FAO FPI was 
sourced from FAO (FAO, 2015). The figure shows an evident increase in the number 
of violent food-related episodes for high levels of the FAO FPI. 
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Figure 4.1 - The FAO monthly price index (nominal prices in blue and deflated in red) 
for food between 1990 and 2011 compared to the number of violent demonstrations 
that were associated with food over that month (shown in green) (Natalini, et al., 
2015b). 
Following the example of Headey (2011), the paper implements a simple 
mathematical approach for both the nominal and deflated versions of the FAO FPI 
(FAO, 2015) to test the existence of a threshold for the international price of food 
beyond which food riots are more likely to occur. The authors found two different 
regimes for the FAO FPI for its monthly and annual and deflated and nominal 
versions. These regimes are significantly different according to a one-tailed t-test. By 
graphically comparing the different regimes, the authors initially identify the 
following thresholds: 200 for the nominal annual FAO FPI and 140 for the deflated 
FAO FPI. The threshold for the monthly, deflated version of the FAO FPI was found 
at 130. 
Subsequently, the monthly threshold for the deflated version of the FAO FPI was 
further tested by introducing the database including only the countries that actually 
experienced a food riot in the period of the analysis in a logit model with random 
effects for country and time, with time expressed as the number of months since 
January 2005. The maximum likelihood estimations resulted in a highly significant 
positive coefficient for the monthly, deflated FAO FPI, which aids support to the idea 
of a direct causal relation between the increase of food prices and food riots. Table 4.2 
reports the results of the analysis.  
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) −14.434 2.165 −6.667 0.000*** 
FAO FPI deflated 0.066 0.013 5.091 0.000*** 
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σ 0.000 0.294 0.000 1.000 
Log-Likelihood −138.114    
No. 2,100    
Table 4.2 - Random effects logit regression model estimates (Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
The threshold for the deflated, monthly FAO FPI estimated from the model was 
calculated by evaluating Equation 4.1 with x = 0.01 to find the value for the 
international price of food above which the probability of a random country to 
experience a food riot is greater than 1%. The Betas in the equation were substituted 
with the coefficients resulting from the econometric model, i.e. -14.434 and 0.066.  
𝐹(𝑥) =
1
1 +  𝑒−(𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑥)
 
Equation 4.1 – Formula for logistic function probability (Own elaboration). 
The resulting value for the FAO FPI threshold was 148. More precisely, the 148 
threshold represents the value for the monthly, deflated FAO FPI above which the 
probability for a random country to experience a food riot is >1%. The 1% probability 
is an arbitrary threshold that was chosen to signify a probability of riots ≠ 0. 
4.1.3. Selecting a measure of national political fragility 
To test the relationship between national political fragility and the occurrence of food 
riots, the first step of the analysis involved choosing a measure that could capture the 
political fragility of countries. Because this measure would ultimately be included in 
the ABMs, hence adding another layer of complexity, the main requirements were 
practicality and ease of replication. This reasoning is in line with the idea that the 
most useful computer models are the ones that recreate the dynamics of the system 
which is the object of the study in the most simple, yet accurate, manner. National 
political stability or fragility can depend on a very large number of factors (Carment, 
et al., 2011) and modelling the dynamics that determine whether a country is 
politically stable or fragile was beyond the scope of this research. The method to be 
applied hence needed to encapsulate this information in a concise form. An index 
approach was the most suitable for this analysis as this approach is particularly used 
when there is a need to summarise different measures into a single figure. A report 
from The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) focusing on national 
political fragility reviewed some of the freely available indices and provided a clear 
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and comprehensive overview of the methodology used by each of these measures 
(UNDP, 2009). The indices included in the report that met the criteria of this research 
(see below) were hence included and their accuracy at capturing food riots was 
evaluated. Finally, the index that performed best was selected as a measure of national 
political fragility. 
Since this measure was going to be used in further developments of the research, i.e. 
the evaluation of the relationship between national political fragility and fuel riots, 
only aggregated indices of political fragility were evaluated, avoiding sector- or 
resource-specific measures of fragility (e.g. food security indicators). In addition, the 
index that would eventually be used in this research needed to abide by Principle 3 of 
the GRO Project, i.e. only use open-access sources, which further restricted the pool 
of possible measures of fragility that could be implemented.  
The review of indices started from UNDP (2009), a report collecting data and 
methodology for several indices. Table 4.3 presents the final list of indices of political 
fragility whose accuracy in capturing food riots was assessed. 
Index Producer 
No. of Countries 
Covered 
Years Available 
Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index State Fragility Index 
(BTI-SFI) (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung, 2008) 
Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 
119 (2006)–128 
(2012) 
2006, 2008, 2010, 
2012 
Fragility Index of the Country 
Indicator for Foreign Policy 
project (CIFP) (CIFP, 2008) 
Carleton University 30 (2008)–197 (2010) 2006–2008, 2010 
Failed States Index (FSI) (Fund 
for Peace, 2008) 
Fund for Peace 76 (2005)–177 (2012) 2005–2012 
Global Peace Index (GPI) 
(Institute for Economics and 
Peace, 2008) 
Institute for 
Economics and 
Peace 
120 (2007)–158 
(2012) 
2007–2012 
Index of state weakness in the 
developing countries (ISW) 
(Rice and Patrick, 2008) 
Brookings Institute 141 2008 
Peace and Conflict Instability 
Ledger (PCIL) (Hewitt, et al., 
2008) 
University of 
Maryland 
162 (2008)–163 
(2012) 
2008–2012 
Political Instability Index (PII) 
(EIU, 2007) 
The Economist 
Group 
165 2007, 2010 
State Fragility Index (global 
reports) (SFI global) (Marshall 
and Cole, 2009) 
George Mason 
University 
159 (2006)–164 
(2010) 
2006–2008, 2010  
State Fragility Index (excel file) 
(SFI xls) (Center for Systemic 
Peace, 2014) 
George Mason 
University 
164 (2004)–167 
(2012) 
2004–2012 
Worldwide Governance 
Indicators: Political Instability 
and Absence of Violence 
The World Bank 
207 (2004)–212 
(2012) 
2004–2012 
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(WGI) (WB, 2015c) 
Table 4.3 - Summary of the indices used in this study with time series available and 
the number of countries covered (adapted from Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
Two indices of political fragility included in the UNDP (2009) publication were 
excluded due to a comparatively low number of countries covered: (i) the Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)/International Development Association 
(IDA) Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) developed by the World Bank (WB, 2014); 
(ii) the Harvard Kennedy School Index of African Governance developed by the 
Harvard Kennedy School (Rotberg and Gisselquist, 2009); As for the BTI, the index 
as produced by the Bertelsmann Stiftung originally included two different indices: the 
Status Index and the Management Index, which both rely on further indicators 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2008). UNDP (2009) extracted two indicators from the index 
built by Bertelsmann Stiftung and rearranged them in a new fragility index called the 
State Fragility Index (BTI-SFI). The two measures selected in the report to create this 
new index were: (i) monopoly on the use of force; and (ii) basic administration 
(security area and political area). This research employs the BTI-SFI and not the 
index as developed by its producer. Moreover, since UNDP (2009) only provided one 
year for the BTI-SFI, i.e. 2008, the missing time-series13 were calculated following 
the methodology used in the report. 
In addition to this list of indices, GDP per capita (GDP pc) in both its ‘current’ and 
‘constant 2005 dollars’ versions were included and their accuracy as possible 
indicators of food riots. Since different authors have argued that the Arab Spring and 
in particular food riots may be partly due to the conditions of poverty that countries 
suffer (Gaub, 2012), the most common indicator of a country’s wealth was evaluated 
alongside other indicators of political fragility. The data for these two variables was 
sourced from the GRO Database (GSI, 2015). 
The evaluation of the different indices of political fragility followed several stages: i) 
which index ranked as most fragile the highest number of countries that experienced a 
food riot the same year the riot was recorded, i.e. best descriptor of food riots; ii) 
which index ranked as most fragile the highest number of countries that experienced a 
                                                 
13 Since the original BTI index is published biannually and this analysis covered the period 2005 – 
2011, the BTI-SFI was calculated for the years 2006, 2010 and 2012. 
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food riot the year before the riot was recorded, i.e. best predictor of food riots; iii) test 
whether the indices suffer from a one- (or more) year time lag in the data for the 
indicators on which they rely. 
The indices included in this analysis had different purposes: some were aimed at 
simply describing the current fragility of countries, others claimed predictive power, 
i.e. forecast situations of fragility or unrest, and still others claimed to be able to do 
both. In addition, most institutions that develop this type of indices warn possible 
final users not to rely on their products for decision-making. Despite this 
recommendation, indices are commonly used as part of the decision-making process 
as relates to future international policies, investments and aid (Carment, et al., 2011). 
For all these reasons, the year 2004 was included in this analysis in order to evaluate 
whether the indices were indeed able to predict the food riots occurred in 2005 and 
every following year.  
The analysis of the indices encountered several methodological issues: i) the indices 
used different definitions of political fragility; ii) the indices used different categories 
to classify the political fragility of countries between years; iii) the indices used 
different approaches to divide the countries in categories; iv) different ranking 
techniques have been applied to the indices and to different versions of the same 
index (e.g. the SFI as provided with the excel spreadsheet downloaded from the 
George Mason University website and as provided by the Centre for Systemic Peace 
Global Reports); v) the time series available for the indices did not cover the whole 
period of this analysis, and data often presented missing values for some countries 
(e.g. Somalia in the Political Instability Index). For instance, the CIFP for 2006 and 
2008 provides only the top 30/40 most-at-risk countries and only the rank of the 
countries (and not the scores) for the year 2010. This and other similar examples 
made the cross-index comparison methodologically challenging.  
To partially overcome these issues, the analysis of the accuracy for the indices only 
involved a specific number of countries per index. This was selected by comparing 
the number of countries included in the categories most at risk of the indices that 
provided defined categories of fragility. In particular, the categories that were taken 
into account were: (i) very high alert, high alert and alert for the FSI; (ii) failed states, 
very fragile states and fragile states for the BTI-SFI; (iii) top 30/40 for the CIFP; (iv) 
top 20% least at peace for the GPI; (v) failed states, critically weak states and weak 
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states for the ISW; (vi) top 25 countries for the PCIL (as reported in Hewitt, et al., 
2008; Hewitt, et al., 2010); (vii) very high risk and high risk for the PII; and (viii) 
extreme fragility and high fragility for the SFI. As shown in Figure 4.2, which 
presents the number of countries in the categories of interest for each country/year, 
this number ranged between 6 – 94 and the average 31.5. The analysis hence focused 
on the top 30 most fragile countries for each index. The analysis was also extended to 
the top 40 most fragile countries to evaluate whether this affected the results. Albeit 
this method solved some of the methodological issues characterising the cross-index 
comparison, the data available for the indices did not allow the employment of a 
formal, standardised and sound quantitative method for the cross-index comparison. 
For this reason, approximate estimates were calculated in the first instance to evaluate 
the accuracy of the different indices and the results were subsequently validated with 
formal quantitative methods. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Number of countries in the categories of interest for each index of 
fragility. The columns represent each index (see legend), for each year (own 
elaboration). 
The accuracy of the indices at predicting and describing food riots was tested by 
comparing the ranking given to each country by the indices and the actual food riots 
recorded in the database presented in Table 4.1. In particular, their accuracy was 
computed by calculating the proportion of countries that experienced a food riot out 
of the top 30/40 countries most fragile as ranked by the indices. This was done both 
for the year prior to the food riots recorded to test the forecasting power of the indices 
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and for the same year to test their descriptive power. For example, if an index was 
assigned with 50% accuracy for the top 30 countries most at risk, this meant that half 
of the countries listed as the 30 most fragile countries from that index experienced a 
food riot. For reasons of brevity Table 4.4, provides as an example the results of the 
accuracy analysis for the indices for the year 2008, i.e. the year with the largest 
number of food riots.  
Name of the Index 2007 Year Prior 2008 Same Year 
Descriptive Indices: Top 30 Top 40 Top 30 Top 40 
SFI xls 41% 47% 41% 59% 
SFI global 41% 53% 47% 53% 
GPI 35% 47% 35% 53% 
ISW NA NA 47% 47% 
BTI NA NA 47% 53% 
WGI 65% 65% 59% 65% 
Descriptive and predictive 
indices: 
    
CIFP 53% 59% 47% NA 
FSI 53% 77% 59% 77% 
Predictive indices:     
PCIL NA NA 41% 65% 
PII 41% 41% NA NA 
GDP per capita:     
GDP pc (current $) 35% 41% 35% 47% 
GDP pc (2005 const $) 29% 35% 35% 41% 
Table 4.4 - Example of accuracy test carried out on the indices for the food riots 
occurring in 2008 (best data coverage: food riots recorded in 15 countries) (adapted 
from Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
The same procedure was employed for each year considered in the analysis. The 
indices that proved to be most accurate – both as predictors and as descriptors of food 
riots – are reported in Table 4.5. Since 2008 and 2011 saw the largest number of food 
riots, these years were considered as more important for this analysis. 
Purpose of  Year of Food Riots 
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the Index 2005 2007 2008 2010 2011 
Predictor 
WGI, SFI xls, GDP pc 
(current $), GDP pc (2005 
constant $) 
SFI xls, CIFP WGI 
PCIL, GDP pc 
(current $), 
GDP pc (2005 
constant $) 
WGI, SFI 
xls 
Descriptor 
WGI, SFI xls, FSI,  
GDP pc (current $), GDP 
pc (2005 constant $) 
WGI, SFI xls, 
CIFP 
FSI 
PCIL, GDP pc 
(current $), 
GDP pc (2005 
constant $) 
WGI 
Table 4.5 – Most accurate indices divided by year for food riots (adapted from 
Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
The WGI was the most accurate index throughout the period, correctly categorising as 
highly fragile the largest number of countries that experienced food riots for three 
years out of five, both as a predictor and descriptor. Second was the SFI xls, which 
resulted most accurate three years out of five as predictor and two years out of five as 
descriptor. The FSI resulted the third most accurate index, with two years out of five 
as descriptor, along with both versions of the GDP pc (current $ and 2005 constant $), 
which jointly came first alongside other indices two years out of five in both 
categories. Therefore, the other indicators can be considered as no better than general 
GDP measures as a tool to predict and capture the occurrence of food riots. 
Since the two years that saw the largest incidence of food riots were 2008 and 2011, 
i.e. 17 and 9, respectively, this analysis suggests the WGI as the best predictor of food 
riots, even if its purpose was only descriptive. The descriptive power of WGI and FSI 
is apparently equal. Two out of four indices whose aim is to forecast political fragility 
of countries were the most accurate only one year out of five (alongside other non-
predictive indices): the CIFP and the PCIL. As for the other two predictive indices, 
the FSI was better at describing rather than forecasting food riots, whereas the PII did 
not perform well in either category. Interestingly, these indices were most accurate at 
predicting food riots in years that saw a very low number of events recorded, which 
leads one to question the ability of these indices to capture the outbreak of violent 
events. To justify this statement it is worth remembering here that, as highlighted in 
Chapter 2, food riots have a negative impact on the political stability of countries. 
This dynamic should be captured by indices of political fragility and alike by 
definition. 
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To investigate the presence of time lags in the data underlying the indices, the time-
series of the rankings for the countries that experienced food riots as given by the 
indices were plotted. For each index, the simple average ranking for every year for 
those countries was calculated. This was done only for the countries that experienced 
food riots in 2008 and 2011 because of the larger number of observations, i.e. food 
riots, during these years. 
This assessment was carried out for both indices with the highest accuracy score. The 
WGI and FSI averages are provided in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Since the 
ranking scale used by the indices was different, the WGI’s was inverted to allow 
comparison between the two indices. In the figures, the higher the fragility of a 
country, the higher its ranking. 
 
Figure 4.3 – Plot of the WGI average scores each year from 2004 until 2012 for the 
countries that experienced food riots in 2008 (blue line) and those that experienced 
food riots in 2011 (red line) (Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
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Figure 4.4 – Plot of the FSI average scores each year from 2004 until 2012 for the 
countries that experienced food riots in 2008 (blue line) and those that experienced 
food riots in 2011 (red line) (Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
If the indices were able to accurately capture the increased political fragility due to the 
occurrence of food riots in the selected countries, we would expect to see a peak in 
their rankings in correspondence to the years 2008 and 2011 for the indices with 
descriptive purpose, i.e. both indices, and a peak in correspondence to the years 2007 
and 2010 for the index has a predictive purpose, i.e. the FSI. The plot for the WGI 
shows a peak in 2008 with no delay, whereas it continues to rise into 2012 after the 
2011 food riots, which could indicate a delay or that other factors affecting political 
fragility more generally could be associated with this increase. As for the FSI, the plot 
shows a one-year delay in capturing the food riots for 2008, and again, the 2011 line 
increases in 2012. This further shows the inability of the FSI to fulfil its aim as a 
predictor, at least in capturing food riots. This analysis suggests the WGI as the most 
accurate index amongst those evaluated, as it best captures the underlying conditions 
(Gaub, 2012) for food riots. 
4.1.4. Initial evaluation of net food production as potential indicator for food 
riots 
As reported in Chapter 2, another main driver of food riots is believed to be the level 
of food security in countries. Countries that are reliant on the international food 
market to source the part of national food demand that they cannot meet internally are 
more likely to experience food riots when the international price of food increases, as 
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they are more exposed to the higher prices (Lagi, et al., 2011). To test this hypothesis, 
the WGI was used in conjunction with a measure of national self-sufficiency for food 
availability (and hence as a measure of national reliance on the international food 
market) to evaluate the contribution of food security to the occurrence of food riots.  
To carry out this analysis, the countries were divided into categories of political 
fragility. As the WB does not provide categories of fragility for the WGI, these were 
calculated as equal intervals based on the range of the fragility scores for the whole 
period of analysis and sorted in a decreasing order of fragility, i.e. the first category is 
the most fragile and the last the least fragile. Countries were further divided in two 
categories, according to their net food production throughout the years: (i) countries 
with positive net production of food (net food exporters, self-sufficient countries); and 
(ii) countries with negative net production of food (net food importers, not self-
sufficient countries). Net food production was calculated as the difference between 
countries’ national food production and consumption using the variables Food 
Production (1000 MT) and Food Consumption (1000 MT) sourced from the GRO 
database (GSI, 2014). The following countries were excluded from this analysis due 
to missing data for food production/consumption: French Guiana, Réunion, 
Martinique, Taiwan (China), Nauru, Netherland Antilles and Anguilla. 
Similarly to the measure of accuracy computed in the previous section, this test 
calculated the proportion of countries that experienced a food riot as compared to the 
number of countries in each category of fragility for the WGI. This was done for both 
categories of food availability, for every year when a food riot was recorded, i.e. 
2004, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010 when the index was used as predictor and 2005, 2007, 
2008, 2010, 2011 when used as descriptor. An example is provided in Table 4.6. For 
instance, a measure of 50% in the first quartile of the WGI for countries with negative 
net food production implies that half of the countries included in the first category of 
the WGI that were net food importers experienced a food riot in that year. 
WGI Proportions of Food Riots in 2008 
Categories 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
WGI as predictor 
    
Net food importers 67% 21% 13% 0% 
Net food exporters 40% 24% 5% 0% 
WGI as descriptor     
Net food importers 50% 27% 13% 0% 
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Net food exporters 33% 29% 4% 0% 
Table 4.6 - Proportions of net food importers/exporters that experienced food riots 
divided in categories of fragility for the WGI in 2008 (adapted from Natalini, et al., 
2015b). 
To provide an approximate estimate for the whole period, the proportion of the 
countries belonging to each category of food availability and to each category of 
fragility that experienced a food riot were averaged across the reference period of the 
analysis. The results are presented in Table 4.7 alongside the range, which is provided 
as a measure of dispersion of the results. 
 
Table 4.7 - Average proportions of net food importers/exporters divided in categories 
of fragility for the WGI that experienced food riots (adapted from Natalini, et al., 
2015b). 
The results in Table 4.7 show a slightly higher accuracy of the WGI as predictor than 
as descriptor. Although net food importers registered a slightly higher rate of food 
riots than net food exporters, the range for the proportions for every category of 
fragility are large and indicate an extreme variability in the occurrence of food riots in 
either category of food availability. This makes it difficult to draw any conclusion 
from this analysis and it also implies that the occurrence of food riots was only 
marginally affected by national annual availability of food. This may be due to a 
number of different factors, including a higher degree of corruption, seasonal 
variation in the availability of food or lack of infrastructure in those fragile countries 
(see, for example, Bretthauer, 2014), that can all lead to inadequate distribution of 
food within countries, which might not show in annual variables such as the ones used 
in this analysis. In conclusion, this analysis suggests that annual food availability 
WGI Average Proportions of Food Riots 
Categories 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
WGI as predictor 
    
Net food importers 20% 6% 3% 1% 
Range 0-67% 0-15% 0-13% 0-4% 
Net food exporters 10% 7% 1% 0% 
Range 0-25% 0-25% 0-5% 0-1% 
WGI as descriptor     
Net food importers 10% 8% 4% 0% 
Range 0-50% 0-22% 0-13% 0% 
Net food exporters 8% 8% 2% 0% 
Range 0-20% 0-30% 0-4% 0% 
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within a country is not a reliable indicator for food riots alongside the condition of 
being an existing fragile state. 
4.1.5. Formal quantitative test to validate previous results 
To validate the previous indicative analyses and their conclusions on the threshold for 
the FAO FPI, on the WGI as best indicator to capture food riots and on the national 
availability of food not being a reliable indicator of food riots alongside national 
political fragility, a more formal statistical approach was implemented. This was 
possible because, notwithstanding the low number of food riots used in this analysis, 
data for the WGI and for the variables used to derive countries’ net food production 
presented very few missing values. The method selected was HZ using a Cox PH 
regression model. In the case of this research, the events were the food riots, and the 
time variable introduced in the HZ recorded the months during which the monthly, 
deflated FAO FPI was above the 148 monthly threshold as calculated with the RE 
model in Section 4.1.2. Throughout the time frame considered for this study, i.e. 
2005–2011, there were in total 32 non-continuous months above the threshold: i) 
September 2007–September 2008; ii) November–December 2009; iii) August 2010–
December 2011. The covariates tested were the national political fragility of countries 
as represented by the WGI and countries’ net food production as proxy for national 
availability of food. The variable net food production was recoded in a binary variable 
which equalled 0 for countries that were net food importers, i.e. countries with 
negative net food production, and 1 if net food exporters, i.e. countries with positive 
net food production. 
Since the majority of food riots recorded in the database were concentrated in the 
period September 2007–September 2008, i.e. 19 events, this was used as reference 
period for the analysis. In line with the standard use of HZ, countries were right-
censored as they experienced a food riot, i.e. if a country experienced a food riot in 
June 2008, its observations were only included in the database for the first ten months. 
Countries that experienced more than one food riot during the period of analysis were 
hence only counted once. Since the time frame selected was in between the years 
2007 and 2008 and the variables used as covariates were annual estimates, the model 
used an average estimate for the WGI for each country and data for 2008 to calculate 
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national net food production. This last choice was due to inconsistencies in data for 
the variables used for the calculations between the two years.  
Table 4.8 shows the results from the HZ, which remarkably confirm the findings from 
the previous sections. Although the availability of food in a country has a negative 
impact on the occurrence of food riots, this relationship is not significant. Conversely, 
the relationship between WGI and food riots is positive and highly significant: for 
every unit increase in the WGI estimate, i.e. higher political fragility of countries, the 
likelihood of experiencing a food riot increases on average by a factor of 2.75. The 
Concordance Index provides a very positive result as any value above 0.5 for this 
index implies a good ability of the covariates at predicting the observed data. The 
other measures of goodness of fit, i.e. Wald, likelihood ratio and score (log rank), are 
significant, which means that the null hypothesis that the betas equal 0 can be rejected 
with 95% confidence. 
Covariates 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Exponentiated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
(Coef) 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
z p-value 
Net food 
production (2008) 
−0.1286 0.8793 0.4807 0.4690 −0.274 0.784 
WGI average 
(2007/2008) 
1.0103 2.7465 0.2066 0.1543 6.548 5.83e−11 *** 
Notes: N = 202; number of events = 18 (9 observations deleted because they were missing); 
concordance = 0.826 (se 0.069); R-squared = 0.114 (max possible = 0.609); likelihood ratio test = 
24.44 on 2 df; p = 4.92e-06; Wald test = 46.59 on 2 df; p = 7.626e-07; score (log rank) test = 29.91 on 2 
df; p = 3.206e-07; robust = 12.77, p = 0.001688; Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ 
’. 
Table 4.8 – Hazard model calculated on the months between 2007 and 2008 when the 
monthly, deflated FAO FPI was above the threshold of 148 using countries’ reliance 
on the international food market and national WGI as covariates (adapted from 
Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
To further examine the effect of WGI estimates for a country on the probability of 
that country to experience a food riot when the FAO FPI is above the 148 monthly 
threshold, the hazard ratios were calculated assuming the relationship between WGI 
and food riots as linear. These are plotted in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 – Plot of the hazard ratios for the hazard model on the 2007-2008 period of 
analysis, where the hazard ratios are plotted on the y-axis and the covariates on the x-
axis. Note that the plot was generated taking into account both covariates. Since Net 
food production 2008 is not significant, the whole impact on the occurrence of food 
riots can be attributed to the WGI alone. The shaded areas represent the σ and 2σ 
probability intervals, respectively (Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
As Figure 4.5 shows, countries that are more politically fragile have a relatively 
higher probability of experiencing food riots than those that are less politically fragile. 
For instance, Somalia, who had an average WGI of 3.28 in the years 2007–2008, was 
around 21-times more likely to experience a food riot than Malawi, whose average 
WGI was 0.00. This estimate was calculated by evaluating the maximum likelihood 
equation provided by the model with x = 3.28. 
4.1.6. Proportion of food riots for different WGI categories when FAO FPI is 
above the threshold 
This section aims at bringing together findings on the threshold for the FAO FPI and 
on the accuracy of the WGI by calculating the average proportions of countries that 
experienced a food riot for each category of fragility as determined by the WGI for 
the years when the international price of food was above the threshold. This was only 
done for the annual versions of the FAO FPI as the WB does not provide monthly 
data for the fragility of the countries.  
The selection of the years when the FAO FPI was above the annual threshold incurred 
another methodological challenge: by using the threshold on the nominal value of the 
FAO FPI, the years above the threshold during the timeframe considered in this study 
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were two, 2008 and 2011, whereas using the deflated version of the index the years 
above the threshold were three, 2008, 2010 and 2011. Tables 4.9 and 4.10 present the 
proportions of food riot for each category of the WGI when the price was above the 
threshold for the nominal and deflated versions of the FAO FPI, respectively. Both 
tables provide the range for each figure as a measure of dispersion of the results. 
 
WGI classes of fragility 
Categories 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Proportions of food riots 37% 18% 5% 0% 
Range 33-40% 8-28% 2-8% 0% 
Table 4.9 - Average proportions of food riots for the categories of the WGI when the 
FAO FPI was above the 200 threshold on the annual, nominal version of the FAO FPI 
(adapted from Natalini, et al., 2015b). 
 
WGI classes of fragility 
Categories 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
Proportions of food riots 24% 12% 4% 0% 
Range 0-40% 0-28% 1-8% 0% 
Table 4.10 - Average proportions of food riots for the categories of the WGI when the 
FAO FPI was above the 140 threshold on the annual, deflated version of the FAO FPI 
(own elaboration). 
Both tables show a clear trend: the proportions decrease alongside the decrease in 
fragility. The proportions in from Table 4.9 are higher than those reported in Table 
4.10 and, in addition, the range of the results from the first table are rather narrow, 
which denotes a clear trend in the relationship between these two variables and a high 
confidence in these results. This is due to the fact that the years taken into account to 
generate this table, i.e. 2008 and 2011, were the years when the largest number of 
food riots was recorded.  
In Table 4.10 the inclusion of 2010, which only recorded one food riot during the 
timespan and geographical area considered in this analysis, resulted in a considerable 
increase in the range of the figures. This brings into question the validity of these 
results and of the method implemented for this analysis.  
Finally, it is worth noting that fragility is not confined to the most fragile categories, 
but also relatively politically stable countries that fall in the third category can still 
experience violent events under specific circumstances.  
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However promising and interesting the findings presented in the previous sections 
may be, this analysis presented several methodological issues. In particular, the very 
low number of food riots recorded in the database used poses questions about the 
reliability of the results from the statistical models that have been implemented. In 
addition, the different proportions for the categories of the WGI obtained using either 
the threshold on the nominal or deflated versions of the FAO FPI called for further 
investigation. 
4.1.7. An updated analysis on food riots 
Following the mixed and sometimes contradictory results provided by the initial 
analysis on food riots, this was replicated on a larger database. By extending time- 
and geography-wise the scope of the analysis more food riots were included in the 
analysis, which provided more robust and confident results that remarkably confirmed 
those from the initial analysis. In addition, the new version of the database also 
included updated data for food production and consumption for countries, always 
sourced from the GRO database (GSI, 2015) and for the WGI estimates, sourced from 
the WB (WB, 2015c). This larger database was used to rerun the statistical tests 
presented in the previous sections. The analysis was also extended to include further 
statistical tests to operationalise the results and include them in the Food and 
integrated Food and Fuel ABMs. 
4.1.7.1. An updated database of food riots 
This updated analysis now included a reference period of 9 years, i.e. 2005 –2013, 
and the geographical area was extended to the whole world. This was done also to 
include the observations from a key database on food riots created by the WB Food 
Price Observatory programme, i.e. Food Riot Radar (WB, 2015a). The previous 
version of the food riot database and the Food Riot Radar database presented some 
inconsistencies. Although the same definition of food riots was used to collect data, 
the database included some food riots that weren’t captured by the Food Riot Radar 
database. For this reason, it was updated to include all the records from the WB’s 
database, but also a new keyword Internet search was performed following the same 
methodology reported in Section 4.1.1. The final version of the database for food riots 
presented in Appendix 1 included more records than the Food Riot Radar database.  
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Each year therefore experienced the following number of food riots: 2005 (1), 2007 
(3), 2008 (27), 2009 (1), 2010 (3), 2011 (11), 2012 (4), 2013 (2) that amounted to a 
total of 52 food riots, with 2008 and 2011 as the years that saw the highest number of 
food riots throughout the period considered. This update added 21 records to the 
previous database. 
4.1.7.2. An updated threshold for the FAO FPI 
To overcome the discrepancy obtained in the previous section while selecting the 
years above the FAO FPI threshold, from here on the analysis was focused 
exclusively on the deflated version of the FAO FPI. This is justified by the fact that 
the deflated version is purified from the effect of inflation and other short-term price 
dynamics. In addition, the analysis on the FAO FPI threshold only focused on annual 
estimates to simplify the analysis and to allow for consistency between different parts 
of the analysis.  
The same RE model presented in Section 4.1.2 was fit to the new database over the 
timeframe 2005 – 2013. During this time period new countries formed: Montenegro 
gained independence in 2006, Kosovo in 2008 and South Sudan in 2011. These three 
countries have been included in the database from the year following their 
independence because of the better reliability of annual data. As found by Natalini, et 
al. (2015a) the maximum likelihood estimations resulted in a highly significant 
positive coefficient for the deflated FAO FPI (Table 4.11). Applying Equation 4.1 the 
new annual threshold on the deflated version of the FAO FPI above which countries 
start to experience food riots was found at 140, slightly lower than the one found in 
the previous analysis, but, due to the larger database used, more accurate. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -11.689 1.785 -6.549 5.79e-11*** 
FAO FPI deflated 0.051 0.011 4.526 6.02e-06*** 
σ 1.524 0.397 3.842 0.000*** 
Log-Likelihood -217.185    
Table 4.11 - Random effects logit regression model estimates (Natalini, et al., 2015a). 
Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
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4.1.7.3. An updated formal test for the relationship between WGI, 
import/export and food riots 
The results from the Cox PH analysis was updated as well fitting the same model 
presented in Section 4.1.5 to the new data. The periods when the deflated version of 
the FAO FPI was above the 140 threshold were the following: i) August 2007 – 
September 2008 that corresponds to 14 months and 28 food riots (although India and 
Peru experienced more than one food riot during this timeframe, only the first riot 
occurred in either country was accounted for and data after that was right-censored as 
is standard practice in HZ models); ii) November 2009 – February 2010 that 
corresponds to 4 months and no food riots; iii) July 2010 – November 2014. Since this 
timeframe goes beyond the period considered for this analysis, only the period July 
2010 – December 2013 was considered. This corresponds to 42 months and 20 food 
riots. This analysis focused on the periods 2007-2008 and 2010-2013 as these were 
the only timeframes when the FAO FPI was above the threshold and food riots were 
recorded.  
Differently from Natalini, et al. (2015b) and from the analysis reported in Section 
4.1.5, this update used national data from the first year, i.e. 2007 and 2010 for the first 
and second period above the price threshold respectively, rather than data averaged 
for the two (or more) years, as this is more common practice in the use of HZ. In 
addition, this updated analysis provides the controls to check whether the covariates 
meet the assumption of proportionality required by the Cox PH model, which was 
tested using the cox.zph() function (Grambsch and Therneau, 1994) provided with the 
survival package for R (Therneau and Lumley, 2016) based on weighted residuals. 
This control tests the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝛽 = 0 that the covariates included in the 
model do not meet the assumption of proportionality. The test was run with the 
argument global = True, which also tests whether the model as a whole meets the 
proportionality of hazard assumption. The results of this test for both covariates are 
presented in Table 4.12 for the first period and in Table 4.13 for the last period 
considered in this analysis.  
Covariates 𝝆 𝚾𝟐 p-value 
Importer/exporter 
2007 
0.014 0.005 0.942 
WGI 2007 0.361 1.948 0.163 
Global NA 1.973 0.373 
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Table 4.12 – Test for the proportionality of the hazards for the covariates included in 
the Cox model for the period 2007-2008 (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 
‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
Covariates 𝝆 𝚾𝟐 p-value 
Importer/exporter 
2010 
-0.123 0.295 0.587 
WGI 2010 0.061 0.055 0.815 
Global NA 0.416 0.812 
Table 4.13 – Test for the proportionality of the hazards for the covariates included in 
the Cox model for the period 2010-2013 (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 
‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
As the tables above clearly show, both the p-value for the single covariates and for the 
model as a whole are > 0.05. This is true for both periods considered in this analysis. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of the hazards for the covariates not being proportional 
can be confidently rejected and the alternative hypothesis of the proportionality of the 
hazards for the covariate is accepted.  
Having ensured that the covariates met the assumptions of the Cox PH model, the 
models could be fit to the data for both periods when the FAO FPI was above the 140 
threshold. The results for the models are reported in Table 4.14 for the period 2007-
2008 and in Table 4.15 for the period 2010-2013. 
Covariates 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Exponentiated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
(Coef) 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
z p-value 
Importer/exporter 
2007 
-0.3983 0.6715 0.3929 0.3823 -1.042 0.297 
WGI 2007 0.8614 2.3664 0.1628 0.1338 6.436 1.23e-10*** 
Notes: N = 202; number of events = 27 (9 observations deleted because they were missing); 
concordance = 0.796 (se 0.057); R-squared = 0.129 (max possible = 0.754); likelihood ratio test = 
27.82 on 2 df; p = 9.111e-07; Wald test = 45.95 on 2 df; p = 1.055e-10; score (log rank) test = 33.38 on 2 
df; p = 5.633e-08; robust = 17.62, p = 0.0001492; Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ 
’. 
Table 4.14 – Hazard model on the period August 2007 – September 2008 when the 
deflated version of the FAO FPI was above the 140 threshold using whether the 
countries were net importers/exporters and WGI as covariates (own elaboration). 
Covariates 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Exponentiated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
(Coef) 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
z p-value 
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Importer/exporter 
2010 
-0.3206 0.7257 0.4554 0.4545 -0.706 0.48 
WGI 2010 0.9427 2.5669 0.2106 0.1897 4.970 6.71e-07*** 
Notes: N = 204; number of events = 20 (8 observations deleted because they were missing); 
concordance = 0.769 (se 0.065); R-squared = 0.099 (max possible = 0.644); likelihood ratio test = 
21.18 on 2 df; p = 2.513e-05; Wald test = 27.67 on 2 df; p = 9.809e-07; score (log rank) test = 24.31 on 2 
df; p = 5.249e-06; robust = 10.62, p = 0.004935; Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ 
’. 
Table 4.15 – Hazard model on the period July 2010 – December 2013 when the 
deflated version of the FAO FPI was above the 140 threshold using whether the 
countries were net importers/exporters and WGI as covariates (adapted from Natalini, 
et al., 2015a). 
The results from the HZ model were very similar for both periods and were consistent 
with those found by Natalini, et al. (2015b). Although the relationship between being 
a net food exporter and food riot was negative, this was not significant. Conversely, 
even with a longer period of analysis and a larger food riots database, higher levels of 
political fragility positively and significantly affect the probability of food riots in 
countries. In particular, according to the exponentiated coefficients for the covariate 
in both periods, any unit increase in the WGI of a country more than doubles the 
probability of that country to experience a food riot. As for the tests provided with the 
Cox model, the Concordance Index provided a very positive result as any value above 
0.5 for this index implies a good ability of the covariates at predicting the observed 
data. The other measures of goodness of fit, i.e. Wald, likelihood ratio and score (log 
rank), were significant, which means that the null hypothesis that the betas equal 0 
can be rejected with 95% confidence. 
To further examine the effect of WGI estimates for a country on the probability of 
that country to experience a food riot when the FAO FPI is above the 140 annual 
threshold, the hazard ratios were calculated. These are plotted in Figure 4.6 and 
Figure 4.7 for the 2007-2008 and 2010-2013 periods, respectively. 
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Figure 4.6 – Plot of the hazard ratios for the hazard model on the 2007-2008 period of 
analysis, where the hazard ratios are plotted on the y-axis and the covariates on the x-
axis. Note that the plot was generated taking into account both covariates. Since 
Importer/Exporter 2007 is not significant, the whole impact on the occurrence of food 
riots can be attributed to the WGI alone. The shaded areas represent the σ and 2σ 
probability intervals, respectively (own elaboration). 
 
Figure 4.7 – Plot of the hazard ratios for the hazard model on the 2010-2013 period of 
analysis, where the hazard ratios are plotted on the y-axis and the covariates on the x-
axis. Note that the plot was generated taking into account both covariates. Since 
Importer/Exporter 2010 is not significant, the whole impact on the occurrence of food 
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riots can be attributed to the WGI alone. The shaded areas represent the σ and 2σ 
probability intervals, respectively (Natalini, et al., 2015a). 
As Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show, countries that are more politically fragile have a 
relatively higher probability of experiencing food riots than those that are less 
politically fragile. Following these results, the WGI was selected as the preferred 
method to simulate countries’ political fragility for the other parts of this analysis and 
in the ABMs. 
4.1.7.4. Selection of a method to implement food riots probabilities in the Food 
and integrated Food and Fuel versions of the ABM 
This section aims at operationalising the findings reported so far. Once tested the 
influence of the international price of food and national political fragility on the 
occurrence of food riots, this information needed to be translated in a functional 
probability for each variable that would subsequently be included in the ABMs. This 
could have been done with different methods, whose applicability was comparable, 
but whose accuracy and practicality differed greatly. For this reason two different 
methods were implemented and their accuracy at predicting food riots was compared 
to finally select one. The selected method was then implemented in the Food and 
Food and Fuel ABMs to calculate the probability for each country to experience a 
food riot. Since this whole analysis was repeated to parameterise fuel riots and 
subsequently operationalise the findings and implement them in the Fuel and Food 
and Fuel ABMs, consistency between the two analyses was critical. The method 
selected needed to be the same for food and fuel riots and the integrated analysis, 
which is why the final choice will be made in the Discussion Section of this chapter.  
The methods selected for the comparison were: i) RE and ii) REEM. Both methods 
used a binary variable that recorded whether each country experienced a food riot in a 
given year as dependent and two new independent variables: one binary variable that 
modelled the international price of food through two regimes, i.e. above/below the 
threshold, by classifying each year as either below or above the 140 threshold for the 
FAO FPI and an ordinal scale variable that assigned each country to one of four 
homogenous categories of fragility according to their WGI estimate for each year. 
These categories were calculated by computing homogenous breaks for the WGI 
estimates using the whole range of possible estimates given by the index for the whole 
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period, i.e. 2005 – 2013. The categories were arbitrarily called: high fragility; 
medium-high fragility; medium-low fragility; low fragility. Although, as it will be 
shown below, the original independent variables for the FAO FPI and WGI used in 
their continuous form generated better predictions for the probability of food riots, 
these were translated in discrete variables because of how these variables are 
modelled in the ABMs. In line with the modelling approach, the ABMs were 
structured to be kept as simple as possible, although still able to reproduce some of 
the dynamics that lead to the occurrence of food riots. International price of food and 
national political fragility are amongst these and hence needed to be included in the 
models. However, since both the variables that capture this information, i.e. FAO FPI 
and WGI, depend on complex dynamics themselves, which were not necessarily the 
aim of this research, the dynamics that lead to international food price fluctuations 
and change in countries’ political fragility were not modelled or only modelled 
partially. This means that the figures for these variables generated by the ABMs 
would be inaccurate estimates. To avoid the provision of specific figures that would 
be meaningless, it was preferred to provide classes for each of the variables, hence 
reducing the possibility of error.  
Firstly, a RE model (M1) using the continuous versions of the FAO FPI and of the 
WGI tested these variables’ influence on the dependent variable Food Riots. The 
results presented in Table 4.16 show that both variables have a positive, significant 
influence on the occurrence of food riots in countries and the accuracy of this model 
at predicting food riots was used as a baseline to show the loss of information due to 
the transformation of the independent variables from continuous to discrete. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -1.189e01 1.786 -6.658 2.79e-11*** 
FAO FPI deflated 5.153e-02 1.132e-02 4.551 5.35e-06*** 
WGI 1.070 1.421e-01 7.528 5.14e-14*** 
σ 3.190e-11 7.342e-01 3.842 1 
Log-Likelihood -187.2191    
Table 4.16 – Results for RE model M1 with FAO FPI and WGI included as 
continuous variables used as baseline for comparison with other models (own 
elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
Secondly, another RE model (M2) was developed using the discrete versions of the 
two independent variables. The results presented in Table 4.17 show that the 
variables, even in their discrete version have a significant influence on the occurrence 
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of food riots in countries. As expected, each class of fragility has a positive influence 
on the occurrence of food riots, which is stronger as the fragility of the classes – and 
hence of the countries belonging to each class – increases. This can be noted by the 
increasing values of the estimates, i.e. the 𝛽, for each class. In addition, this model 
provides a comparison of the significance between the classes of each variable using 
the below-the-threshold price regime for the FAO FPI and the low-fragility category 
for the WGI as benchmarks. The model results highlight a significant difference for 
all the categories included in each variable from the respective benchmark. Therefore, 
this model was selected and its accuracy compared with a REEM model using the 
same variables. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -7.250 8.246e-01 -8.792 < 2e-16*** 
FAO FPI regime 1.975 4.759e-01 4.150 3.33e-05*** 
Medium-low WGI 2.142 7.484e-01 2.862 0.004213** 
Medium-high WGI 2.886 7.443e-01 3.878 0.000105*** 
High WGI 3.653 7.874e-01 4.639 3.49e-06*** 
σ -6.854e-12 1.475 0 1 
Log-Likelihood -196.2663    
Table 4.17 – RE model M2 with discrete variables for FAO FPI threshold and WGI 
categories (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
Subsequently, a REEM model was fit to the data using the variable food riots as 
dependent and the discrete variables for FAO FPI and WGI as independent to find 
different ‘paths’ or combinations of values that lead to different probabilities of food 
riots for countries. The continuous variables were not tested with this method as the 
algorithm would have identified splits in the variables, hence leading to discrete 
variables. The results of the model are presented in Figure 4.8.  
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Figure 4.8 – REEM model with discrete variables for FAO FPI threshold and WGI 
categories (adapted from Natalini, et al., 2015a). Notes: n = 1904; intercept = 
0.0001082515; Estimated variance of errors = 0.0251652781120792; Log likelihood 
= 789.545285468834. 
REEM models only return leaf nodes that are statistically significant (Sela and 
Simonoff, 2012). Positively, the structure of the tree looks very simple, splitting on 
both variables and identifying only three ‘paths’ that lead to different probabilities of 
food riots for countries. In particular, countries belonging to low or medium-low 
category of fragility for the WGI will have the same probability of experiencing a 
food riot independently from the FAO FPI regime. This only significantly affects the 
probability of food riots for the countries belonging to the categories with higher 
levels of fragility as defined by the WGI. Interestingly, the splits calculated by the 
REEM model suggest that the variable WGI that was arbitrarily split in four 
categories with different levels of fragility could potentially be split in only two 
classes, as far as the probability of food riots for countries is concerned. This is 
different from the results of the model M2, which suggest that each category of the 
WGI is significantly different from the benchmark ‘low’ fragility. 
The accuracy of these three models was compared alongside model M0, which always 
predicts 0 for the variable Food Riot. In addition, two versions of the model REEM 
were tested, one without RE (REEM) and another which included them (REEMre). 
The random effects estimated for each country were extracted with the function ranef 
() of the R package REEMtree (Sela and Simonoff, 2011). The accuracy of the models 
was tested by running 1000 iteration of an R script which generated predictions on 
whether each country included in the full database would have experienced a food riot 
according to the likelihood functions generated by each model for each year and 
compared them with the database on reported food riots. The script recorded for every 
run and for every model the percentage of food riots correctly predicted out of the 
total number of food riots occurred, i.e. comparison of only the 1s included in the 
variable food riot, and the percentage of records correctly predicted out of the total 
number of records present in the database, i.e. comparison of both 0s and 1s in the 
variable food riot. The records that presented missing values in any of the variables of 
interest were omitted from the database used for the comparison. Because of the 
variability built in the predictions generated by each model, each of the 1000 
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iterations was slightly different and the mean for both percentages was calculated. 
Table 4.18 presents the mean percentages of correctly predicted food riots and 
correctly predicted records for each model. 
Models 
Food riots 
predicted 
Total 
correct 
M0 0 97.21% 
M1 13.59% 94.92% 
M2 53.90% 79.46% 
REEM 5.61% 94.81% 
REEMre 6.39% 94.83% 
Table 4.18 – Results of the accuracy test for the different models evaluated in this 
analysis. The second column reports the mean of the percentage of food riots correctly 
predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations, whereas the third column 
reports the mean of the percentage of any record, i.e. food riot yes or no, correctly 
predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations (own elaboration). 
Table 4.18 clearly shows that model M1 was overall the most accurate by predicting 
the largest percentage of records, i.e. both whether countries experienced or did not 
experience a food riot. Model M2 was the most accurate at predicting food riots, 
despite losing accuracy in the percentage of total records correctly predicted. This is 
probably due to the fact that Model M2 simply attributed to countries a high 
probability of experiencing a food riot, hence increasing the number of false positives, 
i.e. countries that were predicted to experience a food riot according to the likelihood 
function generated by the model, but did not in reality. REEM models maintain a total 
accuracy comparable to that of M1, although underestimating the probability of food 
riots. Once RE for each country are added to the predictions of the model, i.e. 
REEMre model, the accuracy at predicting food riots increases by almost 1%. 
4.2. Parameterising the fuel system and the dynamics that lead to fuel riots 
As discussed in Chapter 2, research on riots related to oil and other energy resources 
is absent to the best of my knowledge. However, this type of events does happen, as 
testified by the several online newspaper articles that report the occurrence of the so-
called ‘fuel riots’.  
Due to this lack of academic knowledge, the approach taken by this thesis was to test 
whether the same dynamics that are true for food riots also apply to fuel riots. Since 
  
114 
the previous sections already identified the WGI as the index of political fragility 
most accurate at capturing riots, the analysis on fuel riots only used this. 
4.2.1. Compiling a database for fuel riots 
Similarly to the analysis on food riots, the aim of this analysis was to evaluate if and 
how scarcity of fuel, international fuel prices and national political fragility impact the 
occurrence of fuel riots in countries. As mentioned in Chapter 2.7.1, the Collins 
English Dictionary defines as ‘fuel’ ‘every conventional non-renewable energy 
resource’ (Collins, 2016). Following this definition, this research included coal, 
natural gas and oil as the energy resources to be modelled. Although fuel riots have 
been occurring until recently, this analysis focused on the period between 2005 and 
2013 to provide results comparable to those from the analysis on food riots. Due to 
the lack of research and academic literature in the field, no databases on fuel riots 
were available at the time when this thesis was being written. For this reason, the 
same methodology used for food riots was implemented to collect data on fuel riots. 
A database of monthly fuel riots that occurred anywhere in the world during the 
period between 2005 and 2013 was created. The definition of fuel riots used to collect 
data was provided in Chapter 2.7.1. Data collection followed the same process as for 
food riots and a table summarising the fuel riots included can be found in Appendix 2.  
Each year experienced the following number of fuel riots: 2005 (2), 2006 (2), 2007 
(2), 2008 (13), 2010 (4), 2011 (8), 2012 (4), 2013 (9) that amounted to a total of 44 
fuel riots and 2008, 2011 and 2013 as the years that saw the highest number of fuel 
riots throughout the period considered. 
4.2.2. A threshold for the international price of fuel 
This section presents tests on the relationship between the international price of fuel 
and the occurrence of fuel riots, in particular trying to identify the presence of a 
threshold for the international price of fuel over which fuel riots are more likely to 
occur. Although fuel riots, as explained in previous section, can relate to any energy 
resource, only the relationship between the international price of crude oil and the 
occurrence of fuel riots was evaluated in this thesis. This decision was due to different 
reasons: firstly, oil is the only energy resource for which an international market has 
fully developed. The international trade of natural gas is mostly ‘continental’, i.e. 
traded within continents, because of storage and transportation challenges (Davoust, 
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2008; Phillips and Natalini, TBP) with prices that vary greatly between different 
markets (Davoust, 2008) and although evidence of an international market for coal 
was found (Ellerman, 1995), this finding has been challenged for more recent data 
(Wårell, 2006). In addition, most of the coal produced is mainly consumed in the 
same country where it is produced, with international trade accounting for only 15% 
of coal consumption worldwide in 2012 (US EIA, 2016); secondly, most of the 
analyses on price behaviours of energy resources focused on US prices due to the high 
availability of data and long time-series for this country (see for example Pindyck, 
1999; Serletis and Xu, 2016), which makes it challenging to draw conclusions on the 
relationships between the different energy sources at the international level. However, 
it is common knowledge that the prices of coal, natural gas and oil are correlated, at 
least at the national level (see for example Serletis and Xu, 2016) with evidence that 
markets of crude oil, coal, and natural gas are cointegrated in the long run in the US 
(Bachmeier and Griffin, 2006) and UK (Asche, et al., 2006). In particular, there is 
evidence of an indirect link between prices of natural gas and crude oil in the US 
(Hartley, et al., 2008). Because oil is the only energy resource with a real international 
market and international price and retains the world’s largest share of total primary 
energy supply (IEA, 2016), only its international price was evaluated as potential 
cause of fuel riots. However, to allow future versions of the ABM to implement prices 
for the other energy resources, production and consumption dynamics for natural gas 
and coal are included in the Food and Fuel ABM. 
Data for the international price of crude oil was sourced from the US Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) (US EIA, 2015b). EIA provides free to use time 
series for crude oil spot prices for the two main international hubs where crude oil is 
exchanged and which are used as benchmarks for the international price of crude oil, 
one based in the US and one in Europe: Cushing, Oklahoma (WTI) and Brent, 
London (Brent). Although the prices recorded for the two benchmarks slightly differ, 
research found that the international market for crude oil is highly globalised and the 
two benchmark prices tend to move together (Hammoudeh, et al., 2008; Reboredo, 
2011). For this reason, the fuel price used as independent variable in this analysis 
(hereafter called EIA fuel price) was the simple average between the two benchmark 
prices.  
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The relationship between the international price of fuel and fuel riots can already be 
seen in Figure 4.9, which plots the EIA fuel price (blue line) against the number of 
fuel riots recorded in the database (green columns). The Figure shows an evident 
increase in the number of violent fuel-related episodes for high levels of the EIA fuel 
price. 
 
Figure 4.9 - The EIA fuel price between 2005 and 2013 (blue line) compared to the 
number of violent demonstrations that were associated with fuel over each month 
(green columns) (own elaboration). 
An RE model for fuel riots was fit to the data for fuel following the procedure 
presented in the food riots section. The results are presented in Table 4.19. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) − 8.847 1.175 − 7.530 5.08e-14*** 
EIA fuel price 0.046 0.012 4.038 5.39e-05*** 
σ 2.095 0.427 4.902 9.47e-07*** 
Log-Likelihood -182.48    
Table 4.19 - Random effects logit regression model estimates for EIA fuel price 
influence on the occurrence of fuel riots (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 
‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
The maximum likelihood estimations resulted in a highly significant positive 
coefficient for the EIA fuel price, which provides initial evidence of a direct causal 
relationship between the increase in the international price of fuel and the occurrence 
of fuel riots. Similarly to the analysis on food riots, Equation 4.1 was implemented 
and the threshold for the EIA fuel price was found at $93 per barrel.  
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4.2.3. Testing the relationship between WGI, import/export and fuel riots  
As for the analysis on food riots, the method selected to test the relationship between 
fuel scarcity, WGI and fuel riots was Cox PH. In this case, the events whose 
probability was being estimated were the fuel riots, and the time variable introduced 
in the HZ model recorded the months during which the monthly version of the EIA 
fuel price was above the $93 annual threshold. Throughout the time frame considered 
for this study, i.e. 2005–2013, there were in total 44 non-continuous months above the 
threshold: i) November 2007; ii) February–September 2008; iii) January 2011–May 
2012 and iv) July 2012-December 2013.  
The analysis focused only on the second, third and fourth period excluding the first, as 
this only involved one month and no fuel riots. In addition, the third and fourth 
periods were considered as a single continuous interval as they are divided by only 
one month, i.e. June 2012. This decision is justified by the fact that treating the two 
periods as a single interval allowed the model to run on three whole years, including 
18 fuel riots (India and Indonesia experienced more than one fuel riot during this time 
frame and the records for these countries were right-censored after the first fuel riot 
they experienced as is standard practice in HZ models). Moreover, June 2012 fell 
below the threshold because of the averaging procedure implemented: the month 
recorded a price well above the threshold for the Brent spot price, whereas the WTI 
was below the threshold, resulting in an international price below the threshold when 
averaged. Therefore, two HZ models were fit to the data: one for the period February–
September 2008, which included 11 fuel riots, and another for the period January 
2011–December 2013, which included 18 fuel riots.  
The model tested the effect of two covariates on the probability of the occurrence of 
fuel riots: the net oil production of countries, i.e. proxy for a country’s reliance on the 
international oil market for the part of oil consumption that cannot be met internally, 
hence defining a country as either net importer or net exporter of oil, and the WGI. 
The variable net oil production consisted in the simple difference between the 
variables Total Petroleum Consumption (Thousand Barrels per day) and Total Oil 
Supply (Thousand Barrels Per Day) sourced from the GRO database (GSI, 2015) for 
each country, for each year and was recoded in a binary variable which equalled 0 for 
countries that were net oil importers and 1 if net oil exporters. The data used for the 
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covariates related to the first year of each period that was analysed, i.e. 2008 and 2011 
for the first and second period above the price threshold, respectively. 
The results for the tests checking whether the covariates met the assumption of 
proportionality required by the Cox model for both covariates are presented in Table 
4.20 for the first period and in Table 4.21 for the last period considered in this 
analysis.  
Covariates 𝝆 𝚾𝟐 p-value 
Importer/exporter 
2008 
-0.545 3.415 0.0646 
WGI 2008 0.371 0.626 0.4289 
Global NA 3.619 0.1637 
Table 4.20 – Test for the proportionality of the hazards for the covariates included in 
the Cox model for the period 2008 (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 
0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
Covariates 𝝆 𝚾𝟐 p-value 
Importer/exporter 
2011 
0.0661 0.069 0.793 
WGI 2011 0.1245 0.174 0.677 
Global NA 0.231 0.891 
Table 4.21 – Test for the proportionality of the hazards for the covariates included in 
the Cox model for the period 2011-2013 (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 
‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
As the tables above clearly show, both the p-value for the single covariates and for the 
models as a whole are > 0.05, although the Imporer/Exporter covariate for the period 
2008 is very close to the acceptance threshold. This is true for both periods considered 
in the analysis. Therefore, the null hypothesis of the hazards for the covariates not 
being proportional can be confidently rejected and the alternative hypothesis of the 
proportionality of the hazards for the covariates is accepted.  
HZ models were then run on both periods when EIA fuel price was above the $93 
threshold. The results are reported in Table 4.22 for the period 2008 and in Table 4.23 
for the period 2011-2013. 
Covariates 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Exponentiated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
(Coef) 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
z p-value 
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Importer/exporter 
2008 
- 1.2115 0.2978 1.0577 1.0734 -1.129 0.259 
WGI 2008 0.3524 1.4225 0.2727 0.2190 1.609 0.108 
Notes: N = 202; number of events = 11 (9 observations deleted because they were missing); 
concordance = 0.661 (se 0 0.09); R-squared = 0.014 (max possible = 0.438); likelihood ratio test = 2.83 
on 2 df; p = 0.2427; Wald test = 3.3 on 2 df; p = 0.1923; score (log rank) test = 2.73 on 2 df; p = 
0.2555; robust = 2.92, p = 0.232; Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
Table 4.22 – Hazard model on the period February–September 2008 when the EIA 
fuel price was above the $93 threshold using whether the countries were net 
importers/exporters and WGI as covariates (own elaboration). 
Covariates 
Regression 
Coefficient 
Exponentiated 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
(Coef) 
Robust 
Standard 
Error 
z p-value 
Importer/exporter 
2011 
- 0.071 0.932 0.531 0.484 -0.146 0.884 
WGI 2011 0.960 2.611 0.218 0.193 4.978 6.41e-07*** 
Notes: N = 205; number of events = 18 (8 observations deleted because they were missing); 
concordance = 0.787 (se 0.068); R-squared = 0.089 (max possible = 0.604); likelihood ratio test = 
19.04 on 2 df; p = 7.324e-05; Wald test = 24.97 on 2 df; p = 3.778e-06; score (log rank) test = 21.61 on 2 
df; p = 2.025e-05; robust = 11.7, p = 0.00288; Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
Table 4.23 – Hazard model on the period January 2011 – December 2013 when the 
EIA fuel price was above the $93 threshold using whether the countries were net 
importers/exporters and WGI as covariates (own elaboration). 
The results for the periods differed greatly. Although the HZ model for the 2008 
period found a negative relationship between a country being a net importer or 
exporter of oil and fuel riots and a positive one between the WGI and fuel riots, 
neither of these were significant. This may be due to the fact that the period 
considered was shorter than that used for the other models and did not cover an entire 
year, i.e. only 9 months. Conversely, the results from the HZ model run on the second 
period, i.e. 2011 – 2013 were very positive and similar to those found in the analysis 
on food riots: the relationship between being a net oil exporter and fuel riots was not 
significant, conversely from WGI and fuel riots. In particular, according to the 
exponentiated coefficient for the covariate in the last period, any unit increase in the 
WGI of a country more than doubles the probability of that country to experience a 
fuel riot. As for the tests provided with the Cox Model, the results for the period 2008 
are negative for all the tests presented. Conversely, those provided for the period 2011 
– 2013 are positive: the Concordance Index provides a very positive result as any 
value above 0.5 for this index implies a good ability of the covariates at predicting the 
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observed data. The other measures of goodness of fit, i.e. Wald, likelihood ratio and 
score (log rank) are significant, which means that the null hypothesis that the betas 
equal 0 can be rejected with 95% confidence. Figure 4.10 shows the hazard ratios for 
the period 2011 - 2013. Countries that are more politically fragile have a relatively 
higher probability of experiencing fuel riots than those that are less politically fragile. 
Following these results, the WGI was confirmed as accurate at capturing both food 
and fuel riots and hence was used as the preferred method to simulate countries’ 
political fragility for the other parts of this analysis and in the ABMs. 
 
Figure 4.10 – Plot of the hazard ratios for the hazard model on the 2011-2013 period 
of analysis, where the hazard ratios are plotted on the y-axis and the covariates on the 
x-axis. Note that the plot was generated taking into account both covariates. Since 
Importer/Exporter 2011 is not significant, the whole impact on the occurrence of fuel 
riots can be attributed to the WGI alone. The shaded areas represent the σ and 2σ 
probability intervals, respectively (own elaboration). 
4.2.4. Selection of a method to implement fuel riots probabilities in the fuel 
version of the ABM 
This section aims at operationalising the findings reported in the previous sections on 
the analysis for fuel riots. To maintain consistency between the two analyses, the 
same methods evaluated for the analysis on food riots, i.e. RE and REEM, have been 
compared here evaluating their accuracy at predicting fuel riots to finally select one.  
Both methods used a binary variable that recorded whether each country experienced 
a fuel riot in a given year as dependent and two new independent variables: one 
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binary variable that modelled the international price of fuel through two regimes, i.e. 
above/below the threshold by classifying each year as either below or above the $93 
threshold for the EIA fuel price and an ordinal scale variable for the four categories of 
the WGI. As for the analysis on food riots, the continuous versions of the independent 
variables for the EIA fuel price and WGI were compared with their discrete versions. 
Firstly, a RE model (M1) using the continuous versions of the EIA fuel price and of 
the WGI tested these variables’ influence on the dependent variable Fuel Riot. The 
results presented in Table 4.24 show that both variables have a positive, significant 
influence on the occurrence of fuel riots in countries and the accuracy of this model at 
predicting fuel riots was used as a baseline to show the loss of information due to the 
transformation of the independent variables from continuous to their discrete form. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -8.936 1.185 -7.543 4.59e-14*** 
EIA fuel price 0.046 0.011 4.046 5.21e-05*** 
WGI 0.851 0.204 4.170 3.05e-05*** 
σ 1.789 0.413 -4.329 1.50e-05*** 
Log-Likelihood -171.4708    
Table 4.24 – Results for RE model M1 with EIA fuel price and WGI included as 
continuous variables used as baseline for comparison with other models (own 
elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
Secondly, another RE model (M2) was developed using the discrete versions of the 
two independent variables. The results presented in Table 4.25 show mixed results for 
the variables in their discrete version: all the classes for international price of fuel 
regimes and WGI groups have a positive impact on the occurrence of fuel riots. 
Similarly to the analysis on food riots, the comparison of significance between the 
classes of each variable highlights that the two price regimes are significantly 
different from each other, whereas the classes ‘low’ and ‘medium-low’ of the WGI 
are not significantly different from each other. This suggests that potentially these two 
classes could be merged, although the estimated coefficients vary. Therefore, this 
model was selected and its accuracy compared with another REEM model using the 
same variables.  
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -6.2282 0.610 -10.208 < 2e-16*** 
EIA fuel price regime 1.583 0.398 3.976 7.02e-05*** 
Medium-low WGI 0.282 0.574 0.492 0.622822 
Medium-high WGI 1.609 0.541 2.976 0.002925** 
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High WGI 2.309 0.688 3.355 0.000793*** 
σ -1.652 0.408 -4.054 5.03e-05*** 
Log-Likelihood -171.3897    
Table 4.25 – RE model M2 with discrete variables for EIA fuel price threshold and 
WGI categories (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 
0.1 ‘ ’. 
Subsequently, a REEM model was fit to the data using the variable fuel riots as 
dependent and the discrete variables for EIA fuel price and WGI as independent. The 
results of the model are presented in Figure 4.11.  
 
Figure 4.11 – REEM model with discrete variables for EIA fuel price threshold and 
WGI categories (own elaboration). Notes: n = 1904; intercept = 0.001367006; 
Estimated variance of errors = 0.0195820602281012; Log likelihood = 
980.769632178929. 
Positively, the structure of the tree is remarkably similar to the one resulted from the 
analysis on food riots presented in Section 4.1.7.4. The low and medium-low 
categories of the WGI will have the same probability of experiencing a fuel riot 
independently from the EIA fuel price regime. Price regime only significantly affects 
the probability of fuel riots for higher levels of fragility. Also in this case, the REEM 
model suggests that the variable WGI could potentially be split in only two classes. 
This is in line with the results from model M2 which suggest that the WGI could be 
divided in three classes of fragility rather than four. 
The accuracy of these models was compared alongside model M0, which always 
predicts 0 for the variable Fuel Riot. The procedure followed the analysis on food 
riots with two versions of the REEM model being tested, one without RE (REEM) 
and another which included them (REEMre). Table 4.26 presents the mean 
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percentages of correctly predicted fuel riots and correctly predicted records for each 
model. 
Models 
Fuel riots 
predicted 
Total 
correct 
M0 0 97.67% 
M1 3.30% 96.61% 
M2 1.60% 96.80% 
REEM 5.25% 95.67% 
REEMre 11.29% 95.93% 
Table 4.26 – Results of the accuracy test for the different models evaluated in this 
analysis. The second column reports the mean of the percentage of fuel riots correctly 
predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations, whereas the third column 
reports the mean of the percentage of any record (fuel riot 0s and 1s) correctly 
predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations (own elaboration). 
Table 4.26 provides results that differ greatly from those of the same models fit to 
data on food riots. The percentages representing the total number of records correctly 
predicted by each of the model tested is remarkably similar. The comparison between 
the accuracies of models M1 and M2 shows that recoding the variables for EIA fuel 
price and WGI in a discrete form results in a loss of predicting power. However, the 
percentage of fuel riots correctly predicted was very low as compared to the REEM 
models, in particular the version including RE. Indeed, once RE for each country are 
added to the predictions of the model, i.e. REEMre model, the accuracy at predicting 
fuel riots increases by 6%. REEMre model was hence undoubtedly the most accurate 
at predicting fuel riots in countries using the variables tested in this analysis. 
4.3. Interaction between food and fuel riots 
This section tested whether countries that experienced a food riot were more likely to 
experience a fuel riot as well and vice versa. This analysis was interesting for 
different reasons: firstly, as shown in the food and fuel riots databases in Appendices 
1 and 2, respectively, multiple countries experienced both food and fuel riots; 
secondly, food and fuel as resources are partly interdependent. Indeed, fuel is one of 
the inputs needed to grow food and, at the same time, specific crops can be 
transformed in biofuel, which can create competition in the use of these crops 
between the two sectors, hence impacting the price of either resource. Related to this 
last point, multiple sources indicated the US expansive policy on biofuels as one of 
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the major causes of the spike in the international price of food in 2008 and 2011 (See 
Chapter 2.8). Finally, food and fuel are also basic needs (alongside water), so any rise 
in the cost of these resources will impact households’ budgets similarly. 
Once again, the analysis tested the same methods that were used for both the food and 
fuel riots analyses. Both methods whose accuracy at predicting either riots was tested 
used a binary variable that recorded whether each country experienced a fuel or a food 
riot in a given year as dependent and another binary variable recording the other type 
of riots as independent.  
Firstly, a RE model (M1) testing the effect of Fuel Riot as independent variable on the 
variable Food Riot was fitted to the data from the full database. The results presented 
in Table 4.27 show that the variable Fuel Riot has a positive, significant influence on 
the occurrence of food riots. The accuracy of this model was hence evaluated and 
compared alongside the others. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -4.05 0.272 -14.877 < 2e-16*** 
Fuel Riot 2.454 0.452 5.435 5.47e-08*** 
σ -1.1 0.435 -2.527 0.0115* 
Log-Likelihood -221.54    
Table 4.27 – Results for RE model M1 with the variable Fuel Riot used as 
independent variable to predict the occurrence of food riots (own elaboration). Sig. 
codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
Secondly, another RE model (M2) was developed to test the inverse relationship 
between the two variables, i.e. testing the effect of Food Riot as independent variable 
on the variable Fuel Riot. The results presented in Table 4.28 show that the variable 
Food Riot has a positive, significant influence on the occurrence of fuel riots. The 
accuracy of this model was hence evaluated and compared alongside the others. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -4.741 0.361 -13.144 < 2e-16*** 
Food Riot 2.427 0.493 4.925 8.46e-07*** 
σ -1.788 0.409 -4.374 1.22e-05*** 
Log-Likelihood -183.4802    
Table 4.28 – RE model M2 with the variable Food Riot used as independent variable 
to predict the occurrence of fuel riots (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 
‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
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Subsequently, a REEM model (REEMfood) was fit to the data using the variable 
Food Riot as dependent and the variable Fuel Riot as independent. The results of the 
model are presented in Figure 4.12.  
 
Figure 4.12 – REEMfood model testing the effect of fuel riots on the occurrence of 
food riots (own elaboration). Notes: n = 1904; intercept = 0.0005401692; Estimated 
variance of errors = 0.0247643227790632; Log likelihood = 793.817352564094. 
The REEM tree identifies the variable Fuel Riot as significant and the split identifies 
two different probabilities for countries to experience a food riot according to whether 
the country previously experienced a fuel riot or not. In particular, the model assigns a 
probability close to zero if the country did not experience a fuel riot, whereas the 
chances for a country to experience a food riot increase substantially if that country 
had previously experienced a fuel riot. 
The inverse relationship was tested with another REEM model (REEMfuel), which 
was fit to the data using the variable Fuel Riot as dependent and the variable Food 
Riot as independent. The results of the model are presented in Figure 4.13.  
 
Figure 4.13 – REEMfuel model testing the effect of food riots on the occurrence of 
fuel riots (own elaboration). Notes: n = 1904; intercept = 0.001469882; Estimated 
variance of errors = 0.0194768047140661; Log likelihood = 986.414684322138. 
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Similarly to the previous REEM tree model on food riots, the REEM tree for fuel riots 
identifies the variable Food Riot as significant and the split identifies two different 
probabilities for countries to experience a fuel riot according to whether the country 
previously experienced a food riot or not. In particular, the model assigns a 
probability close to zero if the country did not experience a food riot, whereas the 
chances of the country to experience a fuel riot increase substantially if that country 
had previously experienced a food riot. 
The accuracy of the models distinguishing between those using Food Riot and Fuel 
Riot as dependent variables and was compared alongside model M0, which always 
predicts 0 for the variables Food and Fuel Riot). Mirroring the previous analyses on 
riots, two versions of the REEM models were tested, one without RE (REEM) and 
another which included them (REEMre). Table 4.29 presents the results for the 
models using Food Riot as dependent variable and reports the mean percentages of 
correctly predicted food riots and correctly predicted records for each model. 
Models 
Food riots 
predicted 
Total 
correct 
M0 0 97.21% 
M1 0.34% 97.19% 
REEMfood 5.78% 94.87% 
REEMfoodre 7.77% 94.91% 
Table 4.29 – Results of the accuracy test for the different models using Food Riot as 
dependent variable. The second column reports the mean of the percentage of food 
riots correctly predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations, whereas the 
third column reports the mean of the percentage of any record (food riot 0s and 1s) 
correctly predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations (own elaboration). 
The results shown in Table 4.29 differ greatly from the comparison provided for the 
models on food riots and resembles that on fuel riots. In particular, here the RE model 
captures a negligible percentage of food riots, whereas the REEM model captures a 
larger amount. As for the total amount of records, the REEM model performs worse 
as compared to the RE model, although losing only 3% of accuracy. As for the 
previous analyses on riots, adding the country-specific random effects to the REEM 
model, i.e. REEMfoodre, increases both the percentage of correctly predicted food 
riots and the overall records. In particular, including the random effects in the REEM 
model increases the percentage of correctly predicted food riots by 2%. 
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Table 4.30 presents the results for the models using Fuel Riot as dependent variable 
and reports the mean percentages of correctly predicted fuel riots and correctly 
predicted records for each model. 
Models 
Fuel riots 
predicted 
Total 
correct 
M0 0 97.21% 
M2 0.26% 97.72% 
REEMfuel 4.86% 95.68% 
REEMfuelre 12.10% 96.04% 
Table 4.30 – Results of the accuracy test for the different models using Fuel Riot as 
dependent variable. The second column reports the mean of the percentage of fuel 
riots correctly predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations, whereas the 
third column reports the mean of the percentage of any record (fuel riot 0s and 1s) 
correctly predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations (own elaboration). 
Similarly to the previous table, Table 4.30 differs greatly from the comparison 
provided for the models on food riots and resembles that on fuel riots. Also here the 
RE model captures a negligible percentage of fuel riots, whereas the REEM model 
resulted more accurate at predicting the fuel riots. As for the total amount of records, 
the REEM model performs worse as compared to the RE model, although losing only 
2% of accuracy. As for the previous analyses on riots, adding the country-specific RE 
to the REEM model, i.e. REEMfuelre, increases both the percentage of correctly 
predicted fuel riots and the overall records. In particular, including the RE in the 
REEM model increases the percentage of correctly predicted fuel riots by a 
remarkable 8%. 
4.4. Discussion 
This chapter presented findings from initial approximate calculations and formal 
statistical tests that evaluated and quantified the effect of different variables on the 
occurrence of food and fuel riots. Interestingly, the analyses on each type of riot was 
perfectly in line with the other. 
The results presented found a positive, statistically significant relationship between 
the international price of food – as modelled by the FAO FPI – and the occurrence of 
food riots, also identifying 140 as the threshold for the annual, deflated version of the 
FAO FPI over which the probability of food riots increases significantly. In addition, 
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an accuracy analysis identified the WGI as the best predictor of food riots. This 
finding was later confirmed by more robust econometric analyses. In particular, a Cox 
PH HZ model was fit to the data for two different time frames and both models found 
a positive, significant relationship between national political fragility – as modelled 
by the WGI – and the occurrence of food riots. Conversely, national food availability, 
i.e. national net food production used as a proxy for a country’s reliance on the 
international market for the supply of food, does not significantly affect the 
occurrence of food riots according to the same model. Subsequently, different 
econometric models, i.e. RE model and REEMtree model, were tested to integrate and 
quantify the previous findings, with the final aim of operationalising the information 
for their inclusion in the food and food and fuel versions of the ABM. The results 
show that the translation of the variables for the FAO FPI and WGI in their discrete 
versions leads to a substantial loss of information, which in the case of this thesis was 
necessary due to how these variables are modelled in the ABMs (see Chapter 5). The 
RE model M2 was able to capture more than half of the food riots which occurred in 
the period considered, although losing predictive power once accounting for both 
prediction of food riots and non food riots, i.e. once asked to identify both countries 
that did and did not experience a food riot. The REEM model accounted for only 5% 
of food riots with an overall prediction power similar to the best model with 
continuous variables M1. Its accuracy at predicting food riots increased by almost 1% 
once the RE assigned from the model to each country were included in the 
predictions.  
The analysis on fuel riots led to very similar results: a RE model fit to the data 
highlighted a positive, significant relationship between the international price of fuel – 
modelled as the price of crude oil averaged between two spot prices, WTI and Brent, 
sourced from the US EIA – and the occurrence of fuel riots, also identifying $93 per 
barrel as the threshold over which the probability of fuel riots increases significantly. 
In addition, a Cox PH model was fit to the data for two different time frames and led 
to mixed results. The Cox PH model for 2008 found that the singular relationships 
between the WGI and fuel riots and national fuel availability, i.e. national net oil 
production used as a proxy for a country’s reliance on the international market for the 
supply of fuel – modelled as the difference between national oil production and 
consumption – and fuel riots are not significant. Conversely, the Cox PH model fit to 
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the data for the time frame 2011 – 2013 found a positive, significant relationship 
between national political fragility and the occurrence of fuel riots. National fuel 
availability does not significantly affect the occurrence of fuel riots according to the 
same model. The findings from the last period are in line with those found between 
the same covariates and food riots. One of the possible reasons why the model fit to 
the data for 2008 did not produce significant results is because the period considered 
was very short, not covering a whole year, hence potentially biasing the estimates 
calculated by the Cox PH model. Indeed, all the variables analysed were annual 
figures and, in general, the analysis of a longer period allows to better capture the 
dynamics underlying prices and fragility. This is confirmed by the positive results 
from the analysis on the 2011 – 2013 period. For this reason the results for the last 
period were selected as more robust as this covered a time frame of three whole years. 
Subsequently, an RE model and a REEM model were tested to integrate and quantify 
the previous findings, with the final aim of operationalising the information for their 
inclusion in the fuel and food and fuel versions of the ABM. Differently from the 
analysis on food riots, the results of the models applied to fuel riots show that the 
translation of the variables for the EIA fuel price and WGI in their discrete versions 
leads to a minimal loss of information. In this case the REEM model was more 
accurate at predicting fuel riots as compared to both RE models. In particular, the RE 
model using discrete variables correctly predicted 3% of fuel riots as compared to 5% 
predicted by the REEM model. All three models had a comparable overall accuracy. 
Once accounting for country-specific random effects, the predictive power of the 
REEM model reached 11%, still maintaining an overall accuracy comparable to that 
of the other models.  
The integrated analysis between food and fuel riots found a positive, mutual influence 
between these two types of event, i.e. countries that experience either a food or a fuel 
riot are more likely to experience an event of the opposite type during the same year. 
This was highlighted by fitting RE models that used alternatively food and fuel riots 
as dependent and independent variables. The analysis compared once again the 
accuracy of RE and REEM models at capturing the mutual influence between food 
and fuel riots. As for the models generating predictions for food riots using fuel riots 
as independent variable, the RE model performed very poorly, correctly predicting 
less than 1% of food riots. The REEM model performed remarkably better, correctly 
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predicting 6% of food riots and its accuracy increased to 8% when including country-
specific random effects. The overall accuracy of the models was comparable. The 
models generating predictions for fuel riots using food riots as independent variable 
performed similarly: the RE model performed very poorly, correctly predicting less 
than 1% of food riots. The REEM model performed remarkably better, correctly 
predicting 5% of the food riots and its accuracy increased to 12% when including 
country-specific RE. The overall accuracy of the models was comparable. 
The different loss of information due to the transformation of the international price 
of the resources and the WGI in their discrete forms is an interesting finding in itself. 
Indeed, splitting the WGI in categories is positive when predicting food riots and it is 
detrimental to predictions for fuel riots will require further investigation in future 
research. The results of models M1 and M2 suggest that this is attributable to the WGI 
variable. In M2 for food riots the categories for the WGI are all significantly different 
from the benchmark category as opposed to the M2 for fuel riots, which suggests that 
the two low fragility categories could potentially be merged. This is due to the 
different distribution of food and fuel riots in the classes of the WGI: food riots are 
more evenly distributed between the classes of fragility than fuel riots, which are 
instead concentrated in the classes with highest fragility. 
Interestingly, REEM models were more accurate than RE at predicting fuel riots and 
in the integrated analysis, whereas RE performed better at predicting food riots. 
Intuitively, this could be explained by the characteristics of the methods: the 
occurrence of food riots, being more evenly distributed between classes, can be 
approximated by a function with a clearer trend, as compared to fuel riots whose 
distribution is more similar to irregular functions such as moving average. Therefore, 
RE may be more suitable at reproducing a function that follows a clear trend, whereas 
REEM may be more accurate in the second instance. However, this statement requires 
further investigation. 
Having evaluated the accuracy of each method at predicting food and fuel riots and 
their mutual influence, it was possible to select an approach that would be carried on 
in the following stages of the analysis to implement these findings in the different 
versions of the ABM. It is important to remember here that for reasons of consistency 
only one method was selected. REEM was the method finally selected for three main 
reasons: firstly, for all the analyses apart from the one on food, REEM outperformed 
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RE models and showed the largest increase in accuracy once country-specific random 
effects were considered in the predictions. Secondly, the probabilities of riots for each 
condition highlighted by the models as significant were immediately implementable 
in the ABMs. Indeed, these models are highly recommended when operationalising 
results to be included in ABMs (Sánchez-Maroño, et al., 2015). Finally, the trees 
resulting from the models showed an extremely simple structure, which further 
facilitated the implementation of these results. 
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5. Modelling food and fuel riots 
One of the main characteristics of ABMs is the possibility of simulating a system 
while including interactions between micro (national, country-level in this case), and 
macro (global) levels of analysis. This was particularly important in this research as 
the system recreated in the models is made of individual agents (countries) whose 
decisions (in this case production, consumption and trade of cereals, oil, natural gas 
and coal) have international consequences in terms of global availability of cereals 
and oil. This influences the international prices of these resources, which in turn have 
national consequences in terms of occurrence of national food and fuel riots. Abiding 
by Principle 2 of the GRO Project, the Food, Fuel and integrated Food and Fuel 
versions of the ABM that are presented in this chapter are empirically grounded, 
meaning that all the data fed into the models as well as the parameters used have been 
informed using real data. The sections of this chapter relative to the Food version of 
the ABM constitute a further update of Natalini, et al. (2015a) and has been submitted 
to the journal ‘Food Security’ as Natalini, Bravo and Jones (TBP). In addition, the 
procedures related to international trade of natural resources and data that has been 
used to inform the social networks in the ABMs are partly based on Phillips and 
Natalini (TBP), submitted to the journal ‘The World Economy’. 
As mentioned before, three versions of the ABM were developed: i) the Food ABM 
only includes dynamics that represent the global food system and that lead to food 
riots; ii) the Fuel ABM only includes dynamics that represent the global oil system 
and that lead to fuel riots and finally iii) the Food and Fuel ABM that integrates the 
two previous versions and also includes dynamics for production, consumption and 
trade of other energy resources, i.e. natural gas and coal. The dynamics that lead to 
food and fuel riots included in the three versions of the ABM are based on the 
analysis presented in Chapter 4. Abiding by Principle 1 of the GRO Project, the 
ABMs were built to give short-term (5 years) predictions.  
This chapter presents the different versions of the ABM to explain the dynamics 
included. Their description is provided following the Overview, Design concepts, 
Details (ODD) protocol developed by Grimm, et al. (2006) as it is common practice in 
the field of ABMs. The ODD only describes the basic dynamics and processes 
underlying the ABMs, whereas the calibration and validation of the models are 
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summarised in Sections 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. Future forecasts are provided in 
Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 will present findings from the sensitivity analysis on the 
ABMs. Finally, Section 5.6 will discuss findings from this chapter. 
The ABMs have been implemented and run with NetLogo version 5.2 (Wilensky, 
1999), whereas the results from the models runs have been analysed with R (R Core 
Team, 2013).  
5.1. Using the Overview, Design concepts, Details protocol to describe the 
ABMs 
Describing a computer model using pseudo-code is a critical part of the research. 
Indeed, when deciding how to communicate the dynamics included in a model, the 
researcher is forced to reflect on all the choices they made while developing the tool, 
hence highlighting the assumptions made and the interconnections between the 
different parts of the model. In addition, a clear description of the model facilitates its 
reimplementation to replicate its results. A model whose results cannot be replicated 
is considered unscientific (Railsback and Grimm, 2012). To facilitate the description 
of ABMs, a large group of experienced modellers developed a standardised format 
called the Overview, Design concepts, Details (ODD) protocol, which was first 
published in Grimm, et al. (2006) and subsequently updated in Grimm et al. (2010). 
Its application has spread widely in the ABM community (Polhill, et al., 2008) and it 
will hence be used to describe the dynamics included in the ABMs developed in 
relation to this work as well. 
The three different versions of the ABM are fundamentally similar and only differ for 
what type of riots the model generates predictions for, i.e. food, fuel or food and fuel 
riots. In particular, only three procedures differ between the models, all rest being 
equal. Although these could have been implemented in the same model and the type 
of riot alternatively selected via a ‘chooser’ dialogue from the model’s interface, the 
three versions of the ABM were developed as independent models for two main 
reasons: firstly, the development of the ABM was approached in stages. First the 
analysis and parameterisation of food riots was undertaken, alongside the 
development of the Food ABM. Subsequently the same analysis to parameterise food 
riots was applied to fuel riots and the Food ABM was converted to generate 
predictions for fuel riots. Finally, the analysis on mutual relationships between food 
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and fuel riots was undertaken and the results were included in another version of the 
ABM to investigate whether adding this dynamic improved the accuracy of the model 
at predicting both types of riot. This integrated version also includes consumption and 
production dynamics for the other two natural resources, i.e. coal and natural gas, and 
four different social networks representing trade, one per each resource and 
constitutes the platform for further updates of the model. Because of the high 
similarity between the ABMs and the dynamics underlying it, the next sections will 
present one ODD protocol for all the models, specifying for each step which version 
of the ABM applies to.  
Provided as attachments to this thesis are: i) database to initialise countries, ii) 
databases to initialise four international trade networks, iii) code of the integrated 
Food and Fuel ABM, iv) databases for ETs, for both food and fuel and for 
calculations on absolute and price variations (only for food). Only one version of the 
code is provided due to the high similarity of the different versions of the models and 
for reasons of brevity. 
5.1.1. Purpose (all ABMs) 
The ABMs are a first attempt to model some of the dynamics that lead to food and 
fuel riots. In particular, the purpose of the model is to test and quantify how scarcity 
of food and oil, their international prices and national political fragility influence the 
probability of food and fuel riots in countries. 
5.1.2. Entities, state variables and scales (all ABMs) 
Grimm, et al. (2010) define an entity as “a distinct or separate object or actor that 
behaves as a unit and may interact with other entities or be affected by external 
environmental factors” (Grimm, et al., 2010, p. 2763). The same authors define a state 
variable or attribute of an entity as “a variable that distinguishes an entity from other 
entities of the same type or category, or traces how the entity changes over time” 
(Grimm, et al., 2010, p. 2763). Below a list of entities with corresponding state 
variables for the ABMs is reported. 
 Agents. One of the entities included in the ABMs are the agents that represent the 
213 countries of the world, which constitutes the micro-level of analysis. The 
  
135 
breed14 of these agents is ‘country’. For reasons of brevity, the state variables and 
attributes that apply to more than one natural resource will be listed with a general 
heading. If not specified, the variable or attribute applies to each resource. The 
state variables and attributes of countries are listed in Table 5.1. 
Variable Resources ABM version Description 
Code - All ISO code for the 
country 
Label - All Name of the country 
Birth-rate - All Rate of birth for the 
country 
Death-rate - All Rate of death for the 
country 
Population - All Population for the 
country 
Population growth - All Rate of population 
growth for the country 
<resource>-reserves Energy  Fuel and Food 
and Fuel 
Reserves of energy 
resources per country 
<resource>-finds Energy  Fuel and Food 
and Fuel  
Energy resources 
endowments 
discovered every year 
within the country 
<resource>-
production-function 
All All National estimates for 
production of natural 
resources 
<resource>-
consumption-
function 
All All National estimates for 
consumption of natural 
resources 
<resource>-
consumption-per-
capita 
All All National estimates for 
per capita consumption 
of natural resources 
<resource>-stock-t-
1 
All All Previous tick’s stock of 
resources for the 
country 
<resource>-exports-
available 
All All National exports 
available for trade 
<resource>-
imports-required 
All All National imports 
required for resources 
<resource>-
imports-required-
before-trade 
All All National imports 
required for resources 
<resource>-
imported 
All All Amount of resource 
imported 
<resource>-
production+exports 
All All Total availability of 
resource for countries 
<resource>-
depleted 
All All Binomial variable that 
defines whether 
resource is depleted  
cereal-land Food Food and Food 
and Fuel 
National amount of 
land available 
food-SUR Food Food and Food Stock-to-Use Ratio, the 
                                                 
14 In NetLogo this term is used to refer to a category of agent, or, more formally, a class. 
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and Fuel ratio between the stock 
of food in a country 
and its annual 
consumption 
desired-cereals-
stock 
Food Food and Food 
and Fuel 
Desired stocks of 
cereals for countries 
    
food-scenario-
parameter 
Food Food and Food 
and Fuel 
See Section 5.1.7.5 
lloyds-scenario-
parameter 
Food Food and Food 
and Fuel 
See Chapter 6.2.2  
fuel-scenario-
parameter 
Energy Fuel and Food 
and Fuel 
See Chapter 6.2.3 
WGI - All National estimate for 
the WGI 
    
WGI-function - All WGI function for the 
country 
WGI-group - All WGI group of fragility 
for the country 
food-crisis Food Food and Food 
and Fuel 
Binomial variable that 
registers a food riot in 
the country 
fuel-crisis Energy Fuel and Food 
and Fuel 
Binomial variable that 
registers a fuel riot in 
the country 
rnd-eff-food1 Food Food and Food 
and Fuel  
RE generated by the 
REEM model on only 
food riots 
rnd-eff-fuel1 Fuel Fuel and Food 
and Fuel  
RE generated by the 
REEM model on only 
fuel riots 
rnd-eff-food2 Food and Energy Food and Fuel  random effects 
generated by the 
REEM model on 
influence between food 
and fuel riots 
rnd-eff-fuel2 Food and Energy Food and Fuel RE generated by the 
REEM model on 
influence between food 
and fuel riots 
lat-centroid - All y coordinate for agents’ 
location 
long-centroid - All x coordinate for agents’ 
location 
Size - All size of the bubbles for 
countries that represent 
the size of their 
population in the 
ABMS’ interface 
Table 5.1 – List of variables included in the different versions of the ABM. The first 
column reports the name of the variable, the second to what resources it refers to, the 
third column reports the version of the ABM where it is included and finally a 
description (own elaboration). 
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 Links. Another type of entities is the directed links that connect the countries 
included in the models generating four different social networks, one for each 
natural resource modelled. These networks are used in the ABMs to model 
international trade of natural resources. Similarly to above, only the variables 
relevant to the food and fuel riots dynamics will be accounted here. The models 
include two breeds (types) of directed links, oil links and cereal links. The state 
variables and attributes of the links are: strength, zero-time (see Section 5.1.7.11).  
The ‘world’ graphically recreated in the screen pane of the ABMs’ interface 
represents an atlas of the world using latitude on the y axis and longitude on the x axis 
for an easier interpretation. Countries’ location in space is determined by the 
coordinates of their centroids, which were sourced from Donnelly (2012). The 
temporal scale used in the ABMs is discrete and every time step represents one year. 
In NetLogo, these are represented with the procedure tick and the counter ticks, where 
the first advances the counter ticks by one unit at the end of each run. The models 
were run for nine years (2005 – 2013) for validation, reflecting the timeframe 
implemented in the studies on riots, and for thirteen years (2005 – 2017) to produce 
forecasts. 
5.1.3. Process overview and scheduling 
Figure 5.1 outlines the procedures run by each agent during one tick (year) and their 
interrelationships. Each rectangular box represents one of the procedures included in 
the different models. White boxes indicate procedures included in all the ABMs, 
green procedures are included in the Food ABM, yellow procedures belong to the 
Fuel ABM and the Food and Fuel ABM includes all the procedures (white, green, 
yellow and orange, the latter being specific for this model). Descriptions are provided 
in this section for simple procedures, whereas the more complex ones will be 
dedicated a section later in the text. For reasons of brevity, only the procedures that 
contain dynamics key to the occurrence of food and fuel riots and for the functioning 
of the ABMs have been included. The procedures are sequential, i.e. one country runs 
the whole procedure, followed by another country, etc., although the order in which 
the agents perform the procedure is random (USA can run procedure one before North 
Korea, whereas North Korea can run procedure two before USA). In Figure 5.1 boxes 
on the same level represent procedures whose order is not significant. Variables are 
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immediately updated once their new value is calculated in the procedures, i.e. 
asynchronous update. Each agent will complete the first procedure before moving 
onto the next. At ticks 13, 15 and 17, which correspond to years 2007, 2009 and 2012 
three new agents are introduced. These correspond to the years when Montenegro, 
Kosovo and South Sudan, were constituted, whose data was sourced from the GRO 
Database (GSI, 2015) for the corresponding year. 
  
139 
 
Figure 5.1 – Outline of the procedures included in the different versions of the ABM 
and their interrelationships. White boxes identify procedures that are included in all 
the ABMs, green boxes identify procedures that belong to the Food ABM, yellow are 
  
140 
procedures included in the Fuel ABM and the Food and Fuel ABM includes all the 
procedures, with the orange boxes being procedures specific for this model. Boxes on 
the same level represent procedures whose order is not significant (own elaboration). 
5.1.4. Design concepts 
5.1.4.1. Basic principles 
As reiterated multiple times throughout the text of this thesis, the different versions of 
the ABM have been developed based on the findings from the quantitative analyses 
presented in Chapter 4. In addition, the ABMs are prototypes that can be further 
developed to improve the existing dynamics that lead to the occurrence of food and 
fuel riots, expanded to include more dynamics and different types of conflict and to 
improve the models’ predictions. Therefore the aim of the ABMs is to explore the 
field of empirical ABMs and to encapsulate the findings produced while undertaking 
this research by introducing the quantitative relationships presented in the previous 
chapter. The models answer two main questions: firstly, whether adopting a fully 
data-led approach in developing an ABM generates a good model and, secondly, 
whether by introducing stochasticity, interaction between countries and the feedback 
between food and fuel riots improves the model’s predictions as compared to the 
underlying statistical extrapolation.  
5.1.4.2. Emergence 
As explained in Chapter 3, emergent properties are dynamics that would not be 
captured if each component of the system was studied in isolation, but emerge from 
their interaction and the heterogeneity of the agents and their behaviours. Emergent 
properties in the different versions of the ABM can be found at different levels of 
analysis: firstly, in the distribution of national stocks of the resources because of the 
structure of international trade recreated in the ABMs. Countries are initialised with 
initial values for national stocks of natural resources that derive from reported data 
(GSI, 2015). Oil trade is simulated in only one round where countries exchange what 
they need to satisfy national consumption. The oil exports still available after trade 
become national stocks of the resource that will be carried over to the following time 
step. Trade of cereals, instead, is modelled in two rounds of international exchanges: 
the first to cover countries’ annual consumption of cereals, and the second to cover 
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their need for restocking. Because production and consumption of natural resources 
are deterministically defined in the model (see later in this section) the global 
production and consumption and global stocks of oil and cereals do not change 
between different runs of the model. However, how these are distributed between 
countries and which countries successfully meet their own consumption (for all the 
natural resources) and needs for stocks (only for cereals) before the availability of 
exports runs out is an emergent property of the models.  
Emergence can also be found in the occurrence of food and fuel riots in countries. 
Because the probability of riots depends on several variables and feedbacks present in 
the models (see Chapter 4), the activation of different probabilities of riots in 
countries is an emergent property of the models. In addition, in the integrated Food 
and Fuel ABM, emergence can also be found in which type of riot countries 
experience first: as explained in Chapter 4, the probability for a country to experience 
a food or a fuel riot is also influenced by whether the same country experienced a riot 
of the other type during the same year. The decision determining which probability 
(for either food or fuel riots) is calculated first is randomised with a 50% probability 
(see Section 5.1.7.13). This can hence be considered as an emergent behaviour in the 
model. 
Ideally, production and consumption of natural resources would be generated through 
endogenous processes included in the model. However, the dynamics that lead 
countries to select their consumption and production of natural resources was not the 
objective of this research and, in line with the modelling approach, the ABMs were 
structured to be kept as simple as possible and to focus on the research questions 
selected. As it is common practice in the field of computer modelling, a behaviour 
that is not the focus of the model, but which is critical for simulating the dynamics 
that lead to the research question that the model needs to answer, needs to be 
simulated in a simplified manner (Railsback and Grimm, 2012). For this reason, these 
variables were modelled by fitting trend lines to historical data for each country (see 
Section 5.1.7.3). As a result, the processes that determine national production and 
consumption of the different natural resources – and hence levels for international 
production, consumption and stocks – are deterministic, i.e. these variables are 
constant among different runs of the models.  
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The same reasoning was implemented while modelling national political fragility as 
represented by the WGI. The variables and sources used to construct this index are 
several and often not reproducible (e.g. expert analysis) (WB, 2015d) and include 
dynamics not modelled in the current versions of the ABM. For this reason, this index 
is modelled through trend lines fit to historical data for each country (see Section 
5.1.7.12). As a result, the level of national political fragility for each country will be 
constant among different runs of the models. 
5.1.4.3. Adaptation 
Adaptation occurs during the procedures that model international trade of resources 
and restocking of cereals when countries seek a new trading partner. Countries adapt 
and widen their pool of trading partners when those they already share a connection 
with run out of exports available for the resources they need. This process is aimed at 
meeting countries’ needs for natural resources, both in terms of consumption and 
desired stocks levels for cereals. However, if this is not possible due to lack of 
resources at the global level, there is no direct consequence for countries other than a 
change in the colour of their ‘bubble’ in the screen pane of the models’ interface.  
Adaptation also occurs in countries in terms of their probability of experiencing a 
food and/or fuel riot in relation to changes in price and own national political fragility. 
This process is not aimed at minimising countries’ probabilities to experience these 
types of conflict, rather it simply reflects the dynamics estimated and presented in 
Chapter 4. 
5.1.4.4. Objectives 
Countries’ objective is to meet their needs for natural resources to cover national 
consumption and desired stock level of cereals. While trading natural resources, 
importing countries maximise the imports of the resource in an attempt to meet their 
national consumption (both for cereals and oil) and their needs for cereals stocks. 
5.1.4.5. Sensing 
During the international trade of natural resources, importers ‘sense’ the exports 
availability of other countries, both those that they already share a connection with, 
but also when importers seek a new trade partner with exports still available if the 
exports availability for the resource has been depleted within their current network. 
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This remote sensing partly happens via the social networks countries are embedded 
in, which has an emergent structure as explained in detail in Section 5.1.7.8.  
In addition, countries ‘sense’ the regime of the international price of each natural 
resource, i.e. either above or below the thresholds calculated in Chapter 4, which is 
determined at the global level. This in turn affects countries’ probability of 
experiencing food and/or fuel riots. 
5.1.4.6. Interaction 
Direct interaction between agents occurs through the social networks and particularly 
during two procedures: to trade-<resource> and to restock-cereals. See Sections 
5.1.7.8 and 5.1.7.10 for an in-depth explanation of each procedure, respectively. 
5.1.4.7. Stochasticity 
Stochasticity is naturally embedded in the ABMs due to the use of NetLogo. One of 
the default characteristics of this piece of software is the randomness applied to the 
order in which each country performs each procedure, which results in stochastic 
processes. 
Stochasticity is also introduced in the population model. Currently, population 
dynamics are modelled through birth and death rates for each country, to which ± 
0.5‰ is added or subtracted. This is to avoid deterministic results, which are deemed 
to be inaccurate due to the very simplistic population model introduced. Also for this 
reason, population size has no impact on other parts of the ABMs, as it will be 
presented in Section 5.1.7.2. 
In the current version of the integrated ABM for Food and Fuel, stochasticity is also 
introduced in the sequence in which the probabilities for food and fuel riots are 
calculated. As presented in Chapter 4, the occurrence of food riots in countries 
increases the probabilities of fuel riots to happen in the same country during the same 
year and vice versa. Since this influence is mutual, the order in which the procedures 
are run by the agents is randomised with a 50% probability for each outcome, 
resulting in a different sequence of what type of riots is calculated first. 
Finally, all the versions of the ABM include stochasticity in the procedure that defines 
whether a country experiences any type of riot, since this is the result of a probability 
as presented in Chapter 4. 
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5.1.4.8. Collectives  
The only informal aggregation of agents occurs during the international trade of 
resources and restocking of cereals in all the versions of the ABMs: when importing 
countries choose a trade partner whom to import what they need from, they create a 
temporary agentset with the pool of countries they already share a connection with, 
whose <resource>-exports-available > 0. 
5.1.4.9. Observation 
The variables saved from the simulations of the ABMs and subsequently analysed are: 
Year, Country, Code, food-crisis, fuel-crisis, oil-stock and cereals-stock. These are 
saved for each agent at the end of every time step. Importantly, food- and fuel-crisis 
are binary variables that register whether a food and/or a fuel riot occurred in a 
country during that particular time step, whereas oil- and cereals-stock record the 
amount of stocks for each resource still available in each country at the end of every 
time step. The variables natural-gas-stock and coal-stock, although present in the 
Food and Fuel version of the model, are not recorded, as these do not currently affect 
the dynamics of the system. 
5.1.5. Initialisation 
During the initialisation, 210 agents corresponding to the countries of the world 
present in 2005 are created in each version of the ABM. Data for the variables 
corresponds to reported data for those countries for the year 2005 and is sourced from 
the GRO database (GSI, 2015). The database used as input for the initialisation of 
countries’ variables is provided as attachment. During the initialisation of the social 
networks for each of the natural resources, countries create links to their trade partners 
(see Section 5.1.7.1). These are based on reported data sourced from the UN 
Comtrade database (UN, 2014) and the four databases containing the links used to 
initialise the networks are provided as attachments. Kosovo, Montenegro and South 
Sudan are initialised in the code of the models, which can be found in the 
attachments.  
5.1.6. Input data 
As mentioned in the previous section, most of the data used to initialise the state 
variables for countries corresponds to reported data sourced from the GRO database 
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(GSI, 2015). For a comprehensive explanation of how data has been collected and 
handled, refer to the publication connected to the GRO database (Jones and Phillips, 
2015). The WGI for countries was sourced from the WB website (WB, 2015c). As for 
production and consumption of natural resources and for countries’ WGI, countries 
are provided with equations in function of ticks (years) that, once evaluated, result in 
the value of that variable for each specific country for that specific tick. This will be 
explained more in depth in Sections 5.1.7.3 and 5.1.7.4 for functions for consumption 
and production of natural resources, respectively, and Section 5.1.7.12 for countries’ 
WGI. Reported data was also used to inform initial food stocks countries are 
initialised with. This was sourced from the United States Department for Agriculture 
(USDA) (USDA, 2015a). Finally, all the data was translated in the units used in the 
ABMs: ‘Barrels’ for oil data, ‘Metric tonnes’ for coal data, ‘Cubic meters’ for natural 
gas data and ‘Kilograms’ for cereal data. 
As for data used to generate the four social networks included in the ABMs, the links 
again are based on real exchanges for 2005 recorded in the UN Comtrade database 
(UN, 2014). The same data was used in a recent publication from Phillips and Natalini 
(TBP) on a study on the evolution of the World Trade Web of Natural Resources 
(WTWNR), a term which was coined by the authors. The paper contains an in-depth 
account of how data was handled to account for coherence and inconsistencies 
(Phillips and Natalini, TBP) and an analysis of the past trends in the WTWNR. For 
the work related to this thesis, the countries recorded in the UN Comtrade database 
were matched with those included in the GRO database, deleting those that were not 
taken into account in the project and their labels modified for consistency. 
Subsequently, all export trade links from countries that did not have any endowments 
for that particular resource (just for oil, coal and natural gas) were ignored. This was 
in an attempt to capture the export of the raw resource (e.g. crude oil) and not the 
export of refined resources that had previously been imported from elsewhere. As 
analysed in Phillips and Natalini (TBP), UN Comtrade database contained several 
inconsistencies, which were particularly related to the weight and value of resources 
traded and which led to the choice of introducing and recreating only binary networks 
both in the paper and in the ABMs presented here. Finally, the countries that are 
introduced during the model runs, i.e. Kosovo, Montenegro and South Sudan, were 
deleted from the input database and are added during the simulation runs.  
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5.1.7. Submodels 
The key procedures included in the models are reported and explained below, also 
specifying in which versions of the ABMs these have been implemented. When the 
procedures are fundamentally similar between models and resources and only the 
name of the variables used change, these will be aggregated for reasons of brevity. 
5.1.7.1. Setup 
The procedure Setup calls several sub-procedures aimed at initialising the ABMs. In 
particular, this procedure recalls a sub-procedure called to countries-setup where the 
shape ‘circle’ is assigned to the agents, i.e. countries, through the set-default-shape 
command and loads the database that is used to initialise the countries. The command 
create-countries creates one agent per each record contained in the initial database 
with the specifics for each country listed.  
Through the sub-procedure to <resource>-network-setup, the different WTWNRs are 
loaded from the four databases containing the links for each country, subsequently 
initialising the WTWNRs. International trade is modelled from the importers’ 
perspective, although the links are directed from the exporting to the importing 
countries. The database containing data for trade connections between countries is 
loaded during this procedure. The final database used in this thesis hence derives from 
the one used in Phillips and Natalini (TBP). The databases used in the ABMs (one for 
each natural resource) are composed of two columns, one with the name of the 
importing country and the second with the name of the exporter. This procedure will 
create one link for each record included in each of the databases, through the 
command create-<resource>-link-from run by the importer countries listed in the 
first column. 
Ticks are initialised at tick 11 through the primitive tick-advanced. This is because, as 
it will be explained in Section 5.1.7.3 and 5.1.7.4, the equations for consumption and 
production of natural resources and WGI for each country have been calculated as a 
function of time starting from the year 1995 as this was the first year available from 
the GRO database and because using a longer time frame as a reference resulted in 
more accurate estimates. For consistency, 1995 was used as first year to calculate 
WGI equations as well.  
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The Setup procedure also initialises the visualisation of the models assigning a 
different colour to each type of link, i.e. the WTWNR for each natural resource will 
be coloured differently, and the choices made from the user through a chooser in the 
models’ interface that controls which links and colours to show according to the 
natural resource selected, are operationalised here.  
5.1.7.2. Population-growth (All ABMs) 
Population in the model is introduced as a rough estimate and is assumed to vary only 
according to birth and death rates. Population and consumption of natural resources 
are decoupled in the current versions of the ABM. In addition, the ABMs do not take 
into account migration between countries and do not include any feedback between 
level of development of countries and their population size. This is obviously an 
oversimplification of real-world dynamics that will be improved in further 
developments of the ABMs (see Chapter 6). 
5.1.7.3. Setup-resources-consumption (All ABMs, all natural resources) 
For all the resources, this procedure is initialised with a check on countries’ reserves 
to ensure that these didn’t become negative during the previous time step. If so, 
<resource>-reserves is set to 0. 
For energy resources, i.e. oil in the Fuel version of the ABM and also natural gas and 
coal in the Food and Fuel version of the ABM, in this procedure countries update their 
natural endowments with the current tick’s (year) finds. For simplicity, finds of 
energy resources, i.e. any increase in the endowments of energy resources for 
countries, which includes actual discoveries of new deposits and correction of 
estimated reserves due to changes in extraction efficiency, have been assumed as 
constant throughout the period modelled and between countries. This was calculated 
as the yearly average percentage variation of reserves of energy resources amongst all 
the countries between 1995 and 2012 based on data from the GRO Database (GSI, 
2014). Since data for the variation of energy reserves implicitly includes the 
production of energy resources that diminish countries’ natural endowments, the 
average percentage ratio between production and reserves of each natural resource 
was added to the final estimate for the annual finds of each resource. The final 
parameter was included in the ABMs and represented the average percentage annual 
increase of energy reserves across the countries. This parameter equals 5.07% for oil, 
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3.55% for natural gas and 0.63% for coal. The variables <resource>-finds are then 
replaced with the result from the multiplication between the variables <resource>-
reserves and the parameters reported above. The current tick’s reserves for countries’ 
energy resources are subsequently updated in the variable <resource>-reserves by 
adding the <resource>-finds. 
In addition, countries also calculate the current tick’s estimate for their consumption 
of each energy resource and cereals. Projections for consumption of all the resources 
for each country have been calculated by fitting polynomial regression trend lines on 
reported data available for the period 1995 – 2013 for each country included in the 
GRO database (GSI, 2015). Consumption hence is smoothed by the trend lines. The 
polynomial functions resulting from the trend lines have subsequently been included 
in the initial database loaded by the model. The equations for national consumption of 
all the resources are evaluated with x = current tick (year) and the national estimates 
for consumption are stored in the variable <resource>-consumption (see the 
attachments for the whole database used to initialise the ABMs). The data used to 
calculate the estimates for consumption of natural resources used different units than 
those used in the ABMs, in particular the GRO Database reported oil variables for 
production and consumption in ‘Thousand barrels per day’, coal in ‘Thousand short 
tons’ and natural gas in ‘Billion cubic feet’. The variables <resource>-consumption 
are hence transformed in the units used by the ABMs, i.e. ‘Barrels’ for oil, ‘Metric 
tonnes’ for coal and ‘Cubic feet’ for natural gas. Finally, per capita values for the 
consumption of each natural resource are calculated and stored in the variable 
<resource>-consumption-pc by dividing <resource>-consumption by pop for each 
country. 
5.1.7.4. Setup-<resource>-trade (Fuel and Food and Fuel ABMs, all energy 
resources, one procedure per resource) 
This procedure is aimed at identifying countries as either net exporters or importers of 
energy resources. This procedure is initialised with a check on countries’ reserves to 
ensure that these didn’t become negative during the previous time step. If so, 
<resource>-reserves is set to 0. In addition, if <resource>-reserves = 0 countries 
move the previous tick’s un-exported production of the energy resource from the 
variable <resource>-stock-t-1 to <resource>-production+exports. This is because 
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although countries may have exhausted their natural endowments of an energy 
resource, they might have not been able to export all of it, carrying it over to the 
following tick in the variable <resource>-stock-t-1, which is updated at the end of 
each tick.  
The GRO Database from which data is sourced assumes that countries without natural 
endowments of energy resources have a production = 0. This assumption is reflected 
in the ABMs. This is also due to the fact that this research aims at simulating the 
dynamics of trade of raw natural resources and hence does not take into account 
refined products.  
Subsequently, countries with <resource>-reserves > 0 calculate the current tick’s 
national production for the resource. Countries evaluate the polynomial equations 
derived from reported data in function of time with x = current tick (year), and check 
whether this is < 0. If so, this is set to 0 otherwise the number is assigned to the 
variable <resource>-production and multiplied by 365,000 as the units used in the 
models are ‘Barrels’, differently from the original data sourced from the GRO 
database where the unit used is ‘Thousand barrels per day’. Due to this estimate being 
a simple fit to past data in function of time and hence uncoupled from the amount of 
reserves for the resource owned by each country, the resulting value of national 
production for the resource for the current year might be ≥ <resource>-reserves for 
the country. If this is true, countries replace the estimate for their production with 
their leftover reserves, subsequently setting their <resource>-reserves for the 
resource to 0. Conversely, if the estimated <resource>-production < <resource>-
reserves countries subtract the estimate for production to their amount of reserves 
hence simulating resource extraction, subsequently adding to their estimated 
production the stocks carried over from the previous tick resulting in the variable 
<resource>-production+exports. Finally, all the countries determine whether they are 
net importers or exporters of the resource by running an ifelse clause on the condition 
<resource>-consumption > <resource>-production+exports. If this clause returns 
true, countries classify as net importers and set the variables <resource>-imports-
required and <resource>-imports-required-before-trade = <resource>-consumption 
- <resource>-production+exports. Alternatively, countries classify as net exporters 
for the resource and set the variable <resource>-exports-available = <resource>-
production+exports - <resource>-consumption.  
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5.1.7.5. Setup-cereals-trade (Food and Food and Fuel ABMs)  
This procedure is aimed at identifying countries as either net cereals exporters or 
importers and differs from the procedure for energy resources as cereals cannot be 
modelled as natural endowments for countries. During the procedure, countries with 
cereal-land < 0 are set to 0. Although this variable is not involved in any dynamic 
process, it was already introduced in the ABMs in case of future developments, in 
particular foreseeing a feedback from climate change which, when introduced, will 
have an impact on the quantity of land available for cereal crops. This line of code 
hence constitutes a check to ensure no negative values for this variable throughout the 
model runs. Similarly to the previous procedure for energy resources, countries with 
cereal-land = 0 are assumed not to have production of the resource by the GRO 
database from which data is sourced. Countries that do not possess cereal land hence 
move the previous tick’s un-exported cereals production from the variable cereals-
stock-t-1 to cereals-production+exports. 
Subsequently, countries with cereal-land > 0 calculate the current tick’s (year) cereals 
production and multiply this number by 1,000,000 as the measurement unit used in 
the model is ‘Kilograms’, whereas the variables used to calculate production sourced 
from the GRO database use ‘1,000 Metric Tonnes’. As for the production of energy 
resources, cereals production for each country was calculated by fitting trend lines to 
data for the same time frame. However, because each trend line constitutes only an 
approximate fit of the data, the functions resulting were smoothed and significant 
production shocks were not present in these trends. These needed to be added 
exogenously to the model to recreate real world events where they have occurred, in 
particular the 2008 global food production shock. For this reason the scenario 
‘drought-2008’ was built into the Food and Food and Fuel versions of the ABM that 
can be activated via a switch on the model’s interface. These production shocks were 
derived from reported data. In particular, a significant food price shock was observed 
in 2008 as depicted in Figure 5.2. This approach is standard practice in the modelling 
of shocks, where, due to the pursuit of simplification, empirical time-series may need 
to be aggregated and averaged. This loss of micro-level information may hinder the 
dynamics that are key for the shock to realise (Filatova and Polhill, 2012). To avoid 
this situation, the data lost in the process was reintroduced with an exogenous shock. 
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The same reasoning also applies to how the shock was calculated for reintroduction in 
the ABMs.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 – Monthly prices for 2000-2010 for wheat, maize and rice showing 
significant price shocks in 2008. Prices are standardised so that price for each grain in 
January 2000 is 1 (Natalini, et al., 2015a).  
Although several factors mainly related to weather and low stock-to-use ratios for 
countries (Bailey, et al., 2015) impacted food production around this time, the price 
shock of 2008 is widely known to have been caused by two previous major food 
production shock events that occurred in 2002/03 and 2006 (Headey and Fan, 2010) 
and by long- and short-term drivers that have been discussed in depth in Chapter 2.8. 
The causes of the 2008 food production shock go as far back as the 1980s, when for 
more than two decades, i.e. until 2000s, a long period of low real food prices led to 
scarce investments in the supply side of the agricultural sector. Consequently, global 
demand for food eventually outpaced – and for a period of time was constantly higher 
– than global food supply. During 2002/03 global food stocks were still at an all-time 
high. This was mainly due to high stock levels in China and the 2002/03 production 
shock happened to coincide with the time when China decided to strategically reduce 
its stock levels (Huang, et al., 2008; Abbott and De Battisti, 2011). Therefore, this 
food production shock was delayed as stocks entered international markets. Due to 
this early production shock and a medium-term slow growth in global food 
production, food stocks were already dwindling when the 2006 food production shock 
hit and therefore could not act as a buffer between demand and international prices, 
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which spiked. Clearly, these price dynamics involve an intricate set of variables and 
feedbacks that went beyond the scope of this research. However, to be able to model 
the dynamics that lead to the occurrence of food riots it was critical to introduce a 
price shock in the ABM. To simplify, the food production shocks were collapsed in a 
single shock exogenously introduced in the ABMs during the tick corresponding to 
the year 2008. Hence, the 2008 exogenous production shock represents the average of 
the three production shocks occurred in 2002/03 and 2006 in the major food 
producing countries. The shock was introduced at the national level, i.e. one shock per 
country, and these figures were calculated by averaging the food production shocks 
per country across the three years. Although averaging the shocks resulted in a 
smaller overall shock due to the inevitable variation of food production between 
countries and years, Challinor, et al. (2015) suggest that food production seems to be 
anti-correlated between major producers. This means that different countries tend to 
experience shocks with different signs, i.e. negative and positive, within the same 
year. When recreating the global shock, it was hence more realistic to ‘average’ the 
worst three years to get a more realistic ‘shock year’ rather than take the worst of each 
country and recreate an over-pessimistic figure. Finally, the shock was introduced in 
2008 because food stocks kept decreasing between 2006 and 2008, which was one of 
the drivers of the price spike in 2008. Only in 2008 the stocks were low enough for 
the production shock to effect prices, which is the process recreated in the ABMs. The 
exact dynamics of this shock(s) could be explored and included in more detail in 
future research. 
To calculate the food production shocks in 2002/03 and 2006 best fitted lines per 
country were fit to cereals production data between 2000 and 2013. This was done for 
each of the main country producers, which represented 75% of global cereals 
production. These best fit lines were then subtracted from the production to remove 
the overall growth in production which characterised the food system. This growth 
matched the increase in demand from changing diets and a growing population. A 
percentage anomaly per year per country was then calculated away from this best fit 
line by dividing it by the production for that country. Table 5.2 shows these country 
anomalies for each year and the average for the years 2002, 2003 and 2006. These 
average production shocks were then summed to create the best estimate of the 
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cumulative production shock that caused the food price shock in 2008. The sum of 
these production shocks represented an overall global food production shock of 8%.  
 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Average 
shock 
Argentina 4 1 -3 -1 0 2 -3 6 -3 -12 5 -3 
Australia 4 6 -10 7 2 5 -11 -9 -1 -1 -1 -5 
Bangladesh 3 0 0 0 -4 -2 -2 -1 1 1 2 -1 
Brazil 0 8 -1 9 -1 -12 -7 1 5 -7 -5 0 
Canada 6 -1 -6 0 2 2 1 -6 3 0 -5 -2 
China  36 13 -1 -40 -13 -10 2 -6 4 -6 -5 -13 
France 3 -4 4 -6 4 1 -1 -4 2 1 1 -1 
Germany  0 1 -1 -3 3 1 -1 -2 3 2 0 -2 
India 18 19 -20 -2 -11 -6 -9 2 4 -16 -7 -10 
Indonesia 4 1 0 -1 -1 -2 -4 -3 -1 2 2 -1 
Pakistan 2 0 -2 -1 -1 1 0 1 -2 1 0 -1 
Russia  -11 4 9 -11 -1 1 -2 5 17 15 -19 -1 
Thailand  0 1 0 1 -1 0 -2 0 -1 -2 0 0 
Ukraine 0 9 7 -11 4 1 -8 -9 6 -3 -8 -4 
USA 14 -13 -46 -1 32 4 -29 39 18 29 4 -25 
Vietnam 1 0 1 0 1 0 -1 -2 0 -1 -1 0 
Table 5.2 – Food production anomaly (percentage of overall production) away from 
best fit line for cereals production between 2000 and 2010 in major food producing 
countries. The average losses per country for the major production shock events 
(2002, 2003 and 2006) are shown in the final column (adapted from Natalini, et al., 
2015a). 
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The percentage reductions of national food production for each country presented in 
Table 5.2 were included in the database used to initialise countries under the variable 
food-scenario-parameter. This variable equals 1 for countries that were unaffected by 
the food production shocks and 1 – the average shock reported in Table 5.2 otherwise. 
Consequently, if the switch in the ABMs’ interface is ‘on’, i.e. the variable 2008-
drought = true, and if ticks = 14, i.e. the year 2008, countries multiply their current 
tick’s cereals-production * food-scenario-parameter, replacing previous values for 
the variable cereals-production. Countries subsequently add the previous tick’s un-
exported cereals production, i.e. variable cereals-stock-t-1, and this tick’s cereals 
production to the variable cereals-production+exports. 
Finally, all the countries determine whether they are net importers or exporters of the 
resource by running an ifelse clause on the condition cereals-consumption > cereals-
production+exports. If this clause returns true, countries classify as net importers and 
set the variables cereals-imports-required and cereals-imports-required-before-trade 
= cereals-consumption - cereals-production+exports. Alternatively, countries classify 
as net exporters for the resource and set the variable cereals-exports-available = 
cereals-production+exports - cereals-consumption. 
5.1.7.6. Compute-food-price (Food and Food and Fuel ABMs) 
This procedure first aggregates national values for different variables related to 
cereals into global variables. In particular, the global variables are called: global-
cereals-production, global-cereals-consumption, global-cereals-stock-t-1 (this variable 
represents only the level of stocks that the current tick was initialised with), global-
cereals-exports-available (cereals still available for exports before trade and after 
national consumption has been subtracted), global-cereals-availability (this variable 
represents the sum of production and exports available). Subsequently, the current 
tick’s regime for international price of food is calculated according to the dynamics 
resulting from the ET presented in Section 5.2. 
5.1.7.7. Compute-fuel-price (Fuel and Food and Fuel ABMs) 
The same aggregation of national values into global variables is carried out for 
different variables related to oil: global-oil-reserves, global-oil-production, global-oil-
consumption, global-oil-stock-t-1, global-oil-exports-available, global-oil-availability. 
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The ET implemented to calculate the current tick’s regime for international price of 
fuel is presented in Section 5.2. 
5.1.7.8. Trade-<resource> (All ABMs, all resources) 
During the procedure to trade-<resource> importing countries try to import 10% of 
the total amount needed from a random country with which they share a connection 
and that still has exports available. This is to avoid one importing country to instantly 
deplete the exports available of the exporting country. However, this is still possible if 
the importer’s desired-imports > <resource>-exports-available of the exporter or if 
this is the only country the importer is connected to with <resource>-exports-
available > 0 and if desired-imports of the importer > <resource>-exports-available 
of the exporter. This is due to the fact that the search for new trade partners only starts 
when all the countries the importer has a connection with deplete their availability of 
exports for that resource. Therefore, the importing country sequentially imports 10% 
of its total imports needed from random countries it is connected with until either 
desired-imports = 0 or <resource>-exports-available of its current trade partners = 0. 
In the latter case, the importing country will randomly select a new trade partner from 
the pool of countries it is not yet connected with and with <resource>-exports-
available > 0. If the criteria are not met by any of the countries, i.e. the exports 
available for the resource have been depleted in the whole world, the procedure 
terminates, otherwise a new directed link is created from the exporting country to the 
importer. The procedure continues until the importer’s desired-imports = 0 or until the 
exports for the resource are depleted in the whole world. In addition, every successful 
transaction increases by one the strength of the link that has been used. Links ‘break’ 
after five years of consecutive not use. This figure is arbitrary and this behaviour was 
introduced to remove unused links.   
Countries’ bubbles in the ABMs’ interface are coloured green if their consumption of 
the resource that has been selected to show are satisfied, orange otherwise. Because of 
the way international trade was implemented in the ABMs, if countries’ bubbles turn 
orange signifies that the exports available for the resource have been exhausted 
worldwide, as importing countries will always try to (sequentially) import any exports 
available from any country until their national consumption is satisfied. 
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Countries that were constituted post-2005 and hence added during the runs of the 
model (Kosovo, Montenegro and South Sudan) are not assigned with any links once 
created, which are instead created through this procedure. 
5.1.7.9. SURs (Food and Food and Fuel ABMs, only cereals) 
After the first round of trade to cover consumption, countries proceed to compute 
their desired stocks for cereals according to the national Stock-To-Use Ratios (SURs) 
that they have been initialised with. This procedure and the following, i.e. to restock-
cereals, have been introduced in the ABMs because these constitute one of the 
possible bases for further developments of the models. Since the 2008 global food 
crisis, an increasing amount of research has been dedicated to the role of food stocks 
in price formation. In particular, food storage has been found to greatly affect food 
price behaviour and that food price spikes are more likely to happen when stocks are 
low (Bobenrieth, et al., 2013). In addition, the work from Bobenrieth, et al. (2013) 
found that national SURs, coupled with prices, are good indicators of market tightness 
and scarcity in grain markets. This information also drove the decision to include the 
level of stocks in computing international prices for both food and fuel as presented in 
Section 5.2. 
SURs are a percentage measure of a country’s desire for food storage and are 
calculated as the ratio of stocks to consumption. In the ABMs developed as part of 
this work, SURs have only been calculated for cereals, as this is the only resource for 
which data on desired stock levels required by countries was available and, in 
addition, countries consciously make decisions as regards stock levels for this 
resource (Bobenrieth, et al., 2013). National stocks for energy resources are 
constituted by un-exported exports and carried over to the following tick. 
National SURs have been calculated as the percentage ratio between cereals 
consumption and stocks for each country. Following Principle 2 of the GRO project, 
reported data has been used to calculate this parameter: the variable ‘Food 
Consumption (1,000 MT) was sourced from the GRO database (GSI, 2014), whereas 
data for the variable ‘Beginning Stocks’ was sourced from the USDA database 
(USDA, 2015a). These two variables were used to calculate national SURs per each 
year for the period 1995 – 2011 and then averaged for each country to obtain a single 
parameter expressed as a percentage. This parameter, which, for simplicity, is kept 
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constant throughout the simulation, is hence fed to the ABMs during their 
initialisation and national SURs are stored in the variable food-SUR. 
Countries running this procedure hence calculate their SUR by executing the equation 
cereals-consumption * food-SUR / 100 and store the amount of food stock desired for 
the current tick in the variable desired-cereals-stock. If desired-cereals-stock > 0, 
countries with cereals-exports-available >= desired-cereals-stock, i.e. countries with 
cereals still available for exports after the first round of trade to cover countries’ 
consumption, will cover their own needs for stocks with their leftover exports 
available, leaving the remainder in the variable cereals-exports-available. Conversely, 
countries with cereals-exports-available < desired-cereals-stock will subtract their 
cereals-exports-available from desired-cereals-stock.  
5.1.7.10. Restock-cereals (Food and Food and Fuel ABMs, only cereals) 
This procedure is only run by countries that have a preference for SURs and that 
could not cover their own needs for cereals stocks with their own production and 
previous stocks, i.e. countries with desired-cereals-stock > 0. The remainder of the 
procedure for restocking cereals is fundamentally similar to that of trade-<resource> 
and hence will not be repeated.  
At the end of this procedure, the bubble of countries that could not meet their own 
needs for restocking turns either pink if these had also not met their needs for 
consumption or yellow if they did meet consumption but they did not meet their needs 
for restocking. 
5.1.7.11. Check-network (All ABMs) 
This procedure regulates the evolution of the social networks for the international 
trade of natural resources in the ABMs. As mentioned earlier in the text, the evolution 
of the networks included in the ABMs, i.e. four networks, one per each natural 
resource included, have emergent structures. In particular, links that have been left 
unused for longer than five ticks break. Two variables included in the ABMs are 
related to the links, which are called strength and zero-time. Strength increases by one 
unit every time natural resources are exchanged via this link, whereas zero-time is a 
counter that records the number of ticks the link has not been used.  
  
158 
By the time countries start running this procedure, both rounds of trade have already 
taken place, therefore if the link was used, its strength ≠ 0. Therefore, links whose 
strength = 0 will increase the counter zero-time by 1 or will set the counter to 0 if 
strength ≠ 0. Every five ticks, i.e. if ticks mod 5 = 0, links with zero-time ≥ 5 will die, 
whereas the other links will see their variables strength and zero-time reset to 0. 
5.1.7.12. Compute-WGI (All ABMs) 
As explored in depth in Chapter 3, the WGI is the measure of political fragility that 
has been selected and introduced in the ABMs and which significantly influences the 
occurrence of food and fuel riots in countries. Since this index is an aggregation of 
several different indices and measures (WB, 2015d), it could not be recreated 
endogenously and it was hence calculated for each country included in the ABMs by 
fitting trend lines to data sourced from the WB website (WB, 2015c). The time frame 
taken into account was 1996 – 2012 (as this is the first year for which data for the 
index is available. In addition, data for the WGI is available for every other year until 
2002, after which yearly data is provided) and the polynomial functions calculated are 
fed into the ABMs during the initialisation of countries and stored in the variable 
WGI-function. 
Countries running this procedure therefore evaluate their own WGI function with x = 
tick (year) and store the estimate for the WGI in the variable WGI. It is worth 
recalling here that the version of the WGI used in the models uses an inverted scale as 
compared to the original data downloadable from the WB website, i.e. high, positive 
estimates for the index equal to high levels of fragility and vice versa. The WGI has 
historically been constrained to the range {-1.94; …; 3.4}, with an increasing level of 
fragility as the estimate increases. This range is maintained constant in the different 
versions of the ABMs. In addition, to implement the findings from Chapter 4, 
countries needed to be divided into categories for the WGI, which were calculated as 
homogenous breaks using the whole range of possible estimates given by the index 
for the whole period: countries with a WGI < -0.622587779 are classified as ‘low’; 
countries with - 0.622587779 < WGI < 0.69290963 are classified as ‘medium-low’; 
countries with 0.69290963 < WGI < 2.008407038 and finally countries with WGI > 
2.008407038 are classified as ‘high’. The group countries belong to is stored in the 
variable WGI-group.  
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5.1.7.13. Food-or-fuel-fragility-first (Food and Fuel ABM) 
This procedure is only present in the Food and Fuel version of the ABM, as this 
model includes dynamics that lead to both food and fuel riots and their mutual 
relationship. As presented in Chapter 4.3, the occurrence of food riots in countries 
increases the probabilities for the occurrence of fuel riots in the same country the 
same year and vice versa. Since this influence is mutual, the sequence with which the 
probabilities are calculated for each country is randomised. In particular, the 
probabilities leading to each type of riot are calculated in four different procedures 
grouped in two sets of two sub-procedures based on the REEM models presented in 
Chapter 4. According to the statistical models, the type of riot for which probabilities 
are calculated first will depend on both international price of the resource and national 
political fragility of the country, whereas the probability for the second type of riot 
will depend solely on whether the first type of riot occurred. The choice between 
which set of procedures is run, i.e. the decision determining which between food and 
fuel riots are calculated first, is randomised with 50% probability for each outcome. If 
the randomised choice results in food riots being calculated first, the first set of 
procedures will activate and will be run in the following order: 1. Food-fragility-first; 
2. Fuel-fragility-second. Conversely, if the randomised choice results in fuel riots 
being calculated first, the second set of procedures will activate and will be run in the 
following order: 1. Fuel-fragility-first; 2. Food-fragility-second. The bubbles of 
countries in the ABMs’ interface turn dark red if a food riot occurs or grey in case of a 
fuel riot. 
5.1.7.14. Food-fragility-first (Food and Food and Fuel ABMs) 
This procedure is included both in the Food and Food and Fuel ABMs. In this 
procedure, countries set to 0 a temporary variable p. This value will be replaced with 
the probability of food riot for the country according to the REEM model presented in 
Chapter 4.1.7.4, i.e. according to the international-food-price of the current tick and a 
country’s WGI-group. The final probability of experiencing a food riot for each 
country is calculated according to Equation 5.1. 
𝑃𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑛𝑡 = 𝑝𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑛𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑟𝑗𝑛𝑡 
Equation 5.1 – final probability estimate for each country based on REEM model 
presented in Chapter 4.1.7.4 (own elaboration). 
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In Equation 5.1 𝑃𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑗𝑛𝑡 is the final probability of experiencing a food riot for each 
country n at tick t, which is the sum of each country n specific probability pfood given 
by the REEM model j according to the tick’s t international food price regime and the 
country’s WGI group, the intercept i for the REEM j and country n random-effects r 
for the REEM model j. Once estimated the final probability 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑡, countries compare 
this with a random-float variable with value 1. If random-float 1 < 𝑃𝑗𝑛𝑡, a food riot 
occurs in the country running the procedure. Its variable food-crisis is set to true and 
the bubble of the country in the interface pane of the ABM becomes dark red. 
5.1.7.15. Fuel-fragility-second (Food and Fuel ABM) 
This procedure is only included in the Food and Fuel ABM. Here, a country’s 
probability of experiencing a fuel riot solely depends on whether the same country has 
already experienced a food riot and the final probability is based on the REEM model 
presented in Chapter 4.3 and calculated according to Equation 5.2. 
𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑚𝑛𝑡 = 𝑝𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑚𝑛𝑡+ 𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝑟𝑚𝑛𝑡 
Equation 5.2 – final probability estimate for each country based on REEM model 
presented in Chapter 4.3 (own elaboration). 
In Equation 5.2 𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑚𝑛𝑡 is the final probability of experiencing a fuel riot for each 
country n at tick t, which is the sum of each country n specific probability pfuel given 
by the REEM model m according to the tick’s t variable food-crisis for the country, 
the intercept i for the REEM m and country n random-effects r for the REEM m. Once 
estimated the final probability 𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑡 , countries compare this with a random-float 
variable with value 1. If random-float 1 < 𝑃𝑚𝑛𝑡 , a fuel riot occurs in the country 
running the procedure. Its variable fuel-crisis is set to true and the bubble of the 
country in the interface pane of the ABM becomes grey. 
5.1.7.16. Fuel-fragility-first (Fuel and Food and Fuel ABMs) 
This procedure is overall very similar to that presented in Section 5.1.7.14, although it 
is only included in the Fuel and Food and Fuel versions of the ABM and is aimed at 
estimating the probability for each country to experience a fuel riot based on the 
variable international-fuel-price and a country’s WGI-group. Since the only 
difference between this procedure and Food-fragility-first is the REEM presented in 
Chapter 4.2.4 the full explanation will not be reported.  
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5.1.7.17. Food-fragility-second (Food and Fuel ABM) 
This procedure is also very similar to that presented in Section 5.1.7.15, although it is 
only included in the Food and Fuel version of the ABM and is aimed at estimating the 
probability for each country to experience a food riot based on whether a country has 
already experienced a fuel riot during the same tick, i.e. variable fuel-crisis = true. 
Since the only difference between this procedure and Fuel-fragility-second is the 
REEM presented in Chapter 4.3, the full explanation will not be reported. 
5.1.7.18. Update-stocks (All ABMs, all resources) 
In this procedure global stocks for the natural resources included in the different 
versions of the ABM are calculated by aggregating national leftovers from trade, i.e. 
variables <resource>-exports-available. These aggregated values are stored in global 
variables called <resource>-stock-t-1 and countries’ variables <resource>-exports-
available are set to 0. 
5.1.7.19. Plots-and-monitors (All ABMs) 
This procedure updates the plots and monitors present in the ABMs interface. These 
draw plots and update monitors that display data related to the following global 
variables: global-<resource>-reserves (only for energy resources), global-
<resource>-production, global-<resource>-consumption, global-<resource>-
imports-required-before-trade, global-<resource>-exports-available, global-
<resource>-availability, global-pop, global-pop-growth. These variables are 
aggregates of national values for the same variables. 
5.2. Calibration of the ABMs: modelling international prices for food and 
fuel 
As presented in the previous chapter, one of the conditions that determines whether a 
country will experience a food or a fuel riot is the international price of each resource, 
which in the different versions of the ABM were modelled in two regimes: either 
above or below a threshold found at 140 for the FAO FPI and $93 a barrel for the EIA 
fuel price. International prices for food and fuel – the first included in the Food ABM, 
the second in the Fuel ABM and both included in the integrated Food and Fuel ABM 
– were the two target variables of the calibration in the models. Prices in the ABMs 
were calibrated using only the interaction between global demand and supply, i.e. the 
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ratio between the two, and global stocks for each resource. Although these variables 
constitute only some of the factors that determine international prices of natural 
resources, this constitutes a good first approximation. Indeed, as discussed in Chapter 
2.8, international prices of natural resources depend on complex dynamics led by 
different market and physical conditions, which were beyond the scope of this 
research. The ABMs only needed to reproduce the dynamics of price shocks – and not 
the exact $ amount – to recreate the conditions that lead to the occurrence of riots. 
The consequences of this choice will be discussed in depth in Section 5.5 and Chapter 
7.  
As detailed in Chapter 3.3.7, it is common practice to either use two different 
databases for calibration and validation of the model or split the database using a 
subset of observations to calibrate the model and the remaining ones to validate its 
results. In the case of this research, neither of these options was viable due to the short 
time frame considered, i.e. 2005 – 2013, and the general scarcity of data on food and 
fuel riots, which are still rare events. The only comprehensive databases available 
with records for these occurrences were those created as part of this research and the 
second option of splitting the database in two would have resulted in halving the 
number of riots for each period, which would have been detrimental to the robustness 
of the results from the calibration. Therefore, in the case of this work the same 
database was used to calibrate and validate the different versions of the ABM, 
although focusing each procedure on different variables. The calibration was aimed at 
reproducing the international price regimes for oil and food, whereas the validation of 
the model focused on the variables food- and fuel-crisis, i.e. food and fuel riots. 
Two sets of data were tested to calibrate the ABMs, i.e. reported data for the ratio 
between production and consumption and stocks of the resources and data for these 
variables resulting from the model. To highlight the difference between these two sets 
of data and to justify the introduction of a food production shock in 2008, the first 
subsection will present a comparison. The second subsection will present findings 
from different experiments on reported and simulated data using different methods to 
recreate prices in the ABMs, i.e. ETs and the use of two free parameters. Finally, the 
results for each section of this chapter will be discussed and a method to introduce 
prices in the ABMs will be chosen. For reasons of brevity, the databases used to fit 
each model are provided as attachments and the ETs on reported data for food and 
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fuel are provided in Appendix 3. The analyses were run with R (R Core Team, 2013) 
and ETs were built with the R package ev.tree() (Grubinger, et al., 2014).  
5.2.1. Comparing data from the model with reported data 
Conventionally, the calibration procedure uses real data to find different combinations 
of parameters that, once included in the computer model, allow them to match 
measurements as closely as possible. In other words, models are ‘trained’ on real data. 
Because the calibration of the ABMs was attempted on both reported and simulated 
data for these variables, it is important to compare these estimates. Even more so to 
justify the introduction of the 2008 food production shock in the simulated data and to 
speculate on why only the calibration on simulated data was successful. The 
simulated data for food and fuel variables was extracted from the ABMs at the end of 
each tick and constitutes the sum of national estimates for food/fuel production, 
consumption – to calculate the ratio between the two – and stocks. The national 
estimates for these variables result from the polynomial trend-lines discussed in the 
previous section and the 2008 food production shock was not activated to collect data 
from the Food ABM. 
Reported data for production, consumption and stocks of food (cereals) was retrieved 
from the USDA data bank (USDA, 2015b). The data source for the variables used for 
the calibration was different from that used for the other analyses and for the 
initialisation of the ABMs, i.e. the national data for cereals production and 
consumption implemented in the model was derived from the GRO database, which, 
in turn, sourced it from Food and Agriculture Organisation Statistical Division 
(FAOSTAT) (Jones and Phillips, 2015), because the GRO Database did not provide 
world estimates for food, and FAOSTAT only provided data until 2011. In addition, 
national data for food stocks used to calculate several parameters implemented in the 
ABMs and used to initialise countries’ food stocks was already sourced from USDA. 
The variables used were World Food Production (1,000 MT), World Food Domestic 
Consumption (1,000 MT) and World Stocks (1,000 MT). Although these variables are 
officially related to food in general, the metadata clarifies that these only capture 
cereals, which allows their use in combination with the FAO FPI and the variables 
present in the ABMs.  
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Table 5.3 presents the comparison between ratios and stocks relative to reported 
(USDA) and simulated data, extrapolated from the Food ABM.  
Variable Data source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Ratio prod/cons USDA 0.998 0.980 1.013 1.043 1.024 0.988 1.016 0.989 1.033 
 Food ABM 1.027 1.018 1.021 1.017 1.006 0.994 1.002 0.995 0.988 
 
Ratio 
USDA/ABM 0.972 0.963 0.992 1.025 1.018 0.994 1.015 0.994 1.046 
Food Stocks USDA 394939 348458 371114 452058 490295 460073 466279 451577 512120 
 Food ABM 350768 405156 441724 486362 523383 537250 523543 527060 514121 
 
Ratio 
USDA/ABM 1.126 0.860 0.840 0.930 0.937 0.856 0.891 0.857 0.996 
Table 5.3 – Comparison between data from USDA and data from the Food ABM for 
the variables Ratio Food production/consumption and Food stocks. Data for stocks is 
expressed in 1,000 MT (own elaboration). 
As shown in Table 5.3, the data for food production and consumption included in the 
model is generally similar to that reported by USDA. Reported data for the ratio 
between food production and consumption vary between -4% and +5% as compared 
to simulated data. As regards data for reported and simulated stocks, real international 
food stocks vary between -16% and +13% as compared to simulated data. 
As for the comparison between reported and simulated world data for fuel, reported 
data was retrieved from the EIA website (US EIA, 2015a). The variables used were 
Total Petroleum Consumption (Millions Barrels) and Total Oil Supply (Millions 
Barrels) to calculate the ratio between production and consumption of oil and Total 
Petroleum Stocks, End of Period (Millions Barrels). Table 5.4 presents the 
comparison between the ratios and stocks relative to reported (EIA) and simulated 
data, extrapolated from the Fuel ABM. 
Variable Data source 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Ratio prod/cons EIA 0.994 1.005 1.018 0.994 0.991 1.001 1.006 0.999 1.003 
 Fuel ABM 1.007 1.005 1.004 1.004 1.003 0.996 0.994 0.985 0.893 
 
Ratio 
EIA/ABM 0.987 1 1.014 0.990 0.988 1.004 1.013 1.014 1.123 
Oil Stocks EIA 4075.96 4168.60 4085.52 4202.86 4206.61 4219.02 4118.68 4187.25 4126.61 
 Fuel ABM 4075.96 4269.33 4388.00 4476.91 4546.14 4579.22 4381.92 4016.40 3288.26 
 
Ratio 
EIA/ABM 1 0.976 0.931 0.939 0.925 0.921 0.940 1.043 1.255 
Table 5.4 – Comparison between data from EIA and data from the Fuel ABM for the 
variables Ratio Oil production/consumption and Oil stocks. Data for oil stocks is 
expressed in Million barrels (own elaboration). 
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The data for oil production and consumption included in the model is generally 
similar to that reported by EIA. Reported data for the ratio between oil production and 
consumption vary between -1% and +1% as compared to simulated data, with only 
2013 recording a figure +12% larger than simulated data. As regards data for reported 
and simulated stocks, reported international fuel stocks vary between -26% and +7% 
as compared to simulated data.  
In general, the ABMs seem to recreate quite accurately production and consumption 
patterns for oil, whereas the comparison of food variables shows larger variations. 
This is mainly explained by the use of smoothed trend lines to model these variables 
in the ABMs: indeed, the deterministic estimates for production and consumption –
and hence stocks – of natural resources resulting from the ABMs derive from the 
trend lines on past data for these variables, which are introduced at the national level 
in the models and calculated by the agents at the beginning of each tick. Indeed, the 
Ratio prod/cons in the model was consistently higher than reported data in the period 
2005 – 2007. This justifies the exogenous introduction of the 2008 food production 
shock to compensate for the higher food availability during that year in the model, as 
compared to reported data. It is worth noting that, although a few percentage points 
variations seem small, these can potentially translate in large differences when 
focussing on absolute estimates. Finally, data for stocks vary largely between 
simulated and reported data. The consequences of the difference between the 
variables will be subject to a critical evaluation in Section 5.5. 
5.2.2. Calibration with ETs and free parameters 
As explained in detail in Chapter 3.4.4, ETs are regression trees that belong to the 
family of Machine Learning and identify breaks in the data of a set of independent 
variables that lead to a specific outcome observed in the target variable. In this case, 
the independent variables were the ratios between world production and consumption 
and stocks of food and oil and the target variables were the regimes (either above or 
below the threshold) of the international prices of these resources.  
In the first instance, the calibration was attempted on the reported data presented in 
the previous section. Two ETs were fit to the data, one per each resource analysing 
the period 2005 – 2013 to maintain consistency with previous analyses. Although ETs 
for both resources perfectly recreated the regimes for international price regimes, i.e. 
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either below or above the threshold, and identified both ratio and stocks as significant 
variables, the dynamics identified seemed counterintuitive and unrealistic. For 
instance, the models said that high levels of stocks and ratio between production and 
consumption correspond to high price regimes and vice versa, which are the opposite 
dynamics that one would expect. In addition, data for world estimates of the variables 
used as independent in the models presented several inconsistencies. In particular, 
there does not seem to be a clear relationship between stocks of the resources and 
supply-demand dynamics. This is particularly true for oil, where for several years, in 
correspondence to a surplus of production, global oil stocks decrease in the world. 
This suggests possible inaccuracies in the data and/or in the reporting process for 
these variables, which requires further investigation (see for instance Phillips, 2016). 
Since this went beyond the scope of this research, these variables were not used to 
parameterise the price dynamics in the ABMs. These models are presented in 
Appendix 3 for reasons of brevity, and the results will be further discussed and 
compared to the other ETs in Section 5.5. For all the reasons above, the models were 
calibrated using endogenous data from the ABMs.  
The next experiment for calibration used data from the ABMs for global production, 
consumption and stocks of food and oil and real data for international price regimes 
i.e. either above or below the threshold, of the resources. The 2008 food production 
shock was activated to collect data from the Food ABM. Two different methods were 
tested: ETs and calibration using two free parameters.  
As for calibration of international prices for food, an ET model was fitted to the data 
from the ABMs using the ratio between Global Cereals Production and Global 
Cereals Consumption and Global Cereals Stocks as independent variables and the real 
series of price regimes between 2005 and 2014 as target variable. The results from the 
ET model for food are presented in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 – ET model on data from the ABMs for food using ratio between ‘Global 
Cereals Production’ and ‘Global Cereals Consumption’ and the variable ‘Global 
Cereals Stock’ as independent variables and the variable ‘Price threshold’ as target 
variable (own elaboration). 
The results from the ET for food fit to the data from the Food ABM perfectly recreate 
the international price regime for the period considered and show more intuitive 
dynamics as compared to the ET on reported food data. In particular, when the ratio 
between global production and consumption of cereals is smaller than 0.996637, the 
international price of food is above the threshold. For any ratio larger or equal to 
0.996637, global stocks of cereals become significant and, in particular, when these 
are smaller than 132,529.72 (1,000 MT), the price climbs above the threshold, and 
below otherwise.  
A more conventional method to calibrate models was also tested on data from the 
model and compared to the results from the ET for food: calibration through two free 
parameters, one related to the ratio between global cereals production and 
consumption (α) and the other related to global stocks of cereals (β). This type of 
calibration is usually carried out directly in NetLogo, where the emergent behaviours 
result in different data for each run of the model and these can be accounted for. 
However, since global estimates for production, consumption and stocks are 
deterministic in the ABMs developed in this research, data was extrapolated from the 
models and analysed with an R script. The script runs 100 iterations of a procedure 
that compares the regime price generated by each combination of the parameters α 
and β with the real price regime observed for the FAO FPI for each year. The range 
explored for the parameters are α ∈ {0.909, 0.910, …, 0.998} and β {1.07e+11, 
1.08e+11, …, 3.51e+11} and the combinations were analysed both with ‘AND’ and 
‘OR’ between them. In the case with ‘AND’, the maximum percentage of years that 
the combinations could correctly predict was 80%. There were 5 combinations of 
parameters that led to this result and one of them presented a ratio equal to 0.9983593 
whereas the parameter for stocks was 128,728 (1,000 MT). In particular these 
combinations were not able to capture the years 2008 and 2014, which were both 
predicted below the threshold. As for combinations with ‘OR’ 194 combinations of 
parameters led to a perfect recreation of the international price of food, which were 
not consecutive. One of these was α = 0.910088914 and β = 128,728 (1000 MT).  
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These two methods have also been applied to the calibration on international fuel 
price regimes. Firstly, an ET model was fit to the data from the models using the ratio 
between Global Oil Production and Global Oil Consumption and Global Oil Stocks as 
independent variables and the real series of price regimes between 2005 and 2014 as 
target variable. The results from the ET model for fuel are presented in Figure 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4 – ET model on data from the ABMs for fuel using ratio between ‘Global 
Oil Production’ and ‘Global Oil Consumption’ and the variable ‘Global Oil Stock’ as 
independent variables and the variable ‘Price threshold’ as target variable. The unit 
used for stocks of oil is barrels (own elaboration). 
Also in the case of fuel, the results from the ET run on data from the Fuel ABM 
perfectly recreate the international price regime for the period considered and show 
more intuitive dynamics as compared to the ET on reported fuel data. In particular, 
when global stocks of oil are larger or equal to 4.55e+09 barrels, the international 
price of fuel is below the threshold. Conversely, when the stocks are smaller than 
4.55e+09 barrels, the ratio between global production and consumption of oil is 
significant and if this is smaller than 1.00443 the international price of oil is above the 
threshold. For any ratio larger or equal to 1.00443, the price remains below the 
threshold. 
The calibration of the models through the use of two free parameters, one representing 
the ratio between ‘Global Oil Production’ and ‘Global Oil Consumption’ (α) and the 
other representing ‘Global Oil Stocks’ (β) was also implemented in the case of oil. 
The range explored for the parameters was α ∈ {0.871, 0.872, …, 1.006} and β 
{0.000, 0.001, …, 4.58e+09} and the combinations were analysed both with ‘AND’ 
and ‘OR’ between them. In the case with ‘AND’, 39 combinations led to correctly 
predict 90% of the years, not being able to predict 2008 above the threshold. One of 
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the combinations that led to this result was ratio 0.994218549 and stocks 4.39e+09 
barrels. Combinations with ‘OR’ achieved the same level of accuracy, as the 
maximum percentage of years that the combinations could correctly predict was 90%, 
not being able to correctly predict the price above threshold in 2008. There were 178 
combinations of parameters that led to this result and one of them presented a ratio 
equal to 0.994218549 whereas the parameter for stocks was 4.63e+09 barrels. 
Interestingly, the breaks identified with these two methods, i.e. ET and parameters, 
although equivalent, led to two different accuracies for the replication of international 
price regimes for food and fuel, probably due to the number of decimals included in 
the experiment with the two free parameters. ETs, overall, proved to be more accurate 
as compared to the calibration with two free parameters. Therefore this method was 
selected to simulate price regimes for food and fuel and the dynamics implemented in 
the different versions of the ABMs. 
5.3. Validation of the ABMs 
Models that aim at producing meaningful predictions for future events need to be 
validated, to ensure the model’s ability to reproduce the dynamics that characterise 
the system which they aim to represent. As mentioned before, the ABMs developed as 
part of this research are empirically grounded, which means that reported data was 
used to generate the characteristics of the countries and parameters and relationships 
were informed on statistical tests carried out on real data from past events. This means 
that the ABMs are already internally validated (Squazzoni, 2012). To further test 
whether the dynamics included in the models were sufficient to recreate the 
occurrence of food and fuel riots and with what accuracy, data resulting from the 
models runs on the period 2005 – 2013 was analysed and compared with the real data 
on food and fuel riots presented in Chapter 4. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
validation of an ABM is conventionally carried out by comparing results from the 
model with a database different from the one used for calibration. However, due to 
scarcity of data it was decided to validate the different versions of the ABM on the 
same database used to calibrate them, although focusing on different variables to 
check the validity of the models’ results. The country-level variables relevant to this 
process that have been recorded at the end of each tick in the ABM runs are food-
crisis and fuel-crisis. The validation of the ABMs has been carried out separately for 
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each version, i.e. Food, Fuel and Food and Fuel, to analyse the added value of 
introducing dynamics resulted from statistical models in an ABM environment and 
evaluate possible emergent properties. In particular, the validation evaluated the 
models’ ability to predict four different types of information about riots: i) the total 
number of riots occurred when the regime of the international price of resources was 
either above or below the threshold; ii) the number of riots per year; iii) the countries 
that experienced a riot at any point during the time frame considered and iv) each 
specific riot occurred in each country during each year. 
5.3.1. Validation of the Food ABM 
In order to validate the Food ABM, 100 simulations were run and analysed. Firstly, 
the simulated cumulative probability of food riots to happen in the years below (2005 
– 2007 and 2009) and above (2008 and 2010 – 2013) the 140 FAO FPI threshold were 
calculated and compared with the reported cumulative probability during those 
periods. The simulated probability for the below-threshold period was 0.06 whereas 
the real probability was 0.02. For the above-threshold period, the simulated 
probability was 0.17, whereas the reported probability was 0.22. Although the Food 
ABM overestimates countries’ probability to experience a food riot when the 
international price of food is below the threshold and underestimates their probability 
when the price is high, the probabilities are remarkably similar when aggregated by 
price regime.  
Figure 5.5 plots the number of food riots per year as they occurred in reality and as 
predicted by the Food ABM. The 2008 peak plotted in both lines suggests that the 
ABM correctly represents a higher probability of the occurrence of food riots in that 
year, and, although the absolute number of food riots per year is underestimated by 
the model, the lines follow the same pattern. Interestingly, the model failed to fully 
capture the second peak of food riots that occurred in 2011 and tended instead to 
spread the riots that occurred in 2011 over a four-year period also covering 2010, 
2012 and 2013. The model also seems to overestimate non-food riot years – so the 
overall distribution is flatter. Overall the model seems to smoothen the real-world 
dynamics, which suggests the lack of some important positive feedback mechanism 
(something to include in future versions). 
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Figure 5.5 - Number of food riots per year as they were reported and as predicted by 
the Food ABM. The pink shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval in the 
model’s results (own elaboration). 
To further investigate the results from the Food ABM, the list of countries with the 
highest likelihood of food riots throughout the whole period as simulated in the model 
and the database of food riots presented in Chapter 4.1.7.1 were compared to evaluate 
the accuracy of the Food ABM at predicting which countries experienced food riots in 
the time frame considered. The simulated probabilities ranged between 0% and 9% 
with the lowest probability assigned to Australia and the highest to India. In 
particular, 70% of the countries that fell within the top 10 countries most at risk of 
experiencing a food riot as calculated by the Food ABM experienced a food riot. This 
percentage remains unvaried for the top 20 countries most at risk and 63% for the top 
40. 
The accuracy of the Food ABM was investigated further by evaluating the predictions 
for both year and country for each food riot resulting from the ABM simulations. To 
do this, an R script calculating the percentage match between the variable food-crisis 
extrapolated for each country for each year from the results of the Food ABM and the 
variable Food Riot from the dataset was run. The script first calculated the overall 
accuracy of the model, i.e. at predicting both countries that did experience a food riot 
during a given year and countries that did not, the percentage of correctly predicted 
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food riots in each country for each year, and, finally, the percentage of false food riots 
predicted, i.e. food riots predicted by the model in a certain country during a given 
year that did not occur in reality. This was done for each of the 100 runs of the Food 
ABM and the average results are presented in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5 – Summary of the averaged results for the predictions from the 100 runs of 
the Food ABM, where Food.all is the overall accuracy of the model at predicting both 
countries that did and did not experience a food riot in reality, Food.true the 
percentage of correctly predicted food riots in each country for each year and 
Food.false is the percentage of false food riots predicted (own elaboration). 
Table 5.5 shows that the Food ABM correctly predicts only around 7% of the specific 
food riots reported (both country and year), although maintaining a high overall 
accuracy (95%) due to the low number of false positives predicted, i.e. around 2%. 
The low accuracy at predicting specific food riots clearly highlights the lack of 
important dynamics and factors in the ABM. It is in fact highly likely that the 
international price regimes and national political fragility are only some of the drivers 
of food riots. 
5.3.2. Validation of the Fuel ABM 
Similarly to the Food ABM, the Fuel version was run 100 times and the results 
analysed. The simulated cumulative probability of fuel riots to happen in the years 
below (2005 – 2007 and 2009 – 2010) and above (2008 and 2011 – 2013) the $93 per 
barrel threshold for the EIA fuel price were calculated and compared with the 
reported cumulative probability during those periods. The simulated probability for 
the below-threshold period was 0.07 whereas the reported probability was 0.04. For 
the above-threshold period, the simulated probability was 0.12, whereas the reported 
probability was 0.15. Although, similarly to the Food ABM, the Fuel version 
overestimates countries’ probability to experience a fuel riot when the international 
price of fuel is below the threshold and underestimates their probability when the 
Variables 
Percentages 
predicted 
Food.all 95.13% 
Food.true 6.86% 
Food.false 2.44% 
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price is high, the probabilities are remarkably similar when aggregated by price 
regime.  
Now comparing the predicted number of riots per year and the number of events 
occurred, Figure 5.6 plots the results for reported and simulated riots. As for the 
validation of the Food ABM, also for Fuel the 2008 peak plotted in both lines 
suggests that the ABM correctly represents a higher probability of the occurrence of 
fuel riots in that year, and in general the fit seems somewhat better than for food. 
Indeed, differently from the analysis for the Food ABM, the Fuel version captures the 
second peak of riots occurred in 2011, although the probability of riots remains almost 
constant for the following years. This results in the ABM’s failure to capture the fall 
and subsequent rise in the probability of fuel riots for the years 2012 and 2013.  
 
Figure 5.6 - Number of fuel riots per year as they were reported and as predicted by 
the Fuel ABM. The pink shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval in the 
model’s results (own elaboration). 
Now investigating the accuracy of the Fuel ABM at predicting the countries that, 
throughout the whole period considered, experienced fuel riots, the list of countries 
with the highest likelihood of fuel riots throughout the whole period as simulated in 
the model and the database of fuel riots presented in Chapter 4.2.1 were compared. 
The simulated probabilities ranged between 0% and 25% with the lowest probability 
assigned to Bahrain and the highest to India. 100% of the countries that fell within the 
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top 10 countries most at risk of experiencing a fuel riot as calculated by the Fuel 
ABM effectively experienced a fuel riot. This percentage equals 95% for the top 20 
countries most at risk and all the countries that experienced a fuel riot, i.e. 32 
countries, were ranked in the top 43 countries most at risk. 
The accuracy of the Fuel ABM was investigated further by calculating the percentage 
of fuel riots occurred in each country during each year correctly predicted by the 
model. This was tested by adapting the same R script implemented for the validation 
of the Food ABM. The averaged results from the 100 runs of the Fuel ABM are 
presented in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.6 – Summary of the averaged results for the predictions from the 100 runs of 
the Fuel ABM, where Fuel.all is the overall accuracy of the model at predicting both 
countries that did and did not experience a fuel riot in reality, Fuel.true the percentage 
of correctly predicted fuel riots in each country for each year and Fuel.false is the 
percentage of false fuel riots predicted (own elaboration). 
The Fuel ABM performed better than the Food ABM (around 10%) at predicting the 
year and country when (fuel) riots occurred, although its accuracy remains low. 
Remarkably, also the Fuel ABM had a low percentage of false positive of around 2%, 
which resulted in a high overall performance of more than 96% of observations 
correctly predicted. Even in this case the results show the ABM’s lack of specific 
dynamics that would allow it to predict specific fuel riots, i.e. the country and the year 
when these occurred. 
5.3.3. Validation of the Food and Fuel ABM 
Finally, the integrated Food and Fuel ABM was validated implementing the same 
methodology as the previous sections. Since this version of the model includes 
dynamics that lead to both food and fuel riots and their interaction (see Chapter 4.3), 
its predictions have been validated for both types of event. 
The simulated cumulative probability of food riots to happen in the years below (2005 
– 2007 and 2009) and above (2008 and 2010 – 2013) the 140 threshold for the FAO 
Variables 
Percentages 
predicted 
Fuel.all 96.07% 
Fuel.true 10.24% 
Fuel.false 2.00% 
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FPI were calculated and compared with the reported cumulative probability during 
those periods. The simulated probability for the below-threshold period was 0.08 
whereas the reported probability was 0.02. For the above-threshold period, the 
simulated probability was 0.16, whereas the reported probability was 0.22. These 
results are in all similar to those from the Food ABM, and the minimal differences are 
likely to be due to the stochasticity built into the models. 
Focusing now on fuel riots, the simulated cumulative probability of fuel riots to 
happen in the years below (2005 – 2007 and 2009 – 2010) and above (2008 and 2011 
– 2013) the $93 per barrel threshold for the EIA fuel price were calculated and 
compared with the reported cumulative probability during those periods. The 
simulated probability for the below-threshold period was 0.09 whereas the reported 
probability was 0.04. For the above-threshold period, the simulated probability was 
0.11, whereas the reported probability was 0.15. Even in the case for fuel riots, the 
inclusion of dynamics between food and fuel riots does not increase the predictive 
power of the ABM as far as the cumulated probability of riots per price regime. 
Now comparing the predicted number of riots per year and the number of events 
occurred, Figure 5.7 plots the results for reported and simulated food riots. The plot is 
nearly identical to the one presented in Section 5.3.1, highlighting that the analysis 
does not gain any predictive power when focusing on the total number of food riots 
per year.  
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Figure 5.7 - Number of food riots per year as they were reported and as predicted by 
the Food and Fuel ABM. The pink shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval 
in the model’s results (own elaboration). 
Figure 5.8, instead represents the comparison between the yearly number of fuel riots 
as predicted by the Food and Fuel ABM and those reported, which even in this case is 
nearly identical to that produced for the results from the Fuel ABM, presented in 
Section 5.3.2. The only noticeable difference between the two figures is that in Figure 
5.8 the small peak of fuel riots that can be found in Figure 5.6 is missing, resulting in 
a pattern that resembles reality more closely. 
 
Figure 5.8 - Number of fuel riots per year as they were reported and as predicted by 
the Food and Fuel ABM. The pink shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval 
in the model’s results (own elaboration). 
Now focussing on the countries that experienced a food riot at any point during the 
time frame considered, the accuracy of the predictions from the Food and Fuel ABM 
was evaluated. The simulated probabilities ranged between 0% and 8% with the 
lowest probability assigned to Tanzania and the highest to India. 41.90% of the 
countries that fell within the top 10 countries most at risk of experiencing a food riot 
as calculated by the Food and Fuel ABM experienced a food riot. This percentage is 
equal to 85% for the top 20 countries most at risk and 73% for the top 40. These 
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percentages show a clear improvement from the predictions for single countries’ 
probability to experience a food riot as resulting from the Food ABM.  
The same analysis was applied to fuel riots. The simulated probabilities for fuel riots 
resulting from the Food and Fuel ABM ranged between 0% and 27% with the lowest 
probability assigned to Tunisia and the highest to India. The total number of countries 
that experienced a fuel riot during the time frame considered in this analysis was 32, 
which all fell within the top 33 countries most at risk of experiencing a fuel riot as 
calculated by the Food and Fuel ABM. In this case the model’s accuracy at predicting 
which country will experience a fuel riot during the time frame considered is 
exceptional and also constitutes a remarkable improvement from the predictions 
resulting from the Fuel ABM.  
The accuracy of the Food and Fuel ABM was investigated further by calculating the 
percentage of food and fuel riots occurred in each country during each year correctly 
predicted by the model. The averaged results from the 100 runs of the Food and Fuel 
ABM are presented in Table 5.7. 
 
Table 5.7 – Summary of the averaged results for the predictions from the 100 runs of 
the Food and Fuel ABM, where the variable ‘All’ is the overall accuracy of the model 
at predicting both countries that did and did not experience a riot in reality, ‘True’ the 
percentage of correctly predicted riots in each country for each year and ‘False’ is the 
percentage of false fuel riots predicted (own elaboration). 
The comparison between the results presented in Table 5.7 and Tables 5.5 and 5.6, 
clearly show that the inclusion in the ABM of mutual influence between food and fuel 
riots does not add any predictive power to the model when focusing on both countries 
and years for each type of riot.  
5.4. Future forecasts for the year 2017 
One of the possible uses of computer models is to provide insights about possible 
futures. These future projections are commonly highly arbitrary, being produced by 
taking into account only the specific dynamics and assumptions implemented in the 
computer model. In order to provide insights about the future of food and fuel riots, 
Variables Food Fuel 
All 94.99% 95.99% 
True 6.86% 10.76% 
False 2.58% 2.09% 
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100 simulations of each version of the ABM were run and the results for food and fuel 
riots for the year 2017 were analysed. These consider the Business As Usual (BAU) 
dynamics included in each of the versions of the ABM. 2017 was selected because it 
is the first year in the future at the time of writing this thesis, i.e. March 2016, and, in 
addition, the different versions of the ABM were built to provide short term forecasts 
for the 5 – 10 years after the last year used to calibrate the models, which in this case 
was 2013.  
The results from the ABMs for the international price regimes suggest that both food 
and fuel price are likely to be above the threshold in 2017, thus increasing the 
probability of the occurrence of food and fuel riots during this year. However, the 
predictions for the international price regime need to be taken with reservations as 
explained in depth in the Discussion Section of this chapter. 
First the results for the forecast from the Food ABM were analysed. Out of all the 
years considered, 2017 had one of the highest probability for a random country to 
experience a food riot, which was around 4% as compared to 1% in 2005 (the year 
with the simulated lowest probability of food riots) and 3% in 2008 (the year that 
registered the largest number of food riots reported). The probabilities of food riots 
for countries for the year 2017 ranged between 0% and 17%, with the highest 
probability assigned to Turkey. In the top 10 countries most at risk we find Turkey, 
Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo Democratic Republic, Iran, Lao, Thailand, Algeria 
Mauritania and Nigeria, with probabilities spanning between 17% and 13%. 30 
countries were assigned with the lowest probability, amongst these we find Austria, 
Belgium and Iceland. For a better visualisation, the results from the food riots forecast 
for 2017 from the Food ABM are presented in Figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9 – Probability of food riots for countries based on the forecast for 2017 from 
the Food ABM (own elaboration). 
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Subsequently, the results for the forecast from the Fuel ABM were analysed. 
Similarly to the forecast from the Food ABM, out of all the years considered 2017 
was the second year with the highest probability for fuel riots, which was around 4% 
as compared to 1% for 2006, which was the year with the lowest simulated 
probability of fuel riots and 3% in 2008, the year with the largest number of fuel riots 
reported. The probabilities of fuel riots for countries for the year 2017 ranged between 
0% and 32%, with the highest probability assigned to India. At the top of the list of 
countries most at risk we find India, China, Bolivia, Greece, Yemen, Italy, Korea 
Democratic Republic, Pakistan and Nicaragua, with probabilities spanning between 
32% and 13%. 68 countries were assigned with the lowest probability, amongst these 
we find Côte d’Ivoire, Japan and Haiti. For a better visualisation, the results from the 
fuel riots forecast for 2017 from the Fuel ABM are presented in Figure 5.10. 
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Figure 5.10 – Probability of fuel riots for countries based on the forecast for 2017 
from the Fuel ABM (own elaboration). 
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Finally, the predictions for both food and fuel riots from the Food and Fuel ABM 
were analysed. As for food riots, out of all the years considered 2017 was the second 
year with the highest probability for food riots, which was around 4% as compared to 
2% in 2005 (the year with the lowest simulated probability of food riots) and 3% in 
2008 (the year with the largest number of food riots reported). The probabilities of 
food riots for countries for the year 2017 ranged between 0% and 13%, with the 
highest probability assigned to Kenya and Sudan. At the top of the list of countries 
most at risk we find Kenya, Sudan, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Tunisia, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Cameroon, India, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, with probabilities spanning 
between 13% and 11%. 23 countries were assigned with the lowest probability, 
amongst these we find Congo Republic, Ukraine and Zimbabwe. For a better 
visualisation, the results from the fuel riots forecast for 2017 from the probabilities of 
food riots for the Food and Fuel ABM are presented in Figure 5.11. 
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Figure 5.11 – Probability of food riots for countries based on the forecast for 2017 
from the Food and Fuel ABM (own elaboration). 
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Looking now at the predictions for fuel riots from the Food and Fuel ABM, out of all 
the years considered 2017 was the year with the highest probability for fuel riots, 
which was around 3% as compared to 2% in 2010 (the year with the lowest simulated 
probability of fuel riots) and 3% in 2008 (the year with the largest number of fuel riots 
reported). The probabilities of fuel riots for countries for the year 2017 ranged 
between 0% and 27%, with the highest probability assigned to India. At the top of the 
list of countries most at risk we find India, Cameroon, Italy, Yemen, Myanmar, 
Guinea, China, and Indonesia, with probabilities spanning between 27% and 13%. 41 
countries were assigned with the lowest probability, amongst these we find Côte 
d’Ivoire, Senegal, Somalia and United States. For a better visualisation, the results 
from the probabilities of fuel riots for the Food and Fuel ABM are presented in Figure 
5.12. 
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Figure 5.12 – Probability of fuel riots for countries based on the forecast for 2017 
from the Food and Fuel ABM (own elaboration). 
5.5. Sensitivity analysis of the Food, Fuel and Food and Fuel ABMs 
As shown in Figures 5.4 – 5.7 in the previous section, the uncertainty related to the 
ABMs’ results (in this case represented by the confidence interval in the probability 
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of riots resulting from the ABMs) is small. However, as highlighted in Chapter 3 of 
this thesis, it is also important to evaluate the sensitivity of the dynamics represented 
in the ABMs to some key conditions. Because some of the critical parameters 
implemented in the ABMs and that drive some of the key dynamics simulated have 
been estimated outside of the ABMs, the common approach to sensitivity analysis 
could not be implemented in this case. In an ideal situation, some of the key 
parameters would be varied within certain ranges, both singularly and in combination, 
evaluating the sensitivity of the ABMs to changes in these values. In this case these 
would be the thresholds for the international prices of food and fuel, the combinations 
of ratio and stock of the resources leading to a price either above or below the 
threshold and the categories of the WGI. All these cut-offs were estimated with RE, 
ET and REEM models, respectively. In the ABMs, the force driving all the different 
dynamics that lead to the occurrence or absence of riots is the availability of food and 
oil, which is in turn driven by the production and consumption of the resources. For 
this reason, the sensitivity analysis of the ABMs was run by exogenously introducing 
positive and negative shocks to the production of the resources in each ABM. In 
particular, a positive and a negative shock was introduced in the Food and Fuel ABMs 
on the single resources and, for simplicity, only a positive shock on food and a 
negative shock on oil in the Food and Fuel ABM. The shocks were introduced in 
2014, i.e. the first year not supported by data in the models, and the global probability 
of food and fuel riots was compared with the baseline projections presented in the 
previous section for the year 2017. The year 2017 was selected to allow the shock to 
produce short-term effects in the system and to allow the comparison with the 
forecasts presented in the previous section. 
The size of the food shock was hypothesised as an increase or a decrease in the global 
food production by 10% in the year 2014. This figure is consistent with the other food 
shocks implemented and tested in the model, i.e. the 2008 food shock and the El Niño 
scenario (see Chapter 6). For simplicity, the shock was redistributed amongst the top 
ten cereals producers, proportionally to their national contribution to the global 
production. This was implemented in the Food and Food and Fuel ABMs. 
As for the oil shock, this was imagined to be around 15% of the global total, and was 
also implemented at the national level. The negative oil shock hypothesised the 
‘switch off’ of the top oil producer, Saudi Arabia in 2014, whose production 
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amounted to 15% of the total. This method for the implementation of the shock was 
selected for simplicity, although it is not inconceivable for a country to officially stop 
trading a resource in case, for example, of the seize of oil wells from rebel movements 
(e.g. Ahmed, 2017). The positive shock was hypothesised as a doubling in the 
production of oil from the second and third largest oil producers, whose 2014 
production corresponded to 17% of the global total. These were Russia and Iraq, 
whose production was 11.3% and 5.7% of the total, respectively. Once again this 
constitutes a simplification, although it is not impossible for a country to increase its 
production by, for example, implementing measures to increase productivity, or the 
discovery of new oil wells, or the sale of national stocks. 
For the sensitivity analysis of the Food ABM, the model was run 100 times with both 
shocks. The results from the runs with the negative shock showed a price above the 
threshold for the year 2017. 2017 had one of the highest probability for a random 
country to experience a food riot, which was around 4% as compared to 1% in 2006 
(the year with the simulated lowest probability of food riots) and 3% in 2008 (the year 
that registered the largest number of food riots reported). These results are very 
similar to the baseline projections for the Food ABM for the same year presented in 
the previous section. The reason being that the ‘normal’ runs of the Food ABM 
already show a price above the threshold, which, as explained in the previous 
sections, is the main driver of the increased probability of a random country to 
experience a food riot. Now looking at the results from the sensitivity analysis with 
the introduction of a positive food shock, 2017 recorded a price below the threshold. 
The positive shock caused the price to fall and remain below the threshold in 2014 
and the following years, due to the build up of national food stocks, which is another 
important variable in the determination of international prices in the ABMs. The 
probability for a random country to experience a food riot in 2017 was around 2% as 
compared to around 4% in 2013 (the year with the simulated highest probability of 
food riots) and around 3% in 2008. 
Now looking at the sensitivity analysis for the Fuel ABM, the results from the runs 
with the negative shock show a price above the threshold for the year 2017. The 
probability for a random country to experience a fuel riot in 2017 was around 4% as 
compared to around 1% in 2007 (the year with the simulated lowest probability of 
fuel riots) and around 3% in 2008. Once again, these results closely resembled those 
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from the baseline projections from the Fuel ABM, since even in the case of oil the 
price ‘normally’ showed a regime above the threshold for this year. The results from 
the runs with a positive oil shock showed a price above the threshold for 2017, with 
the highest probability of fuel riots for this year, i.e. about 4%. 2010 registered the 
lowest probability for the period, i.e. about 1%, and this was 3% in 2008. The 
similarity with the results from the introduction of a negative shock can be explained 
by the oil demand and supply dynamics simulated in the model. Although the price 
showed a regime below the threshold in 2014, i.e. the year the production was 
exogenously increased, hence producing lower probabilities of riots during that year, 
a global demand larger than supply did not allow the build up of national stocks, thus 
bringing the price above the threshold for the following years and causing increased 
probabilities of fuel riots. 
The sensitivity analysis for the Food and Fuel ABM implemented a combination of 
positive and negative shocks on the resources. The results from the runs with a 
negative shock on food and a positive shock on oil showed both prices above the 
threshold in the year 2017. This was the year with the highest probability of food riots 
out of all the years considered, i.e. around 3%. Similar results were found for fuel 
riots, whose probability was around 3% for the same year, although 2017 was the 
third year in order of fuel riots probabilities. Similarly to the sensitivity analyses on 
the single-resource ABMs, due to a high-price regime for both resources the results 
were very similar to the baseline projections for the year 2017, which showed a 4% 
probability of food riots and a 3% probability of fuel riots for this year. The results 
from the sensitivity analysis with the introduction of a positive shock on food and a 
negative shock on fuel showed a price of food below the threshold and a price of fuel 
above the threshold for the year 2017. This resulted in a probability of food riots of 
around 2% and a probability of fuel riots of around 3% for 2017. This year was the 
eighth year in order of probability of food riots and the second in order of fuel riots. 
The results for food riots show the same dynamics as the introduction of a positive 
shock in the Food ABM, and the results for fuel riots are instead similar to the 
baseline projections for this type of event from the Food and Fuel ABM. 
In conclusion, the sensitivity analysis of the models showed that the ABMs responded 
differently to the introduction of positive and negative shocks, or a combination of 
these. Neither the Food nor the Fuel ABMs were sensitive to the introduction of a 
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negative shock on either resource, showing probabilities that closely resembled those 
for the baseline projections. This was due to the unvaried effects on the price regimes, 
which showed a regime above the threshold in the ‘normal’ runs of the models. The 
Food ABM was sensitive to a positive food production shock, with a decreased 
probability of food riots for 2014 that lasted for the following years. The Fuel ABM 
was instead only partially sensitive to a positive oil shock as 2014 showed a price 
below the threshold with a lower probability of fuel riots, which however didn’t last 
as the price returned above the threshold from 2015 on. The combination of a 
negative food shock and a positive fuel shock in the Food and Fuel ABM showed that 
this model was not sensitive to the first type of shock and only partially sensitive to 
the second, showing similar responses as the single-resource ABMs. As for the 
combination of a positive food shock and a negative fuel shock, the Food and Fuel 
ABM was sensitive to the former type of shock and not sensitive to the second type of 
shock, once again showing similar responses as the single-resource ABMs. Finally, 
the sensitivity analysis on the Food and Fuel ABM where food and fuel riots influence 
the probability of one another and where shocks with opposite signs are introduced in 
combination did not produce results different from the single-resource ABMs. 
5.6. Discussion 
Section 5.1 of this chapter presented an in-depth description of dynamics included in 
the Food, Fuel and Food and Fuel versions of the ABM by providing the ODD for the 
models. This protocol is aimed at facilitating the understanding and possible 
replication of ABMs by drawing out the fundamental assumptions and characteristic 
properties of the models, such as emergent properties. 
Section 5.2 focussed on the calibration of food and fuel prices for the ABMs, briefly 
introducing an experiment on reported data and analysing more in depth the 
experiment on simulated data. The analyses between resources were very similar. It 
was possible to make a statistical fit to prices in both cases, although only simulated 
data seem to fit with an intuitive view of how supply, demand and stocks are likely to 
affect prices and is more likely to produce results that are consistent with the internal 
operation of the model. For this reason the calibration on simulated data was 
preferred. For this two different approaches were tested: ETs and via two free 
parameters, with the former outperforming the latter in terms of accuracy for the 
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prediction of price regimes for both resources. For this reason ETs on simulated data 
were chosen as the preferred method. It is worth remembering here that, although the 
dynamics captured by the calibration procedure run on data from the ABMs, are more 
intuitive and logical as compared to those resulting from the ETs run on reported data 
for food and oil, the data stemming from the ABMs does not perfectly recreate reality. 
Arguably, neither does reported data, as observed in a study on the GRO database 
(Phillips, 2016). Data from the models is not that dissimilar from reported data as can 
be seen from Section 5.2.1, however, the dynamics between ratio and stocks levels 
and international prices are reversed when compared to those resulting from the 
model. In particular, reported data seem to suggest that international prices of 
resources are high for high levels of stocks and ratio for the resource, whereas 
calibration on data extrapolated from the ABMs show opposite dynamics. The 
inability of Ets to reproduce the dynamics of price regimes when fitted to reported 
data for ratio and stocks of natural resources has two possible explanations: either 
supply and demand dynamics are not sufficient to recreate international prices and/or 
the data gathered for the variables is not accurate. 
As highlighted in this chapter, key dynamics that in reality influence and shape 
consumption and supply of natural resources have not been included in the current 
versions of the ABM, causing the estimates for consumption and production of 
natural resources for countries to be inaccurate. In particular, two key feedbacks have 
not been included in the ABMs: the change in trends for consumption and production 
of natural resources. The former depends on factors such as increased population 
levels (which are present in the ABMs but not currently used) and change in diets, 
whereas the latter depends on complex dynamics between prices, land availability, 
climate change, productivity of the factors involved and several other factors. Because 
the national levels for production and consumption of natural resources have been 
modelled by calculating estimates based on past trends between 1995 and 2012, the 
values for these variables calculated in the ABMs only capture long-term trends in 
these variables and fail to model sudden changes that might affect either production or 
consumption in the short-term, which anyway are largely unpredictable. This 
inaccuracy is acceptable in a very short time frame, as the dynamics that affect either 
positively or negatively production and consumption of natural resources such as an 
increased population or new technologies that increase productivity, take time to 
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come online. This characteristic of the ABMs was in line with Principle 1 of the GRO 
project, which shaped the conceptual framework of this work. The inaccurate 
estimation of production and consumption of natural resources affects international 
price regimes only from the year after the end of the calibration, i.e. 2014. As regards 
cereals, due to the introduction of an exogenous shock on cereals production in 2008 
to correct the availability of cereals in the system – which was inaccurate due to its 
estimation on past trend lines that smoothed the shocks that occurred during the time 
frame considered – global stocks of cereals are more than halved: these are reduced 
from 330,688 MT in 2008 (estimate before trade), to 132,530 MT in 2009 (estimate 
before trade). Since in the ABMs the ratio between global cereals production and 
consumption constantly remains below 1 until 2017, global stocks of cereals are 
continuously reduced, year on year, causing international price of food to remain 
constantly above the threshold from 2010 onwards. Running the Food ABM beyond 
the time frame it was developed for, i.e. 5 years from the last year that was calibrated, 
shows that the ratio between global cereals production and consumption goes above 1 
from 2017 and global stocks of cereals hence start building up. The international price 
of food only falls below the threshold from the year 2023, when enough stocks have 
been accumulated in the system.  
The same argument applies to the versions of the ABM that include dynamics for 
fuel. The Fuel and Food and Fuel versions of the ABM perfectly recreate the 
international fuel price regime trends until 2013. Global oil consumption overtakes 
production from the year 2010 and, running the ABMs beyond the time frame they 
were developed for, the ratio between the two variables is consistently below 1 until 
2029, causing global oil stocks to be exhausted in 2014. Stocks only start building up 
again in the year 2033. Because of these dynamics, the international fuel price regime 
predicted by the model is constantly above the threshold between 2011 and 2029.  
At the time of writing this thesis, i.e. March 2016, the last year for which the deflated 
version of the FAO FPI and the EIA fuel price as calculated in Chapter 4 are available 
is 2015, which recorded a real price regime below the 140 threshold for the FAO FPI 
and below the $93 per barrel for the EIA fuel price. The predictions from the ABMs 
for international food prices for 2015 diverge from the observed data and this poses 
questions about the validity of how international prices of both food and fuel have 
been modelled in the ABMs. Although the consequences of these inaccuracies will be 
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further explored in Chapter 7 and possible solutions will be suggested in Chapter 6, it 
is worth remembering here that the aim of this research was never to investigate and 
model the formation of international prices, rather to model some of the dynamics that 
lead to the occurrence of food and fuel riots. Although the presence of an international 
price for the natural resources is essential in the ABMs at their current stage of 
development, the dynamics of price formation are not. Potential improvements to the 
ABMs as relates to international prices and their feedback on the occurrence of food 
and fuel riots will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
Now commenting on the validation of the models, the results show that the ABMs are 
remarkably accurate at predicting general probabilities both for food and fuel riots and 
for both price regimes, i.e. below and above the threshold for international prices of 
natural resources, although slightly overestimating the probability of riots below-
threshold and slightly underestimating it in the opposite case.  
When analysing the number of riots per year predicted by the ABMs as compared to 
those occurred, although the trends predicted by the models generally follow reported 
trends, the results vary according to the type of riot predicted. For food riots, the Food 
and Food and Fuel versions of the ABM capture the increased probability of riots for 
the year 2008 – although underestimating the number of riots – but fail to capture the 
other peak in number of food riots occurred in 2011, rather spreading the number of 
riots throughout the second period when the regime for the FAO FPI was above the 
threshold. The predictions from the Fuel and Food and Fuel versions of the ABM for 
fuel riots show better fits. Both models capture the 2008 peak in fuel riots – although 
underestimating its height – but also capture a successive increase in the numbers of 
fuel riots in 2011. However, these models fail to capture the fall and subsequent rise 
in the number of fuel riots in 2012 and 2013, respectively, rather keeping the number 
of fuel riots constant at the levels predicted for 2011. These behaviours are due to the 
fact that one of the main factors that influence the probability of riots in the ABMs is 
the international price regime, which is modelled as a binary variable. This means that 
the current version of the models will predict a roughly similar amount of riots for 
years that recorded an international price regime above/below the threshold. One of 
the other factors that influences the total amount of riots in the ABMs is the WGI 
group of countries. If in a given year more countries are classified with high levels of 
political fragility according to the estimates for their WGI as calculated in the ABMs, 
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the resulting number of riots for that year is likely to be higher, even more so if in 
correspondence with an international price regime above the threshold. In reality, the 
years 2010, 2012 and 2013 for food and 2012 for fuel, although registered an 
international price regime above the threshold, did not see a number of riots 
comparable to those occurred in 2008 and 2011, highlighting the possibility that the 
conditions of the food and fuel systems for these years were different and raising 
interesting research questions for possible future developments of the ABMs. These 
smoothed dynamics resulting from the ABMs may represent a limit of the capacity of 
the models to simulate self-reinforcing effects that are likely to occur in the real world 
and represents an opportunity for further refinements. 
One finding that was partially unexpected was the ABMs’ accuracy at predicting 
which countries were most at risk of experiencing a riot at any point during the time 
frame considered. Predictions from the ABMs based on single resources, i.e. the Food 
ABM and the Fuel ABM, already resulted in a high degree of accuracy at ranking the 
countries in order of risk of riots. This accuracy increases even further when the 
results from the integrated Food and Fuel ABM are taken into account. Probabilities 
for individual countries to experience a riot are mainly driven by the country’s WGI 
group and the country-specific RE calculated with REEM. The random effects 
assigned to each country by each REEM model increase individual countries’ 
probability of experiencing a riot according to the countries’ own previous 
experience, i.e. countries that have experienced multiple riots are more likely to 
experience a riot in the future. Likely, the RE for each country play a role in 
producing this emergent property in the ABMs, hence proving the benefits of 
implementing an ABM approach to this research.  
When estimating the ABMs’ accuracy at predicting both country and year for riots, 
the models show their shortcomings: only 7% of the food riots that occurred during 
the time frame considered in the analysis were correctly predicted by the Food and 
Food and Fuel ABMs. The number of false positives, however, is remarkably low, 
and the overall level of accuracy of the model reaches 95%. Similarly, the Fuel and 
Food and Fuel ABM’s accuracy at predicting both country and year for fuel riots 
reaches 10%, although keeping the percentage of false positives low and registering 
an overall accuracy of 96%. 
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As for the Food and Fuel model more specifically, adding the interaction between 
food and fuel riots to the predictions of the ABMs does not seem to add any predictive 
power to the results from the resource-specific ABMs as far as the probability of food 
and fuel riots per price regime and the prediction of specific riots are concerned. 
However, the interaction seems to positively influence the model’s predictions as 
relates to the specific countries that will experience a food or a fuel riot during the 
time frame considered. 
The predictions for food and fuel riots for 2017 provided by each version of the ABM 
were compared, finding the predictions for food riots fundamentally similar between 
the different ABMs, i.e. Food and Food and Fuel ABMs, in terms of probabilities of 
riots for each year considered in the analyses, whereas the probabilities for annual fuel 
riots were slightly different according to the ABM used, i.e. Fuel and Food and Fuel 
ABMs. As per the national probability of both food and fuel riots, the ranges of 
probabilities forecasted by the different ABMs, although different, remain 
comparable. The specific countries forecasted as most and least likely to experience a 
food or a fuel riot in 2017 differ greatly between the lists produced by the ABMs. 
This is mainly due to the stochasticity embedded in the models, which is standard 
practice in the field of computer modelling. Indeed, due to the unpredictability of 
future scenarios and situations, it is standard practice to build variability into the code 
of the models and aggregate results from multiple runs to account for this variability.  
Finally, a note on the sensitivity analysis run on the different versions of the ABM. 
This was implemented by introducing positive and negative shocks to the production 
of resources in the models, both singularly (in the Food and in the Fuel ABMs) and in 
combination (in the Food and Fuel ABM). None of the ABMs resulted sensitive to 
negative shocks on either resource, as opposed to positive shocks, which the models 
were sensitive to, although to different degrees. Both the Food and Food and Fuel 
ABMs were highly sensitive to positive shocks on food, with the price falling below 
the threshold from 2014 (the year of the introduction of the shocks) and remaining 
below the threshold until 2017 (and beyond). Conversely, the Fuel and Food and Fuel 
ABMs were only partially sensitive to positive oil shocks, as the oil price fell below 
the threshold for the year 2014, and climbed up (and remained) above the threshold 
from the following year.  
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6. Next steps 
As it is common in research, the findings from this PhD brought about further 
interesting research questions and possible future developments of the ABMs that can 
improve the predictions of food and fuel riots in countries. 
In general, the main issues related to the current versions of the ABM are associated 
with the way national production and consumption of natural resources and their 
international prices are currently estimated in the models. National estimates for 
production and consumption of natural resources were calculated based on trend lines 
fitted to reported data, which was sourced from the GRO Database (GSI, 2015). This 
choice was made to allow this research to comply with Principle 2 of the GRO 
Project, which required the models developed as part of the project to be fully data-
led. As a result, national estimates for production and consumption of natural 
resources are deterministic in the different versions of the ABMs, i.e. they do not vary 
between different runs of the models, unless a scenario different from BAU is being 
run. If these variables were not exogenously imposed, but rather endogenously 
calculated via the dynamics included in the models, the ABMs would be generate 
emergent properties, also providing useful insights about the relationships between 
these variables and the occurrence of food and fuel riots. In particular, the quantity 
and distribution of oil and cereals stocks could have an impact on countries’ food and 
energy security and on the probability of riots via international prices. 
Future versions of the models could generate endogenous estimates for consumption 
of natural resources by introducing a more realistic population model and linking this 
to national consumption. Better estimates for production could be achieved by 
introducing physical limitations to the availability of the resources (e.g. land and 
ores), their productivity and production costs. Another further development could 
relate to the introduction of a measure of countries’ level of economic development. 
This could be linked to several feedbacks, for instance, on national consumption of 
resources, as developed countries have higher per capita consumption. However, 
these dynamics, which are found in the current configuration of the world, will 
possibly change due to policies aimed at mitigating climate change and, in general, a 
higher awareness, which may lead populations to shift to more healthy and 
sustainable lifestyles and diets, and a more sustainable use of land which can in turn 
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have a positive impact on life expectancy and reduce levels of consumption. In 
addition, policies will likely drive technological improvements in every sector, hence 
helping reduce emissions and increase productivity, and the diffusion of renewable 
resources. 
Possible extensions may include different types of conflict, such as civil and 
international wars. This research ignores important alternative measures of conflict 
such as its length, escalation and intensity, which could be explored in association 
with the framework and results yielded by this research. Future versions of the model 
could also include some of the ‘planetary boundaries’ (Rockstrom, et al., 2009), or 
new systems and natural resources, such as the inclusion of water hence allowing to 
explore the link between water15 scarcity and conflict and the inclusion of climate 
change, with a feedback between levels of pollution and impacts on availability of 
resources, extreme climatic events and, ultimately, human conflict. Although the field 
of climate and environmental security, which is where this work fits, has only recently 
been formally instituted (at least in the UK academic landscape), research in this field 
is plentiful and new data on these issues is being measured as I write. This makes me 
confident about future developments of the ABM to include these dynamics.  
Now exploring improvements to the ABMs that involve specific dynamics already 
included in the models, the experiments that will be presented in the next few sections 
were developed during the course of my PhD. However, these could not be included 
in the main findings from the research due to several issues that will be explained in 
detail. All these further developments of the ABMs are somewhat related to how 
international prices are estimated in the current versions of the models. The next 
section will focus on an alternative to the thresholds calculated on the absolute values 
of international prices. The following section will present three what-if scenarios: 
firstly, a future scenario implemented in the Food and Fuel ABM investigating the 
impact of the implementation of export bans on cereals and the subsequent impact on 
international prices and hence on the occurrence of food and fuel riots. Two additional 
scenarios involving likely future production shocks, one for food and another for fuel, 
will be presented in the following two sub-sections. These were developed and 
                                                 
15 Water was not included as a natural resource in these versions of the models due to lack and 
inaccuracy of data. 
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implemented in the Food ABM and in the Fuel ABM, respectively, to demonstrate 
possible applications of the models as early warning assessment tools for the 
evaluation of possible future threats to countries’ security in terms of food and fuel 
riots due to negative shocks to the production of either resource. 
6.1. Thresholds on price variation 
As demonstrated in Section 5.3 of the previous chapter, the different versions of the 
ABM show acceptable levels of accuracy at predicting food and fuel riots, as the 
models capture important information with their predictions, such as the list of 
countries most likely to experience a riot at any point during the period considered. 
However, different experiments to evaluate the influence of international prices on the 
occurrence of food and fuel riots were run in an attempt to improve their predictions. 
In particular, as mentioned in Chapter 2, previous literature highlighted that it is the 
volatility in food prices rather than absolute values that cause most of the problems on 
international markets (e.g. Kharas, 2011; Tadesse, et al., 2014; Bazzi and Blattman, 
2014; Cuesta, et al., 2014; Lagi, et al., 2015), with a few discordant voices (e.g. 
Bellemare, 2014). To investigate this further and provide insights about this 
relationship for fuel variables as well, I ran new analyses recalculating the price 
thresholds on price variations rather than on absolute price levels. The reasoning 
behind this is fundamentally similar to the analyses presented in the previous 
chapters, i.e. the threshold calculated on the variation of the international price divides 
the price fluctuations in two regimes, either above or below the threshold. Whenever 
the price variation is above the threshold, countries’ probability to experience a riot 
increases, and vice versa. The following sub-section presents the results from two RE 
models fit to the data for food and fuel, followed by a REEM model for each resource 
also evaluating the model’s accuracy at generating predictions for riots and, finally, a 
summary of the results from different ET models predicting price fluctuations to 
allow the implementation in the ABMs (the models can be found alongside a brief 
description in Appendix 4 for reasons of brevity). A conclusive sub-section will 
comment on the results. 
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6.1.1. Calculation of threshold on price variation for the FAO FPI and EIA 
fuel price 
Two RE models were fit to the data for the period 2005 – 2013, one focusing on food 
riots and the other on fuel riots. The dependent variable expressed the number of riots 
occurred during the time frame selected, whereas the independent variables 
represented the volatility in the international prices of either food or fuel, testing the 
one- and two-year variation in prices, i.e. Pt – t-1 and Pt – t-2.  
For the analysis on food riots, both price variations had a positive, significant effect 
on the occurrence of food riots when run singularly, whereas the one-year price 
variation sign became negative and lost significance when both variables were 
introduced in the same model. This result indicates that the two-year variation in 
prices is a better predictor and includes the effect of the one-year variation on the 
occurrence of food riots. For this reason the two-year price variation was selected as 
predictor and further analysed. The results for the RE model for FAO Pt – t-2 are 
presented in Table 6.1. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -5.769 0.484 -11.908 < 2e-16*** 
FAO Pt – t-2 0.069 0.010 6.602 4.07e-11*** 
σ 1.72 0.421 4.071 4.69e-05*** 
Log-Likelihood -201.8843    
Table 6.1 – Results for RE model with the variable Food Riot used as dependent 
variable and one- and two-year variation in prices as independent to predict the 
occurrence of food riots (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 
0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
As for the previous analyses, the 1% probability threshold for the price variation was 
calculated and found at 17.1. In other words, the results from the model say that 
whenever the two-year variation in food prices is greater than 17.1, the probability of 
food riots is expected to increase significantly. Comparing these results with real price 
variation, we find that the years that saw an international food price volatility above 
the threshold were 2007, 2008 and 2011, already showing that this model captures 
with more accuracy the years with the largest number of food riots.  
The variable was hence transformed in a discrete binary form, classifying each year as 
either above (1) or below (0) the threshold and included as an independent variable 
alongside the discrete version of the variable WGI group in an REEM model to 
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operationalise the models’ prediction for food riots. The results are presented in 
Figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 – REEMtree model testing the effect of two-year price volatility and WGI 
group on the occurrence of food riots (own elaboration). Notes: n = 1904; intercept = 
0.001469882; Estimated variance of errors = 0.0194768047140661; Log likelihood = 
986.414684322138. 
The accuracy for the REEM model was further tested by generating 1000 predictions 
accounting for country-specific RE and comparing the results with reported food riots 
occurred during the period 2005 – 2013. The averaged results are presented in Table 
6.2 and compared with those from the REEM with RE calculated on the threshold on 
the absolute price of food. 
Models Food riots predicted Total correct 
REEMre VOL 11.11% 95.04% 
REEMre ABS 6.39% 94.83% 
Table 6.2 – Results of the accuracy test for the REEM models on 2-year price 
volatility (REEMre VOL) and on the absolute value (REEMre ABS) evaluated in this 
analysis. The second column reports the mean of the percentage of food riots correctly 
predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations, whereas the third column 
reports the mean of the percentage of any record (food riot 0s and 1s) correctly 
predicted by each model throughout the 1000 iterations (own elaboration). 
Table 6.2 shows a clear improvement in the prediction of food riots for the REEM 
model presented above as compared to that presented in Chapter 5. Looking at these 
results in association with the years above the threshold on the price variation, i.e. 
2007 – 2008 and 2011, this is a clear indication that populations of fragile countries 
  
200 
are more likely to respond with grievances to large changes in the international price 
of food rather than to its absolute value.  
To implement these findings in the Food ABM, the dynamics already included needed 
to be adapted to predict the regimes for the price fluctuations. To do this, two ETs 
were fit to the data using the two-year price variation as target variable and either 
reported or simulated data for the ratio between world production and consumption of 
cereals and stocks as predictors. Both models correctly predicted the regimes of price 
fluctuation for each year, although once again the conditions identified showed 
counterintuitive dynamics for both reported and simulated data, which suggests that 
the variables included in the models are not sufficient to predict two-year fluctuations 
for the FAO FPI.  
Another experiment replaced the absolute values of the independent variables with 
their two-year variations, which resulted in counterintuitive dynamics once again, 
which are commented in detail in Appendix 4. These dynamics could not be 
implemented in the ABMs to generate price fluctuations for food, but raised 
interesting questions about the drivers of food price volatility that require further 
research. 
Moving onto the analysis on fuel riots, the influence of the one- and two-year 
variation in the EIA international fuel price on the occurrence of fuel riots was tested 
by implementing different RE models. Both variables have a positive, significant (at 
the 10% level) effect on the occurrence of fuel riots when evaluated in isolation, 
whereas when introduced jointly as predictors, only the one-year variation remains 
significant and positive at the 1% level. This finding seems to highlight that it is only 
the one-year variation in prices that is influential and the significance of the result for 
the two-year variation when evaluated in isolation is due to the fact that this already 
includes the one-year variation in prices. For this reason the one-year price variation 
was selected as predictor and further analysed. The results for the RE model for EIA 
Pt – t-1 are presented in Table 6.3. 
 Estimate SE t-value p-value 
(Intercept) -5.297 0.457 -11.597 < 2e-16*** 
EIA Pt – t-1 0.048 0.016 3.098 0.00195** 
σ -2.039 0.417 -4.892 1e-06*** 
Log-Likelihood -186.0501    
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Table 6.3 – Results for RE model with the variable Fuel Riot used as dependent 
variable and one- and two-year variation in prices as independent to predict the 
occurrence of food riots (own elaboration). Sig. codes: 0 ‘***’; 0.001 ‘**’; 0.01 ‘*’; 
0.05 ‘.’; 0.1 ‘ ’. 
The 1% threshold calculated on the one-year price variation for the EIA international 
fuel price corresponded to $14.6 per barrel, which indicates that any annual variation 
of the price larger than this amount is likely to trigger an increased probability of fuel 
riots around the world.  
The threshold was used to transform the variable EIA international fuel price from 
continuous to discrete version, identifying each year’s price fluctuation as either 
above (1) or below (0) the threshold. The variable was used alongside the groups for 
the WGI in a REEM model aimed at predicting fuel riots. The results of the model 
(not presented for reasons of brevity) show that the only variable that significantly 
affects the occurrence of fuel riots is countries’ WGI group, hence contradicting the 
results from the RE model presented above. The variable representing the yearly price 
fluctuations is only significant when introduced in isolation in the REEM model. This 
result seems to suggest that the WGI already includes the part of information relative 
to the contribution of international fuel prices to the increase of social unrest. Indeed, 
as mentioned before in the text the WGI is an index that aggregates several variables 
gathered from various sources (WB, 2015d), many of which are likely to be highly 
correlated with increases in fuel prices. To further explore this finding, another 
experiment was run fitting an RE model to data for fuel riots using the discrete 
variables for the one-year fuel price variation and the groups for the WGI. The results 
from this RE model showed a positive effect for both variables on the occurrence of 
fuel riots, which were mutually significantly different. The results from the REEM 
and RE models were discordant and clearly indicate that further research is required 
to investigate how fluctuations in the international price of fuel affect the occurrence 
of fuel riots, if at all. For this reason the analysis on the threshold for fuel price 
variation terminated here. 
6.1.2. Conclusions on the analyses on international price variations 
The dynamics resulting from the analysis presented in this section, raised interesting 
questions on what drives prices of natural resources on international markets and the 
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relationship between these and the occurrence of resource-related social unrest. In 
particular, statistical tests run on the relationship between the international prices of 
food and fuel and the occurrence of food and fuel riots showed that populations seem 
to be more responsive to volatility in prices for the first type of events and to absolute 
values of the price of oil, although mixed evidence showed a potential relationship 
between fuel price volatility and the occurrence of fuel riots as well. Populations seem 
to be more likely to react with the use of violence to sudden changes in the price of 
food, where the two-year increase in prices seems to be what causes unrest, rather 
than annual variations as for oil prices. Interestingly, initial findings suggest a 
different tolerance towards price increases for food and fuel resources, i.e. two years 
for food and one year for fuel. Social responses to prices of different resources are 
worth exploring with future research.  
The relationship found between volatility in food prices and the occurrence of riots, 
agrees with the main literature (e.g. Kharas, 2011; Arezki and Bruckner, 2011; 
Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011; Crawley, et al., 2012; Berazneva and Lee, 2013; Smith, 
2014; Raleigh, et al., 2015) that believes that the changes in prices of food are the 
main issue and found positive relationships between variation in prices and the 
occurrence of social unrest. To the best of my knowledge, the only study that 
compared the effect of both the absolute value of prices and their volatility on the 
occurrence of food riots was Bellemare (2014), who found that food price volatility 
decreases, rather than increases, the probability of riots. The author finds that it is the 
absolute value of the international prices that populations react to with unrest. 
Although the findings presented in this section seem to disagree with this study, the 
findings presented in Chapter 4 fit with the results from Bellemare (2014). Two 
possible reasons for this disagreement are that the author uses a more general 
definition of food riots, which does not restrict these events to the use of violence, 
hence resulting in a larger (and likely substantially different) database. In addition, 
Bellemare (2014) uses a coefficient of variation and monthly data to evaluate the 
relationship between food price volatility and the occurrence of food riots, which, 
once again, can lead to different results. It is also worth noting that the results of the 
analysis undertaken by this author may not be reproducible due to the use of 
LexisNexis news database (LexisNexis, 2016) to collect data for food riots, where the 
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media outlets included can vary with time, possibly leading to a different number of 
records for searches carried out at different times.  
Now commenting on the relationship between volatility in the international price of 
fuel and the occurrence of fuel riots, further research is required to disentangle these 
complex dynamics. The RE model highlighted a significant, positive effect of one-
year volatility in fuel prices and the occurrence of fuel riots, although when the 
variable was translated in a discrete form and tested alongside the WGI groups of 
countries in an REEM model, its significance disappeared. However, when both 
variables were introduced in an RE model, both resulted in a positive, significant 
effect on fuel riots. Their effect on the dependent variable is also mutually, 
significantly different. These mixed findings raise new exciting questions on the 
relationship between fuel price volatility on international markets and the occurrence 
of fuel riots, a topic that, to the best of my knowledge, remains completely unexplored 
in academic literature. Future research should focus on evaluating this relationship 
alongside different measures of political fragility, possibly less aggregated ones. As 
for the ABMs, further developments could endogenise countries’ political fragility to 
eliminate the potential correlation between fuel prices and the WGI. 
The results from this section highlighted another clear direction for possible future 
developments of the ABMs. The results from the ETs fit to the data for the FAO FPI 
fluctuations not only showed that the interaction between reported global availability 
of food and the interaction between global demand and supply are not sufficient to 
recreate food price volatility, but also data from the model was unable to recreate 
price fluctuations. Literature supports this finding: Lagi, et al. (2015) found that the 
trend in the FAO FPI is explained by supply-demand model until 2000 and that the 
underlying increase trend is explained by biofuel dynamics, whereas the peaks are due 
to speculation. One of the possible further developments of the model is to implement 
Lagi, et al. (2015) equation to introduce accurate price dynamics in the ABMs. To do 
this, the model will need to be extended to include the international market of biofuels 
alongside its national and global production and demand. In particular, the ABM 
could simulate the dynamics that revolve around production, consumption and trade 
of the main cereals (wheat, maize, rice and soybean) separately, hence allowing to 
model the competing demand for maize driven by demand for food consumption and 
policies around conversion to biofuels. This would potentially allow the ABM to 
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recreate the underlying upward trend in prices seen post-2000, although to be able to 
simulate price spikes similar to those registered in 2008 and 2011, the model will 
need to be able to incorporate dynamics related to prices of food futures, which is a 
highly complicated topic that draws on concepts such as buyers’ behaviour on 
markets, future price expectations and climate change, just to name a few. Although 
critical for the study of food riots, these dynamics lay outside the scope of my 
research questions, and, as mentioned above, the current versions of the models will 
need to be re-adapted to include these findings. Therefore, these constitute a starting 
point for future studies and developments of the ABMs. However, the findings from 
this research on the relationship between the variation in food prices and its influence 
on food riots were informative and remarkably promising in their own right, and add 
to the current debate on whether food price fluctuations impact food riots and food 
security more in general. 
The analysis on fuel prices was halted before trying to predict and implement in the 
models international prices volatility due to the mixed findings presented above. 
Literature on fuel price formation is relatively scarce as compared to that presented 
for international food prices. However, most of the authors highlight the complexity 
of trying to disentangle the different factors that lead to the international price of fuel 
and its volatility. Hamilton (2009) found that the real price of oil seems to follow a 
random path, hence making it almost impossible to predict. Supply and demand 
dynamics play a role, but it is difficult to discern to what extent. This author and other 
relevant literature in the field (e.g. Kilian, 2009) mainly attribute the 2008 fuel price 
shock to the increased oil demand from the developing world, accompanied by a 
failure of global oil production to increase accordingly and unstable political 
situations in key oil-producing regions (Yu, et al., 2008). Hamilton (2009) argues that 
the lack of responsiveness from the production side is consistent with the hypothesis 
of global peak oil, although this does not explain the sudden fall in prices after the 
2008 peak. Yu, et al. (2008) used a less descriptive approach and implemented an 
empirical mode decomposition based neural network ensemble learning paradigm to 
identify the main underlying trends in oil prices and forecast them. The study showed 
promising results, although the authors neglected to associate these decomposed 
variables with real world dynamics, hence not furthering the understanding of what 
are the drivers of international fuel prices. From this overview of studies on 
  
205 
international fuel prices, it is clear that the picture is not yet complete and more 
research will need to be devoted to understand the complex relationship between the 
different variables that drive fuel price fluctuations and in particular shocks, in order 
to be able to simulate them in the ABM. 
6.2. Future scenarios analysis 
One of the possible applications of the ABMs developed during this work is scenario 
analysis. ABMs, as other computer modelling paradigms, support the implementation 
of scenarios with different aims, e.g. the fomalisation of a new theory, the 
generalisation of an extant one or the ex-ante analysis of the possible consequences of 
a policy, before its implementation. In general, scenarios constitute a deviation from 
the BAU dynamics included in the model and can be implemented by simply 
introducing a switch on the model’s interface, which activates a new or different 
series of procedures and conditions written in the code of the model. The first sub-
section reports the results from a scenario analysing the impacts of the 
implementation of cereal export bans on national cereal stocks and on the occurrence 
of food and fuel riots. This scenario was built as part of the UK – US task force on 
Food Security on the Impact of Extreme Weather on US/UK Food Security, which 
was a project in collaboration with the UK Foreign Commonwealth Office amongst 
other partners and institutions. This scenario has been developed during my role as a 
Research Assistant on the project between April and June 2015 and its results partly 
informed the publications Lloyd’s (2015) and King, et al. (2015). This scenario was 
later updated to be included in this thesis.  
The following two sections will present development and findings from two what-if 
scenarios that have been implemented in the current versions of the ABM for the year 
2016. The aim of both scenarios is to evaluate the risk for countries in terms of food 
and fuel riots in case of a future production shock for food and oil resources. The first 
scenario focusses on a strong El Niño event that is likely to have a negative impact on 
food production around the world. This scenario was published in Natalini, et al. 
(2015a). The following section will present a similar scenario (still unpublished) for 
an oil production shock that was developed following the example of the El Niño 
scenario. 
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6.2.1. The Cereals Export Bans scenario 
As highlighted in Chapter 2.8, one of the factors that worsened and accelerated the 
global food crisis in 2008 were the panic behaviours that governments of countries 
around the world implemented to ensure a safe and cheap food supply for their 
populations (King, et al., 2015; Puma, et al., 2015). One type of policy that 
governments implemented were aimed at restricting trade, particularly banning or 
restricting exports of food to prevent precious cereals from leaving national borders. 
Importing countries implement this policy to try to isolate their internal markets from 
international prices: by not exporting nationally-grown food, these countries hope to 
reduce the quantity of food imported from abroad. Exporting countries are instead 
subject to conflicting interests: similarly to net importers, these countries tend to 
prevent precious cereals from leaving national borders. However, the prospect of high 
revenues from selling their production and stocks of food on the international market 
for a high price are tempting. Policies aimed at restricting international trade, because 
of the high interconnectedness of the global food system, increase its vulnerability to 
sudden reversals in connectivity, although simultaneously increasing countries’ 
resilience towards local shocks (King, et al., 2015). The authors King et al. (2015) are 
the first to call for the development of ‘greater understanding of how responses may 
amplify, or mitigate, how production shocks impact prices (King, et al., 2015, p. 117).  
As a first attempt to address this gap in knowledge and to provide insights from the 
emergent behaviours generated in the Food and Fuel ABM, a scenario involving 
restrictions to the international trade of cereals was developed. This was aimed at 
trying to understand the influence of national trade-restrictive policies for cereals – 
and more in particular of export bans – on the international price of food and hence on 
the probability of food riots. Because the scenario was implemented in the integrated 
version of the ABM, its effects on the occurrence of fuel riots were also analysed and 
reported. The scenario is implemented in the year 2016 and starts affecting the 
model’s dynamics from 2017. For this reason, the results and findings from the 
scenario will be presented for 2017 only. 
Although trade restrictions are widely believed to affect prices of all the natural 
resources, this type of scenario was only implemented on cereals because of the lack 
of a database of policy changes as comprehensive as the one used for this analysis on 
cereals. Indeed, once again this scenario could only be developed thanks to data 
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gathered and published by the WB in the Policy Monitor Dataset that listed the 
national policy changes for the international trade of food-related commodities 
between 2007 and 2014 (WB, 2015b). In particular, the database is aimed ‘to provide 
an integrated and comprehensive “one-stop shop” to monitor price- and commodity-
related policies that may affect, or that may be affected by, food price crises’ (Barbet-
Gros, 2014). In the database each record corresponds to information for one policy 
change. The attributes of each record identify the country that implemented the policy 
change and its date, it defines the direction of the change, i.e. policy 
introduction/removal, the commodities affected, the policy instrument used (e.g. 
tariff, trade restriction, export ban) and a brief description 16 . This database was 
analysed to gather information about which countries are likely to implement trade-
restrictive measures in case of an international food price spike and to evaluate the 
length of the ban. This information was then introduced in the Food and Fuel ABM 
and the results analysed to infer whether these measures have an impact on the 
occurrence of food and fuel riots around the world.  
The database contains information for policy changes related to food commodities 
(including meat, dairy, etc.), therefore to maintain consistency with the analyses 
presented in the previous chapters of this work and the natural resources included in 
the ABM only policy changes related to cereal commodities were selected. In 
particular, only the records whose attribute ‘commodity’ equalled to: ‘wheat’, ‘rice’, 
‘maize’ or ‘cereals’ were taken into account for the development of this scenario. In 
addition, following the example of similar analyses (e.g. Puma, et al., 2015), to 
simplify the implementation of this scenario in the Food and Fuel ABM this analysis 
only focused on full export bans, ignoring other policy changes such as export tariffs, 
import bans, import tariffs, etc. This decision was also led by the fact that this type of 
policy is most likely the one that affects prices the most and sends the strongest signal 
to international markets. As a consequence, it is important to notice that for the 
purposes of this analysis export bans implemented on single grains were accounted 
for as export bans on cereals more in general. The time frame used was consistent 
                                                 
16 For further information refer to the document that accompanies the database that can be found at this 
link 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Poverty%20documents/Introduction%20
Guide%20for%20the%20Policy%20Monitor.pdf. 
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with the analyses presented in the previous chapters, i.e. 2005 – 2013. In order to infer 
the typical length of export bans, the data was analysed to trace each export ban and 
subsequently extrapolate the date of its implementation and removal. Export bans 
whose date of either implementation or removal could not be traced or inferred, were 
not taken into account.  
The final list of countries that implemented an export ban on single grains or cereals 
as a whole and whose start and end date could be inferred contained 26 entries. The 
length of the export bans on cereals spanned between 2 months and 4.5 years, with an 
average length of 1.6 years. In the ABM, countries that implemented an export ban on 
cereals in the past were assumed to repeat this behaviour when the international price 
of food surpassed the 140 threshold for the FAO FPI calculated in Chapter 4 and were 
assumed to keep them in place for at least one year (tick). Countries re-evaluate their 
decision once a year when the international price of food falls below the threshold 
according to a cumulated probability calculated on the data that was extrapolated from 
World Bank (2015b). In particular, countries remove export bans on cereals according 
to the probability function expressed in terms of time (years) presented in Equation 
6.1. 
𝑦 = 0.2482 ln(𝑥) + 0.5424 
Equation 6.1 – Equation that expresses the probability for countries to decide to 
remove the export ban, based on the cumulated probability calculated from WB 
(2015b) (own elaboration). 
The scenario is introduced in the model through a switch in the model’s interface 
which is connected to a categorical variable export-ban-switch which equals true 
when the switch is on and false otherwise. Countries are initialised with a categorical 
variable cereal-export-bans which equals true if the country is included in the list of 
countries likely to implement an export ban or false otherwise. Data for this variable 
can be found in the database that initialises the variables for the agents provided as 
attachment. A new procedure called to export-bans was included in the ABM and run 
after the procedure to compute-fuel-price and before the procedure to trade-
<resource> listed in Chapter 5.1.3, i.e. by when countries need to decide whether to 
implement an export ban, the international price of food will already have been 
formed, whereas international trade will not have taken place yet. In this procedure, if 
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export-ban-switch = true countries calculate their SUR (which in the BAU presented 
in Chapter 5.1.7.9 is calculated in the procedure to SUR) and save the value in the 
variable desired-cereals-stock. Subsequently, if international-food-price = 1, i.e. if the 
international price of food is above the 140 threshold, countries with the variable 
cereal-export-bans = true set their variable cereal-banned = true and the variable 
length-cereal-export-ban = 0. Every year below the threshold after a price spike, if 
international-food-price = 0, countries create a temporary variable called prob-ban-off 
which stores the probability to remove the export ban, which is based on Equation 
6.1.  prob-ban-off is hence equal to  (0.2482 * ln(length-cereal-export-ban) + 0.5424) 
* 100. The result from this equation is compared to another temporary variable called 
prob, whose value is a randomly generated number between 0 and 100. If prob  < 
prob-ban-off, countries set cereal-banned = false, i.e. removing the national export 
ban on cereals, and set the variable length-cereal-export-ban to 0. All the countries 
with cereal-banned = true after these controls, move their exports available for 
cereals to national stocks by setting the variable cereals-stock-t = cereals-exports-
available and setting the variable cereals-exports-available = 0, taking their stocks of 
cereals off the international market. Finally, these countries will check whether their 
current cereals-stock-t > desired-cereals-stock. If this control returns true, countries 
will set the variable desired-cereals-stock to 0 or its value will equal desired-cereals-
stock - cereals-stock-t. The model’s simulation subsequently resumes normally and all 
the remaining procedures listed in Chapter 5.1.3 are run. 
The scenario was run 100 times until the year 2021 and the results were averaged and 
analysed. At the global level, the main effect of the implementation of the export ban 
by some countries is the emergence of unexpected behaviours. When the scenario is 
activated, the distribution of international price of food ceases being deterministic, 
with different runs potentially generating different price regimes for the years beyond 
2017 and hence different probabilities for food and fuel riots. Throughout the 100 
runs, the only year whose distribution was different from the BAU scenario was 2020, 
where one of the runs returned a food price below the threshold for this year. These 
results seem to partly disagree with the current literature in the field. Although 
literature on the effect of trade restrictions on prices has increased after the 2008 
global food crises, the size and directions of these effects are still subject of research. 
Tadesse, et al. (2014) and King, et al. (2015), for instance, believe in the negative 
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effect of these measures on prices level and volatility, with Puma, et al. (2015) 
highlighting the potential multiplier effect of panic behaviours on markets. Other 
authors simply acknowledge the effect on prices, without specifying its direction (e.g. 
Kharas, 2011; Cuesta, et al., 2014). The negative relationship between the 
implementation of trade restrictions and the food price regime witnessed in the results 
from the ABM is due to the dynamics that were implemented to determine the price 
regimes of resources: the global variables that determine whether the international 
price regime of food (and fuel) is above or below the threshold are the global ratio 
between production and consumption of food (or fuel) and the global stocks of the 
resource. These variables consist in the sum of the national production, consumption 
and stocks of the resource, before the international trade takes place in the model. The 
Export Ban Scenario influences the level of national stocks of food, allowing 
countries to take these off the international market. However, in the ABM these 
stocks still concur to create global stocks of food, which influence the international 
price. As a consequence, when the scenario is activated countries will limit their 
exports, resulting in some countries being unable to cover their own consumption or 
desire for stocks of food via imports and ultimately positively affecting the size of 
global food stocks that concurs to determine the international price, which can hence 
be pushed below the threshold. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, this 
scenario was developed as part of a larger framework to evaluate food production 
shocks (Jones and Hiller, 2015) which found that it is the global level of food stocks 
that influence the international food price regime, independently from their 
tradability, which partly led the dynamics implemented in the model to estimate 
international food price regime. It is worth noting that in the current version of the 
ABM, a country not being able to meet its own need for consumption of food and 
other resources does not trigger any consequence. As presented in Chapter 4, the 
relationship between national food security (net food production of countries was 
used as a proxy) and the occurrence of food riots, was not found to be significant. For 
this reason this feedback was not introduced in the current ABMs, although it is 
realistic to believe that the use of different variables that capture the state of food 
security of a country could lead to different results. Therefore, this constitutes another 
possible future development of the ABM, alongside further research on the effect and 
direction of trade restriction on prices and ultimately on the occurrence of riots. 
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The analysis of national food stocks for countries that implement trade restrictions led 
to less disputable results. Table 6.4 presents the comparison between the stocks of 
cereals successfully sourced by countries under the export ban scenario and under the 
BAU scenario. The stocks gathered by countries are presented as a percentage of the 
stocks of cereals required by countries, i.e. their SUR. As expected, the results show 
that when countries implement export bans, the percentages of stocks successfully 
acquired out of those required is higher, in some cases meeting the desired stock 
defined by their own SUR. In addition, Figure 6.2 presents the same information in 
the form of quantity of cereals owned by countries as inventories. These results show 
that countries that implement export bans avoid exporting cereals abroad, successfully 
protecting their internal markets from high international prices, or at least reducing 
the countries’ imports for the resource. 
Country 
Percentage 
stocks met 
with 
scenario 
Percentage 
stocks met 
without 
scenario 
Bangladesh 39.03% 1.29% 
Bolivia 3% 0% 
Cambodia 8% 1% 
Ecuador 6% 0.12% 
Egypt Arab Rep. 3% 0.05% 
Ethiopia 5% 1.63% 
India 2.95% 0.60% 
Indonesia 6.11% 0% 
Iran Islamic Rep. 6.92% 0% 
Kazakhstan 100% 1.16% 
Kenya 4% 0% 
Madagascar 8% 1% 
Malawi 5% 0% 
Moldova 100% 2.27% 
Myanmar 100% 1.54% 
Nepal 6% 0% 
Pakistan 100% 2.76% 
Russian Federation 100% 1.24% 
Serbia 100% 1.92% 
Sierra Leone 100% 1% 
Sri Lanka 5.54% 0% 
Tanzania 5% 0% 
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Thailand 100% 0.08% 
Ukraine 89.35% 0% 
Vietnam 3.23% 0% 
Zambia 100% 1% 
Table 6.4 – Comparison of cereals stocks for countries that implement export bans 
under the export ban scenario and under the BAU scenario. The stocks gathered by 
countries are presented as a percentage of stocks of cereals required by countries, i.e. 
their SUR (own elaboration). 
 
Figure 6.2 – Comparison of cereals stocks for countries that implement export bans on 
cereals under the Export Ban Scenario and under the BAU scenario (own 
elaboration). 
Figure 6.3 presents another important result from the implementation of the scenario. 
Countries that restrict trade on cereals achieve comparatively higher stocks than 
countries that do not regulate their exports under the Export Ban Scenario. 
 
Figure 6.3 – Comparison of stocks of cereals for countries that implement export bans 
and those that do not regulate trade under the Export Ban Scenario (own elaboration).  
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Finally, the predictions for food and fuel riots from the Food and Fuel ABM under the 
Export Ban Scenario were analysed and compared with those from the simple 
forecasts for the same year presented in the previous chapter. As for food riots, out of 
all the years considered 2017 was the third year with the highest probability for food 
riots, which was around 3% as compared to 4% resulting from the simple forecast 
under the BAU scenario. The probabilities of food riots for countries for 2017 ranged 
between 0% and 18%, as compared to the probabilities assigned to countries in the 
BAU scenario that only reached a maximum of 13%. At the top of the list of countries 
most at risk we find Egypt, Madagascar, Yemen, Burkina Faso, India, Ethiopia, 
Kosovo and Peru with probabilities spanning between 18% and 10%. 25 countries 
were assigned with the lowest probability, amongst these we find Congo Republic, 
Ukraine and Germany. Although the probability of a general country to experience a 
food riot is comparatively slightly lower under the Export Ban scenario as compared 
to the BAU scenario, the probability distribution for countries differs and some 
countries report higher probabilities for food riots under this scenario. For a better 
visualisation, the results from the Export Ban scenario for food riots in 2017 are 
presented in Figure 6.4.  
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Figure 6.4 – Probability of food riots for countries based on the year 2017 for the 
Export ban scenario (own elaboration). 
Looking now at the predictions for fuel riots, 2017 was the year with the highest 
probability for fuel riots, which was around 3% as for the BAU scenario. At the top of 
the list of countries most at risk we find India, Cameroon, Bolivia, Indonesia, Nigeria, 
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and Italy, with probabilities spanning between 30% and 13%.  India’s probability of 
experiencing a fuel riot increases by 3% under the Export Ban scenario as compared 
to BAU. 49 countries were assigned with the lowest probability, amongst these we 
find Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Somalia and United States. The list of countries ordered 
by decreasing probability of fuel riot under this scenario is remarkably similar to that 
resulted from the simple forecast under the BAU scenario. For a better visualisation, 
the results from the probabilities of fuel riots for the Food and Fuel ABM under the 
Export Ban scenario are presented in Figure 6.5. 
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Figure 6.5 – Probability of fuel riots for countries based on the year 2017 for the 
Export ban scenario (own elaboration). 
The results from this scenario were mainly positive and provided a good exploratory 
analysis of the effects of trade restrictions on international prices and ultimately on 
the occurrence of riots. However, questions remain as relates to the direction of the 
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effect trade-restricting policies on prices, which is why this scenario was not 
introduced in the main findings from this work. In this scenario these are shown to 
negatively affect prices, hence disagreeing with the main literature in the field, 
although the implementation of the scenario was guided by findings from Jones and 
Hiller (2015). Future versions of the model may implement different dynamics to 
generate prices, hence leading to possible different outcomes as relates the effect of 
trade-restrictive policies.  
6.2.2. El Niño scenario and food riots 
To provide a first example of application of the Food ABM, a what-if scenario 
hypothesising a shock on the production of cereals caused by a strong El Niño in 2016 
was implemented in the model. This climatic event was chosen as it is forecasted to 
cause major disruptions around the world and it is considered as plausible (Lloyd's, 
2015). The implementation of this scenario in the Food ABM is based on the analysis 
recently published in a report by Lloyd’s of London (Lloyd's, 2015). This report tries 
to quantify and qualitatively model the development and the possible impacts of a 
similar scenario. In particular, the authors elaborated that a strong El Niño event and 
spread of disease could result in the following percentage reduction in global 
production of food commodities: maize 10%; soybean 11%; wheat 7%; rice 7%. 
Since the food system in the Food ABM is simulated at the country level, and does 
not diversify between the different food commodities, but rather cereals are 
considered as a single category, the first step to implement this food production shock 
was to aggregate the reductions for each commodity as a more general ‘cereal shock’ 
and then translate the global shock at the national level. To do so data from 
FAOSTAT (FAOSTAT, 2015) was used. Since the data included in the model was 
originally sourced from the GRO Database, which, in turn, sourced it from FAO 
balance sheets for cereals, the model does not include data for soybeans. The shock on 
this commodity could not thus be modelled in this scenario. The first step to create a 
global ‘cereal shock’ was to find the average proportion of wheat, maize and rice on 
the more general cereal category for the last two years for which data was available 
(2012 and 2013). Subsequently the absolute value of cereal losses after the shock 
struck were calculated, which resulted in a total cereal loss of 7.3%. The scenario 
reported by Lloyd’s (2015) already provided national reductions for some of the 
commodities, however these were not comprehensive and did not add up to the 
  
218 
percentages reductions mentioned above. Those national reductions that were reported 
were therefore summed and compared with the reported global reductions for each 
commodity. The remainder of the global loss was then redistributed between the 
remaining countries producing wheat, maize or rice that were not already mentioned 
in the report. This accounts for ≈1% loss of the total loss of wheat, maize or rice and 
was spread across producing countries not mentioned in the scenario. The percentage 
reductions for each country due to the El Niño and disease shock are provided in the 
database that initialises countries provided as attachment. It is worth noting that the 
estimation of total losses due to the shock was slightly underestimated for two 
reasons: i) soybeans were excluded from the shock in this analysis; ii) data 
downloaded from FAOSTAT for total cereals production did not align when summing 
from different datasets.  
The shock was implemented in the year 2016, as when it was developed (July 2015) it 
was aimed at trying to provide insights about possible future scenarios. In addition, a 
strong El Niño has been forecast to have major food production impacts for this year 
(Oxfam, 2015). 100 simulations of the Food ABM were run between 2005 and 2017 
and the results were aggregated. The results from the model suggest that the shock as 
developed by Lloyd’s (2015) is significant enough to bring the FAO FPI over the 140 
threshold, hence significantly increasing the probability of food riots to occur around 
the world. Out of all the years considered, 2016 had one of the highest probability for 
a random country to experience a food riot, which was around 4% as compared to 1% 
in 2005 and 3% in 2008. The probability for single countries to experience a food riot 
ranged between 0% and 17%, with the top ten countries in terms of risk being 
Somalia, Cameroon, Mali, Eritrea, Russian Federation, Angola, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Maldives, Papua New Guinea and Thailand, all with more than 10% 
probability of experiencing a food riot that year. At the bottom of the list with a 
probability equal to 0% we find Solomon Islands, South Africa, St. Lucia, Timor-
Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Virgin Islands (U.S.) and 
Zimbabwe. For a clearer visualisation, the probabilities of food riots for each country 
are summarised in Figure 6.6. 
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Figure 6.6 – Probability of food riots for countries based on the 2016 El Niño scenario 
(Natalini, et al., 2015a). 
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Although the findings from this scenario seem plausible and were presented at an 
international conference on food security (Natalini, 2015), I decided not to include 
this in the main text of the thesis, but rather to present this as a possible future 
development of the Food ABM and one of its possible applications. This decision was 
led by the fact that the aim of this scenario is to evaluate whether a food production 
shock of the size presented in the text is large enough to cause the international price 
of food to spike, hence resulting in a higher probability of food riots in countries for 
the year 2016. As it was highlighted in Chapter 5.5, the BAU runs for the Food ABM 
show a regime for international price of food above the threshold for the year 2016, 
hence posing reservations about the validity of the results presented above.  
However, in reality the year 2015 registered food prices below the threshold. If the 
model were able to capture this drop, the implementation of this scenario would 
provide meaningful results. In particular, the model would be able to tell if the 
production shock is large enough to bring the price above the threshold. As previously 
highlighted, the introduction of more realistic price dynamics in the ABMs is a 
priority for further developments. 
Independently from whether the predictions of the Food ABM from the El Niño 
scenario will turn out to be true, this experiment shows the potential of the Food ABM 
as an early warning assessment tool, which will prove to be useful to highlight 
increased risk of food riots in countries in case of a food production shock once a 
more accurate estimation of the prices will be introduced in the model. 
6.2.3. Fuel production shock scenario and fuel riots 
A what-if scenario similar to that presented in the previous section was developed and 
implemented in the Fuel ABM to evaluate consequences of a possible fuel production 
shock in terms of fuel riots. Following the example of Kumhof and Muir (2013), this 
scenario was developed hypothesising a 2% reduction in global oil supply based on a 
review of several different future forecasts based on Sorrell, et al. (2010). Differently 
from the first authors, the scenario implemented in the Fuel ABM simulated a one-off 
shock for the year 2017, rather than an annual 2% decrease in the extraction of oil. 
Since the oil production shock is a prediction of a future event, data for national and 
global oil production for 2016 was not available and its quantification had to rely on 
previous data. Reported data for oil supply was sought from the GRO Database (GSI, 
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2015). The last year for which complete data for this variable was available was 2012. 
Global daily oil supply for that year amounted to 89,878.47 Thousand barrels per day. 
A global loss in the daily oil supply would thus be quantifiable as 1,797.57 Thousand 
barrels per day. 
Saudi Arabia was the largest oil producer in 2012 and since then data shows a decline 
in its daily oil production. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s oil production is forecasted to soon 
begin its descent, due to its peak oil approaching fast, possibly before the end of the 
next decade (Ebrahimi and Ghasabani, 2015). Therefore, the reduction in oil supply 
modelled with this scenario was allocated to Saudi Arabia alone. 
The 2% shock on global oil production needed to be translated in a national loss for 
Saudi Arabia’s oil production in 2016. According to the estimates calculated by fitting 
trend lines to countries’ production of natural resources, Saudi Arabia’s oil production 
in 2016 is forecasted to amount to 12,694.98 Thousand barrels per day. A production 
loss of 1,797.57 for Saudi Arabia corresponds to a 14.16% loss in oil production for 
the country in 2016. 
The scenario was hence introduced in the Fuel ABM and 100 simulations were run 
between 2005 and 2017 and the results aggregated. The results from the model 
suggest that the shock is significant enough to bring the EIA fuel price over the $93 
per barrel threshold, hence significantly increasing the probability of fuel riots to 
occur around the world. Out of all the years considered, 2016 had the highest 
probability for a random country to experience a fuel riot, which was around 4% as 
compared to 2% in 2009 and 3% in 2008. The probability for single countries to 
experience a fuel riot ranged between 0% and 18%, with the top ten countries in terms 
of risk being Indonesia, India, Libya, France, Chad, Uganda, Bahrain, Cameroon, 
Egypt and Iran, all with more than 13% probability of experiencing a fuel riot that 
year. At the bottom of the list with a probability equal to 0% we find 60 countries, 
amongst which are Côte d’Ivoire, Denmark, Morocco, United States, Haiti and 
Zimbabwe. For a clearer visualisation, the probabilities of fuel riots for each country 
are summarised in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7 – Probability of fuel riots for countries based on the 2016 fuel production 
shock scenario (own elaboration). 
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This scenario was also included in this section because, as highlighted in Chapter 5.5, 
the BAU runs for the Fuel ABM show a regime for international price of fuel above 
the threshold for the year 2016, even without the introduction of the fuel shock 
forecast by the scenario, hence posing reservations about the validity of the results 
presented above. In reality, international fuel prices have dropped below the threshold 
in 2015 due to a low increase in demand coupled with increased production 
(especially from US) and the failure of OPEC countries to reach an agreement on 
national quotas for production, which remained high (European Commission, 2016). 
This dynamic is not currently reflected in the ABM. However, once a more accurate 
estimation of prices is introduced, this scenario would acquire validity, as it would be 
fairly realistic to see Saudi Arabia restrict its oil production by 14% due to terrorism, 
civil unrest or even politics. 
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7. Conclusions 
The research presented in the previous chapters is highly interdisciplinary and aimed 
at advancing knowledge in several different academic fields: environmental security, 
global food and energy security, international economics, political science and 
computer modelling.  
The contributions of this research to the current literature are multiple: i) definition of 
threshold for the international prices of food and fuel (both on their absolute values 
and volatility) that can trigger increased social unrest, ii) novel insights on food and 
fuel riots, iii) open up a novel stream of research on fuel riots, iv) development of 
fully data-led ABMs, and, finally, v) the provision of an ABM that can constitute a 
starting point for further developments. 
Referring back to the description and characteristics of computer models provided in 
Chapter 3.1, the models developed as part of this research only constitute a 
simplification of reality. As it is standard practice in modelling literature, part of the 
research provided involved the formulation of a clear research question, which led to 
the identification of key dynamics that have been explored quantitatively and 
introduced in ABMs to model them and provide predictions of possible future states 
of the system. Finally, the models have been used to test the effect of different 
scenarios and policies. 
Although a discussion section was provided to comment on the findings from the 
most interesting sections, the next section will answer the research questions 
underlying this research, also providing general comments on the findings. The 
following section will discuss the policy relevance of the research and, finally a 
summary of the contributions to literature of this research will be provided. 
7.1. General Statement and answers to research questions 
The challenges ahead of humanity are multiple and complex. Environmental 
dynamics such as climate change and scarcity of natural resources play together with 
social structures such as prices and governments to exacerbate increased insecurities 
and political fragilities. The 2008 global multisystem crisis is testimony of the 
interconnectedness of different SESs and the potential for conflict driven by 
underlying environmental trends. These conditions are expected to worsen in the 
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future, with increased incidence of conflict and in particular of environmentally 
driven riots. For these reasons, the topic of environmental security is worth being 
explored. 
7.1.1 Research question 1 – Is there a linked environmental causal factor in the 
triggering of civil unrest in different countries around the world? 
Sub-research questions:  
o Do international prices have an impact on the occurrence of food and fuel 
riots? What has the biggest effect, absolute prices or volatility? Is there a 
threshold for prices over which food and fuel riots are more likely to 
happen? 
o How does availability of food and oil impact the occurrence of riots? 
o Does national political fragility have an impact on the occurrence of food 
and fuel riots? 
o Are food and fuel riots characterised by the same dynamics? Do they have 
an impact on the occurrence of one another? 
o What is the probability of food and fuel riots to occur according to these 
variables? 
A review of the current literature on environmental conflict presented in Chapter 2 
highlighted a history of mixed findings on the connection between environmental 
processes and conflict, although there seems to be an agreement on the role of 
environmental pressures as catalyst for conflict, in particular riots. Food riots have 
widely been studied since the 2008 global multisystem crisis that saw a sharp increase 
in the occurrence of these events, highlighting the role of international food prices and 
scarcity of food as main drivers. Newspaper articles also identified the occurrence of 
similar events, although connected to fuel, which are known as fuel riots. This topic is 
still unexplored by academic research. 
This research implemented a quantitative approach to explore the answers to these 
questions. Databases with observations for food and fuel riots were compiled by 
collecting data from online newspapers that reported occurrences of violent uprisings 
due to scarcity and/or price of food and fuel. To the best of my knowledge, this 
produced the largest and most accurate database of violent food riots and the first on 
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fuel riots. Some of the records specifically mentioned the terms ‘food’ or ‘fuel riot’, 
whereas others reported a more general discontent towards the country’s 
economic/social situation and in particular towards government’s policies that also 
regarded one or both these resources. Most of the riots were concentrated in 2008 and 
2011, years that corresponded to the Arab Spring and, more generally, to the 
multisystem crisis. It is hence possible to speculate on the fact that food and fuel riots 
were the beginning of a more generalised crisis, which was first exacerbated by 
environmental issues. This is in line with the definition of SF (Homer-Dixon, et al., 
2015), i.e. the idea that the 2008 crisis had environmental roots and that these develop 
within different SESs, which then start interacting and synchronise, giving life to a 
generalised crisis and widespread political fragility. This is also in line with the 
argument that environmental issues are catalysts of conflict rather than direct 
contributors, which is also supported by the non-significant relationships found 
between national availability of food and fuel and riots.  
Chapter 4 found that the absolute level of international prices for both resources has a 
positive and significant effect on the occurrence of food and fuel riots. In particular, 
the hypothesis of the existence of thresholds for the international price of food and 
fuel was found to be true and were identified at 140 for the FAO FPI and $93 per 
barrel for food and fuel. The effect of price volatility was tested in Chapter 6, where 
RE models showed a positive, significant relationship between volatility in 
international food prices and the occurrence of food riots, and mixed findings for the 
relationship between international fuel prices and fuel riots. For fuel riots an RE 
model found a positive, significant relationship between the 1-year variation in 
international fuel prices and the occurrence of fuel riots, also identifying a threshold at 
$4.6 per barrel. However, a REEM model did not find this relationship significant. 
Food riots were found to be more likely to occur when the 2-year price variation is 
greater than 17.1 of the FAO FPI. These preliminary findings show that, although 
there seems to be a tolerance for increases in food prices, this is not the case for fuel 
prices, which seems to suggest a lack of oil stocks or their unavailability. Globally, 
scarcity of oil stocks does not show in data, however their availability may be 
concentrated in specific countries, or, more simply, the data on oil stocks is 
inaccurate. A more in-depth analysis of the effect of national stocks of resources on 
the occurrence of food and fuel riots is hence required.  
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A comparison of the accuracy at predicting food riots between two REEM models, 
one on the absolute price regimes and another on regimes in price variation found the 
latter the most accurate. The model with price variation correctly predicted 11.11% of 
food riots, as compared to 6.39% of the model with the absolute price. This finding 
partly disagrees with Bellemare (2014), who found an inverse relationship between 
the two variables, i.e. food price fluctuations decrease the probability of social unrest. 
The author justifies his findings with the argument that, historically, food producers 
have been the main actor in social upheavals related to food prices. Price volatility has 
a positive effect for these actors as price spikes increase their revenue, hence resulting 
in lower probability of unrest from this category (Bellemare, 2014). The main 
difference between this research and Bellemare’s was the definition of food riots, with 
Bellemare’s database also including non-violent events. Speculating on this 
difference, one could argue that food price volatility does not affect non-violent 
protests, as opposed to violent food riots. As for fuel riots, future research should 
further explore their relationship with fuel price variability. As presented in Chapter 4, 
the international price of fuel was modelled as the simple average between two spot 
prices, which may have concealed key differences between different parts of the 
world and hence caused the mixed results. Different measures of international price of 
fuel should be tested. 
Findings presented in Chapter 4 showed that the national availability of food and fuel, 
modelled as net production, does not significantly affect the occurrence of food and 
fuel riots. This finding is highly controversial, although agrees with the main literature 
(e.g. Buhaug, et al., 2015). These variables were modelled as net production as this 
thesis was testing the hypothesis that when a country relies on imports of a resource to 
cover national demand, it is exposed to the international price of that resource. By 
running the HZ models only on the months when the price of those resources was 
above the threshold, the model was testing whether a country’s exposure to high 
international prices influences its probability of experiencing a riot. Although these 
findings suggest that the connection is not significant at the national level, food and 
fuel availability indirectly affects – alongside other factors – the probability of riots at 
the international level by acting on the prices of these resources, which in turn have a 
positive and significant effect on riots. More research should hence be devoted to 
better understand the relationship between national food and fuel security and the 
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occurrence of riots, testing different variables that capture the national availability or 
access to these resources, such as the percentage of income spent on food and energy, 
or the effectiveness of their redistribution. Legwegoh, et al. (2015) also found that 
diets are an important variable in the willingness to riot. Country-specific studies 
focussing on the availability of cereals central to their diet could lead to different 
results.  
Chapter 4 also tested the accuracy of different measures of political fragility at 
capturing the national exposure to food riots. The most accurate index was the WGI. 
The contribution of national political fragility to the probability of a country to 
experience a food or a fuel riot was hence tested. The results show that countries that 
are more politically fragile are also more likely to experience a food or a fuel riot. 
This finding is in line with the wider literature on food riots (e.g. Brinkman and 
Hendrix, 2011). In addition, REEM models for both food and fuel riots highlighted 
that international prices for both resources are only relevant for classes with high 
political fragility. Politically fragile countries tend to be the poorest and located in the 
global south, which supports the hypothesis that high prices impact poor countries 
more. As we have seen in Chapter 2, countries heavily subsidise the prices of natural 
resources and poor countries do not seem to be able to afford them when prices are 
high, hence leading to their removal, which leads to unrest. 
In general, this research highlighted that food and fuel riots are driven by the same 
dynamics. In fact, the symmetry between the analyses on food and fuel riots – apart 
from the mixed findings on price volatility – show a clear connection between these 
two events and, more generally, between the food and fuel system. Indeed, the study 
on the interaction between food and fuel riots found a mutual, positive relationship 
between the two types of riot: a country that has experienced a food riot is more likely 
to experience a fuel riot and vice versa. This finding is in line with the idea of SF, 
where different SESs – in this case the food and energy systems – are linked and 
become synchronised, resulting in a generalised crisis. More research should be 
devoted to explore the variables that permit these interactions. This research suggests 
that a key factor is prices of natural resources, which transmit shocks from the 
availability of one resource to its price and the price of other resources, eventually 
leading to violent riots.  
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The accuracies of RE and REEM models at predicting food and fuel riots were 
compared, first using only the international price regime and WGI as predictors and 
then using the other type of riot as independent variable. REEM models were 
eventually selected as preferred method to evaluate the probability of riots under 
different conditions because of their overall better performance (when including 
countries’ RE) and the return of probabilities that can readily be implemented.  
Finally, the probabilities of riots in countries under different conditions are presented 
in Tables 4.18, 4.26, 4.29, 4.30 and 6.2. 
7.1.2 Research question 2 – Which is the optimal method that can be used as a 
policy tool that can simulate these dynamics using a data-led approach? 
Sub-research questions: 
o Does adopting a fully data-led approach in developing an ABM generate a 
‘good’ model? 
o Does the introduction of stochasticity and interaction between the agents 
and the feedback between food and fuel riots result in more accurate 
predictions than the underlying statistical extrapolation? 
System pressures such as climate change, food and energy insecurity, globalisation 
and synchronisation between different SESs and their consequences for social systems 
make these connections worth exploring with a system approach. Chapter 3 presented 
different modelling approaches that can and have been implemented to study similar 
topics. Computer simulation was preferred to other modelling techniques due to the 
possibility to introduce dynamic feedbacks between different variables and, in 
particular, ABM was selected because they allow to model heterogeneous agents and 
capture emergent properties through the simulation of interaction between agents. 
Recommendations on when ABMs are most effective perfectly suited this research 
and this method provided the most potential in answering the research questions. 
Three ABMs were developed: the Food ABM (including dynamics for food riots), the 
Fuel ABM (including dynamics for fuel riots) and the Food and Fuel ABM (including 
both types of riots). Following Principle 2 of the GRO project, which this research 
was part of, the models developed ought to be fully data-led. Both the input data and 
the parameters of the ABMs were estimated on reported data. In particular, the results 
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from the studies presented above informed some of the key dynamics included in the 
models, i.e. the relationships between prices, national political fragility and the 
occurrence of riots and the influence between different types of riot. In addition, 
reported data from UN Comtrade (2014) was used to develop the social networks 
representing international trade in the models and production and consumption of the 
natural resources and national political fragility were estimated by applying trend-
lines on data from the GRO database (GSI, 2015). By introducing these parameters in 
an ABM environment, one would expect the ABMs to be more accurate than the 
underlying statistical models that inform them. 
The validation of the ABMs presented in Chapter 5 contradicts this expectation and 
highlighted the first limitation of the combination fully data-led and ABM approach. 
Table 7.1 presents the comparison of the accuracy of the REEM models presented in 
Chapter 4 and of the Food and Fuel ABM at predicting food and fuel riots, which 
shows that the introduction of these dynamics in an ABM does not add to the 
accuracy of its predictions. 
 
 
Table 7.1 – Comparison of the accuracy between the Food and Fuel ABM, and 
models REEMre (food), REEMre (fuel), both including the two price regimes and the 
four groups of fragility for the WGI as predictors and REEMfoodre and REEMfuelre, 
which include the mutual influence between food and fuel riots (own elaboration). 
Indeed, the accuracy of the underlying models on relationships between international 
prices and political fragility and the occurrence of riots (models REEMfoodre and 
REEMfuelre) correctly predict 6% and 11% of food and fuel riots, respectively. These 
percentages are very similar to the accuracy of the Food and Fuel ABM, which 
correctly predicts 7% and 11% of food and fuel riots, respectively. This is a clear 
signal that the fully data-led approach used to develop the ABMs resulted in models 
that are just as accurate as the underlying statistics and that the introduction of 
dynamic behaviours and interaction through a social network are not sufficient to 
improve the models’ predictions. Surprisingly, not even the introduction of the mutual 
Variables Food Fuel 
Food and Fuel ABM 6.86% 10.76% 
REEMre (food) 6.39% - 
REEMfoodre 7.77% - 
REEMre (fuel) - 11.29% 
REEMfuelre - 12.10% 
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influence between food and fuel riots estimated by the models REEMfoodre and 
REEMfuelre was beneficial. Indeed, the percentages of riots correctly predicted by 
these models added to the other REEM models would amount to a respectable 
percentage of accuracy for an ABM. However, the accuracy of the different REEM 
models do not sum when their interaction is implemented in the ABM, but rather the 
overall accuracy of the model remains unvaried. This is due to the fact that, although 
four different REEM models were created to analyse different possible causes that 
lead to each type of riot, i.e. i) international price regimes and WGI group and ii) the 
occurrence of the other type of riot, the variables included in each model are likely to 
be highly cross-correlated between models, hence nullifying the potential increase in 
accuracy that could have been gained by including the mutual influence between the 
two types of riots. Indeed, fuel is one of the primary factors employed in agriculture, 
therefore its international price is likely to have a positive effect on the occurrence of 
food riots. Likewise, food crops are increasingly being utilised for the production of 
biofuels, which can affect the international price of oil and which in turn has an 
impact on the occurrence of fuel riots. 
Despite the inability of a data-led ABM approach to increase the understanding of the 
drivers of food and fuel riots, this does not make of the ABMs developed ‘bad’ 
models. The models are indeed at least as accurate at predicting riots as the statistics 
that underlie their dynamics, which suggests no coding errors. This allows the use of 
the models as platforms for further developments by zooming into specific issues 
highlighted by this research. In addition, the development of fully data-led ABMs 
contributed to the field of computer simulation, as this was never attempted before. 
It is worth noting here that the ABMs developed as part of this work, similarly to any 
other computer model, is not aimed at giving (cannot provide) precise predictions 
about which country will experience a riot and when, which is the information being 
tested in the table above. Rather, the ABMs are aimed at giving an indication about 
which countries are at risk of social upheavals due to multiple factors, amongst which 
we find a high international price of natural resources and their political fragility. 
Indeed, the different versions of the ABM can still provide invaluable information: 
the results of the models constitute an indication for situations of stress induced by a 
high international price of food and/or high political fragility that need further 
investigation and expert field analysis. 
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Indeed, the validation of the ABMs also highlighted positive results. The cumulative 
probability of riots by price regime is remarkably close to reality, although the models 
slightly underestimate the probability of riots for years above the threshold and 
slightly overestimate it when the price is low. Surprisingly, the ABMs are incredibly 
accurate at predicting which country will experience each type of riot throughout the 
period considered. In this case, the Food and Fuel ABM performed better than the 
ABMs on single resources, showing the advantages of using the integrated model. 
Care should be taken in the evaluation of these results, as they may partly be due to 
the inclusion of country-level RE in the calculation of their probability of riots. It is 
worth noting that using the REs to improve predictions constitutes an 
acknowledgement of our ignorance on some of the drivers of riots, as these are 
empirically estimated but represent ‘black boxes’ that do not explain why riots occur. 
The REs, which are provided in the database used to initialise countries attached to 
the thesis, are however very small as compared to the other factors, hence a potential 
strong effect is dubious. 
To partly solve these issues, future developments of the models should relax the fully 
data-led limitation, in particular countries’ decision making as relates to production 
and consumption of natural resources and national political fragility, which should all 
be endogenised in the models. 
7.1.3 Research question 3 – Can these models be used to predict future riots? 
The three versions of the ABM include some of the dynamics that explain the 
occurrence of resource-related riots, but are not yet able to provide future forecasts. 
As presented and discussed in Chapter 5, although the ABMs perfectly recreate the 
price regime trends between 2005 and 2013, the dynamics included in the models 
predict prices above the threshold for around a decade. In reality, international prices 
of food and fuel registered a regime below the threshold in 2015, hence questioning 
the method used to calibrate the prices in the ABMs. Once again, this is partly due to 
the inaccurate estimates for production and consumption of natural resources, which 
were based on trend lines calculated on reported data, as explained in Chapter 5.5. In 
addition, the calibration on reported data presented in Chapters 5 on absolute prices 
and 6 on price volatility, showed that interaction between supply and demand and 
levels of stocks are not sufficient to recreate prices. When calibrated on reported data, 
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the ET models produced counterintuitive dynamics, with prices above the threshold 
when the availability of resources is high and vice versa. This finding adds to the 
literature on drivers of international food prices, which does not find food availability, 
i.e. production, consumption and stock dynamics, as significant factors for recent 
prices. Lagi, et al. (2015) found that the supply-demand model only explains the trend 
in the FAO FPI up until 2000. After that year, the predictions of the model are 
inconsistent with the real trend observed in international food prices. The authors 
provided evidence that the underlying upward trend for the FAO FPI post-2000 can 
be explained by increasing demand from ethanol conversion and that the 2008 and 
2011 spikes in the FAO FPI are only related to speculation on the food futures market. 
As can be recalled from Chapter 4, the years 2008 and 2011 saw the largest number of 
food riots, which in that chapter were explained by the absolute price of food going 
beyond a critical threshold, or in Chapter 6 by the two-year food price fluctuation 
surpassing a critical threshold. If what argued by Lagi, et al. (2015) were true, the 
direct driver of those peaks would be speculation, hence also being the indirect driver 
of most of the food riots occurred during those years. As for the food riots occurred in 
different years, it would hence be possible to speculate that these were driven by 
forces different than financial speculation, such as demand for biofuels and, therefore, 
scarcity of food due to competing uses of the resource. In addition, the two different 
thresholds, i.e. on absolute prices and on price variation, capture different years as 
more ‘at risk’: the former sees 2007-2008 and 2010-2013 above the threshold, 
whereas the latter identifies 2007-2008 and 2011 as above the threshold. The 
threshold on food price variations clearly identifies the years with the highest 
occurrence of food riots, strengthening the hypothesis of a difference between food 
riots in these years and the others. This reasoning would hence allow to differentiate 
between at least two types of food riots: those due to speculation and those due to 
scarcity. A similar classification was used by Cuesta (2014) which in its Food Riots 
radar distinguishes between food riots of type 1 and 2. The former are mainly caused 
by inflation in food prices and directed against the government of the country, 
whereas type 2 are smaller and more localised and usually have weaker political 
motivations, as typically caused by scarcity of food in localised regions (Barbet-Gros 
and Cuesta, 2014). However, to the best of my knowledge, this research and 
classification was never published in a peer reviewed journal, which leaves many 
unresolved questions and potential for further research. In addition, some authors cite 
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the prospected or successful removal of subsidies as the main cause of the 2008 food 
riots (Brinkman and Hendrix, 2011), and this was also found during the collection of 
data for food and fuel riots occurrences carried out in this research. This could 
potentially constitute another category of riots. Further research could hence focus on 
the different drivers of food riots, producing a categorisation, also in light of the 
findings presented above. 
When able to provide realistic price regimes, the ABMs can be used to evaluate 
different scenarios such as those presented in Chapter 6. Several authors call for 
models able to evaluate the impact of production shocks on prices (e.g. King, et al., 
2015) and the scenarios presented here are proof that the ABMs will be able to fulfil 
this aim. In particular, the dynamics already included in the models, i.e. international 
trade of natural resources, the connection prices, national political fragility and riots 
and the connection between food and fuel riots, make of the Food and Fuel ABM the 
perfect starting point to develop a more realistic and comprehensive ABM that could 
be used for different aims: i) as an early warning assessment tool, to highlight the 
beginning of a food or fuel crisis as in Cuesta, et al. (2014), ii) the consequences of 
future production shocks as in Lloyd’s (2015), or iii) capture the development of 
global multisystem crises such as SF as in Homer-Dixon, et al. (2015). 
Now commenting on the ‘Cereal Export Bans scenario’, the results from the 
simulations raised interesting questions for further research on the role of trade 
restrictions, and panic behaviours in general, in the formation of price spikes. Indeed, 
although the price regimes are not accurately simulated in the model, the dynamics for 
international trade and the accumulation of stocks are valid. The aim of the scenario 
was to simulate the consequences of the implementation of export restrictions when 
prices are high and provide evidence of potential of the emergent properties that 
characterise ABMs. The results of the scenario shows that countries that implement 
export bans successfully achieve their aim of shielding national markets from the high 
international prices, which supports the view expressed in the current literature. 
Surprisingly, the accumulation of food stocks in countries resulted in a medium-term 
reduction of international food prices, which disagrees with current literature, as 
presented in Chapter 6. Despite the limitation of the ABM, this finding echoes King, 
et al. (2015) call for further research on how national responses affect prices, and once 
adjusted its price dynamics this ABM will be able to achieve this aim. 
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Finally, a note of caution on the REs included in the ABMs. REs were calculated on 
data between 2005 and 2013, on conditions that are likely to evolve in the future, such 
as countries’ political fragility. Their introduction in the models as constants 
deteriorates the long-term predicting power of the models, i.e. their predictions will 
only be accurate for the short-term future. In the case of this research this was not 
concerning, since the models were only required to provide predictions for the near 
future (5 years ahead) (Principle 1 of the GRO Project). 
7.2. Policy relevance 
Findings from the quantitative analyses on the drivers of food and fuel riots will prove 
critical in shaping future policies that can address and prevent these events. Although 
the ABMs were first envisioned as a tool to provide policy-makers with precious and 
actionable information and forecasts on food and fuel riots, in their current state are 
unable to provide this information with confidence. However, future versions of the 
models will potentially be critical in the definition of policies to tackle price spikes 
and food and fuel riots in relation to food and energy crises. Throughout my PhD I 
engaged with different policy makers and stakeholders to ensure the policy relevance 
of my research. From the conversations, I gathered a clear interest for accessible and 
transparent computer models that can capture the development of shocks to 
production of natural resources and their consequences, which is perfectly in line with 
the main aim of the ABMs that were presented.  
The potential uses of the models are multiple. For instance, these could be used as 
support to multi-stakeholder engagement activities such as ‘Serious Games’, or, most 
importantly, as support to policy evaluation. The development of tools able to help 
evaluate policies ex-ante is indeed critical in times of austerity and limited funds. 
Policies are often tested on a small basis on a small sample of participants to evaluate 
their positive and negative effects, for their subsequent implementation on a larger 
scale in case of positive results. However, due to globalisation and the 
interconnectedness of the system we live in, this task is becoming more difficult as 
the policies, when implemented, can have repercussions on other sectors and distant 
places. Computer models such as the Food and Fuel ABM can provide the ‘virtual 
lab’ where policies can be trialled on a virtual population. For instance, Global Food 
Security (2015) suggested the institution of international food stocks to strategically 
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release when prices are high or when a production shock strikes to act as a buffer, and 
help control prices. It is easy to see how the ‘Cereal Export Bans scenario’ presented 
in Chapter 6 could be adapted to test this policy and explore its consequences. 
7.3 Summary of contributions to literature 
The research presented in this thesis produced several contributions to literature, 
especially in the fields of environmental security, global food and energy security, 
international economics, political science and computer modelling. 
The first contribution to literature of this research is constituted by a robust 
quantitative assessment of the relationship between scarcity of food and fuel, their 
international prices, national political fragility and the occurrence of food and fuel 
riots. This research contributed to the current literature on drivers of food riots, 
identifying international food prices and national political fragility as significant 
drivers, as opposed to national food availability. In addition, this research opened a 
new stream of research on fuel riots, finding symmetry between the analyses on food 
and fuel riots and a positive, reinforcing feedback between the two types of event. 
Related to this, this research also contributed two databases recording the occurrence 
of violent food and fuel riots between 2005 and 2013.  
The second main contribution to literature relates to the identification of thresholds 
for the prices of food and fuel over which food and fuel riots are more likely to occur 
in countries. These were identified for both absolute prices and volatility for food, 
whereas only a threshold on absolute prices for fuel was identified. In addition, the 
research on prices and riots highlighted that the effect of volatility in food prices on 
food riots is larger than the effect of absolute food prices, as opposed to fuel riots, 
where fuel price volatility does not seem to be significant. 
The third contribution to literature regards the development of three novel ABMs, one 
for each type of event considered and another including both types of event and their 
interrelationships. The development of these models followed a fully data-led 
approach, which constitutes another novelty in the field of ABMs. This research 
found that the fully data-led approach used to develop the ABMs resulted in models 
does not add predictive power to their underlying statistics: the introduction of 
dynamic behaviours and interaction through a social network are not sufficient to 
improve the models’ predictions. However, this does not make of the ABMs 
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developed ‘bad’ models, which are indeed at least as accurate at predicting riots as the 
statistics that underlie their dynamics, which suggests no coding errors. This allows 
the use of the models as platforms for further developments. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 – Final database for food riots 
Country 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Burundi 
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2005) 
 
     
 
Somalia  
June (USA 
TODAY, 
2007) 
May (NBC 
News, 
2008) 
  August 
(Pflanz, 
2011) 
 
 
India  
October 
(Majumdar
, 2007) 
August 
(Mukherje
e, et al., 
2008) 
 September 
(WB, 
2015a) 
  
 
Mauritania  
November 
(Mail and 
Guardian, 
2007) 
     
 
Cameroon   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Burkina 
Faso 
  
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Senegal   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Ethiopia   
February 
(Healy and 
Munckton, 
2008) 
    
 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
  
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2008b) 
    
 
Haiti   
April 
(Christie, 
et al., 
2008) 
   October 
(Morrison, 
2012) 
 
Yemen   
March 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Morocco   
February 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Lebanon   
February 
(Worth, 
2008) 
    
 
Egypt   
April 
(BBC 
News, 
2008a) 
  January  
(Rianovost
i, 2011) 
 
 
Tunisia   June   January   
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(Schneider, 
2008) 
(Aburawa, 
2011) 
Sudan   
August 
(Sanders, 
2008) 
  January 
(McDoom, 
2011) 
 
 
Mozambiq
ue 
  
February 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
 September 
(Mangwiro
, 2010) 
  
 
Algeria   
   January 
(The Daily 
Telegraph, 
2011) 
 
 
Oman   
   February 
(Aljazeera, 
2011) 
 
 
Iraq   
   February 
(Al-Salhy, 
2011) 
 
 
Uganda   
   April 
(Kron, 
2011) 
 
 
Syria   
   September 
(Asian 
Correspon
dent, 2013) 
 
 
Banglades
h 
  
February 
(The 
Times of 
India, 
2008) 
    
 
Guinea   
June 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Kenya   
May 
(Schoen, 
2011) 
    
 
Afghanista
n 
  
April 
(IRIN 
News, 
2008) 
    
 
Chad   
September 
(Scoop, 
2008) 
    
 
Honduras   
April 
(WB, 
2015a) 
    
 
Madagasca
r 
  
April 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Peru   
April and 
July 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 
  
April 
(Schneider, 
2008) 
    
 
Zambia   
May (WB, 
2015a) 
    
 
Zimbabwe   April      
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(Schneider, 
2008) 
Pakistan   
 September 
(Reese, 
2014) 
August 
(The 
Times Of 
India 
Delhi, 
2010) 
  
 
Malawi   
   January 
(Joy, 2012) 
 
 
Maldives   
   April 
(BBC 
News, 
2011) 
 
 
Argentina   
    December 
(Daily 
Mail UK, 
2012) 
 
Iran   
    October 
(Bozorgme
hr, et al., 
2012) 
 
South 
Africa 
  
    August 
(Technolog
y Review, 
2013) 
 
Colombia   
     August 
(The 
Associated 
Press, 
2013) 
Venezuela   
     September 
(Vega, 
2013) 
Table 1 – Database of food riots from Natalini, et al. (2015a). Each cell contains the 
month(s) during which each country experienced a food riot during the year listed in 
each column. The months in bold constitute the update from the database of food riots 
originally published in Natalini, et al. (2015b). 
Appendix 2 – Database for fuel riots 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Yemen 
July (IRIN, 
2005) 
 
 
  July 
(Raghavan, 
2011) 
 
 
Canada 
August 
(Menzies, 
2005) 
 
 
    
 
Iraq  
January 
(Gupta, 
2006) 
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India  
June (The 
Times of 
India, 
2006) 
 
June 
(Alter, 
2008) 
June 
(Hindustan 
Times, 
2010); July 
(Timmons 
and 
Kumar, 
2010) 
September 
(The 
Hindu, 
2011) 
 
February 
(Banerji, 
2013) 
Iran  
 June 
(Blair, 
2007) 
    
 
Myanmar  
 August 
(Thomson 
Reuters 
Foundation 
News, 
2012) 
    
 
Mozambiq
ue 
 
 
 
February 
(The 
Khilafah, 
2008) 
   
 
Cameroon  
 
 
February 
(IRIN, 
2008a) 
   
 
Burkina 
Faso 
 
 
 
February 
(IRIN, 
2008b) 
   
 
Indonesia  
 
 
June (The 
Jakarta 
Post, 2009) 
  March 
(Express, 
2012) 
June 
(Weisentha
l, 2013); 
August 
(SBS, 
2013) 
Nepal  
 
 
June 
(Alter, 
2008) 
   
 
France  
 
 
June 
(Siddique, 
2008; The 
Daily Mail, 
2008) 
October 
(Allen, 
2010) 
  
 
Italy  
 
 
June 
(Siddique, 
2008) 
   
December 
(RT, 2013) 
Spain  
 
 
June 
(Siddique, 
2008; The 
Daily Mail, 
2008) 
   
 
Portugal  
 
 
June 
(Siddique, 
2008; The 
Daily Mail, 
2008) 
   
 
Thailand  
 
 
June (The 
Daily Mail, 
2008) 
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China  
 
 
October 
(Graham-
Harrison, 
2008) 
 April 
(White, 
2011) 
 
 
Guinea  
 
 
November 
(Topix, 
2008) 
   
 
Bolivia  
 
 
 December 
(Kraul, 
2011) 
  
 
Chile  
 
 
  January 
(Russell, 
2011) 
 
 
Libya  
 
 
  February 
(Epoch 
Times, 
2011) 
 
 
Uganda  
 
 
  April 
(RNW, 
2011) 
 
 
Malawi  
 
 
  July 
(Industriall 
Union, 
2011) 
 
 
Pakistan  
 
 
  December 
(Dawn, 
2011) 
 
 
Nigeria  
 
 
   January 
(The 
Tripoli 
Post, 2012) 
 
Sri Lanka  
 
 
   February 
(DBSJEY
ARAJ, 
2012) 
 
Jordan  
 
 
   November 
(Luck, 
2013) 
 
Banglades
h 
 
 
 
    January 
(Naim-Ul-
Karim, 
2013) 
Greece  
 
 
    February 
(Euronews, 
2013) 
Egypt  
 
 
    March 
(Haaretz, 
2013) 
Colombia  
 
 
    August 
(Wills, 
2013) 
Sudan  
 
 
    September 
(BBC 
News, 
2013) 
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Table 2 – Database of fuel riots. Each cell contains the month(s) during which each 
country experienced a fuel riot during the year listed in each column (own 
elaboration). 
Appendix 3 – ET models on the absolute value of prices for reported data for 
food and fuel 
As for the ET on international prices of food, real data for production, consumption 
and stocks of food (cereals) was retrieved from the USDA data bank (USDA, 2015b). 
As in the previous analyses, the FAO FPI was used as a proxy for international prices 
of food, which was sourced from the FAO website (FAO, 2015). The ET was hence 
built using the world ratio between the two variables ‘World Food Production’ and 
‘World Food Consumption’ and the variable ‘World Stocks’ as independent variables 
and the variable ‘Price threshold’ which equals 0 when the FAO FPI is below the 140 
threshold calculated in the Chapter 4 and 1 otherwise as dependent variable. The 
results of the ET on real data for food are presented in Figure 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1 – ET model on real world data for food using ratio between ‘World Food 
Production’ and ‘World Food Consumption’ and the variable ‘World Stocks’ as 
independent variables and the variable ‘Price threshold’ as target variable (own 
elaboration). 
The results from the ET for food presented in Figure 8.1 show that both variables, i.e. 
ratio and stocks, significantly affect the international food price regime and the 
dynamics perfectly recreate the international price regime for the period considered. 
However its dynamics are counterintuitive: when the world stocks of food are below 
451,577 (MT), the price is below the threshold, whereas when these are between 
451,577 (MT) and 490,295 (MT) we have a price spike. For world food stocks equal 
or larger than 490,295 (MT), the world ratio between food production and 
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consumption becomes significant as well: when this is lower than 1.02668, the 
international price of food is below the threshold and above for higher ratios. 
Intuitively speaking, it is to expect high international food prices for low stock levels 
and ratios below 1, i.e. when world consumption of food is larger than production, 
and low prices otherwise. The results from the food ET suggest the exact opposite, 
adding proof to the argument that international prices of natural resources are only 
minimally governed by demand-supply dynamics, and rather depend on several 
different variables (see for example Lagi, et al., 2015) and/or that the data is 
inaccurate. 
Another ET was developed for the international price of fuel. Similarly to the 
previous ET, the statistical model used data for world production, consumption and 
stocks of oil to identify breaks in the values for these variables that lead to the two 
different regimes presented in Chapter 4 for the international price of fuel. The model 
used as independent variables the ratio between Total Petroleum Consumption 
(Millions Barrels) and Total Oil Supply (Millions Barrels) and Total Petroleum 
Stocks, End of Period (Millions Barrels). Data for these variables was sourced from 
the EIA website (US EIA, 2015a). The target variable of the model was the EIA fuel 
price17 recoded in two regimes: the variable equalled 0 when the price was below the 
93$ per barrel threshold, as calculated in Chapter 4, and 1 otherwise. The results of 
the statistical model are presented in Figure 8.2. 
 
                                                 
17 For an in-depth explanation of how the EIA fuel price was calculated throughout 
this work refer to Chapter 4. 
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Figure 8.2 – ET model on real world data for fuel using ratio between Total Petroleum 
Consumption (Millions Barrels) and Total Oil Supply (Millions Barrels) and Total 
Petroleum Stocks, End of Period (Millions Barrels) as independent variables and the 
variable EIA fuel price as target variable (own elaboration). 
Similarly to the ET for the international price of food, although the results presented 
in Figure 8.2 show that the dynamics perfectly recreate the international price regime 
for the period considered, these also show counterintuitive dynamics between 
availability, supply and demand interaction and international price of fuel. When 
world oil stocks are below 4118.683 (Million Barrels), the international price of oil is 
below the threshold. This climbs above the threshold when world oil stocks are 
between 4118.683 (Million Barrels) and 4126.608 (Million Barrels). For any value of 
stocks equal or larger than 4126.608, the ratio between world oil production and 
consumption becomes significant: when the ratio is below 1.00485 and stocks are 
below 4206.613 (Million Barrels), the international oil price is above the threshold, 
whereas when the ratio is low and stocks are larger or equal to 4206.613 (Million 
Barrels) the price is below the threshold. Conversely, when stocks are high, i.e. larger 
or equal to 4126.608 (Million Barrels), and the ratio is high, i.e. larger or equal to 
1.00485, the price climbs above the threshold. 
Although both statistical models perfectly recreate the trend in the international price 
regimes for both food and fuel during the time frame considered, the conditions they 
identify are counterintuitive and unrealistic. In addition, the data for world estimates 
of the variables used as independent in the models presented several inconsistencies. 
In particular, there does not seem to be a clear relationship between stocks of the 
resources and supply-demand dynamics. This is particularly true for oil, where for 
several years, in correspondence to a surplus of production, global oil stocks decrease 
in the world. Although this could be justified by a global redistribution of stocks of 
resources and countries preferring to use their own stocks rather than buying the 
resource on the international market, these variables were not suitable to parameterise 
the price dynamics in the ABMs. For these reasons, the model was calibrated using 
endogenous data for production, consumption and stocks of the resources and the 
results are presented in the following section. 
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Appendix 4 – ET models on food price variations 
These ET models were fit to data to predict two regimes for the FAO FPI variation, 
i.e. either above or below the threshold calculated in Chapter 6. The first model in 
Figure 9.1 uses the two-year FAO FPI variation as target variable and USDA data for 
the ratio between food production and consumption and for stocks as predictors. 
 
Figure 9.1 – ET model fit to reported USDA data for the period 2005 – 2013 using the 
two-year FAO FPI price variation and ratio between world food production and 
consumption of cereals and world stocks as predictors (own elaboration). 
Figure 9.1 shows that the variable for the stocks is not significant in the prediction of 
the two-year price variation and found counterintuitive dynamics for the ratio between 
food production and consumption. In particular, the model predicts a price above the 
threshold for high (ratio > 1.04247) and mid (1.01313 < ratio < 1.0239) estimates for 
the ratio, and a regime below the threshold for mid (1.0239 < ratio < 1.04247) and 
low (ratio < 1.01313) estimates. These dynamics are counterintuitive as one would 
expect high increases in prices when food availability is low and vice versa. 
The second ET used the same variables, although this was fit to data from the model. 
Results are presented in Figure 9.2 and show the same counterintuitive dynamics, also 
including stocks. 
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Figure 9.2 – ET model fit to data from the Food ABM for the period 2005 – 2013 
using the two-year FAO FPI price variation and ratio between global food production 
and consumption of cereals and global stocks as predictors (own elaboration). 
Another experiment involved the development of two more ETs, replacing the 
absolute values of the independent variables with their two-year variations. Figure 9.3 
presents the results from the ET fit to data from USDA. 
 
Figure 9.3 – ET model fit to reported USDA data for the period 2005 – 2013 using the 
two-year FAO FPI price variation and two-year variation in the ratio between world 
food production and consumption of cereals and two-year variation in world stocks as 
predictors (own elaboration).  
The model in Figure 9.3 shows a more complex set of conditions that can lead to 
wither price regime. In particular, when the variation in stocks is positive and larger 
than -17,420 MT and the variation in the ratio is larger than 0.06273, the FAO FPI 
variation is above the threshold, whereas for lower estimates of variation in the ratio 
the price variation is below the threshold. When the variation is stocks is between --
24,016 MT and -17,420 MT, the price variation is again above the threshold and 
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below for any negative variation of the stock below 24,016. Once again, the dynamics 
resulting from the model appear counterintuitive, although in this instance it is 
possible to speculate on some of the conditions, especially when we reverse the 
causality in the model, i.e. when we think of how a high variation in prices can trigger 
a variation in the other variables. The two ‘yes’ branches starting from the root node 
on stocks could represent a situation where a large positive variation in prices has 
triggered large investments in food production, which in turn increases as well. A 
combination of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ from the root node leaves the prices unaffected, which 
may show a level of tolerance towards a small decrease in food stocks and small 
ratios between production and consumption. When the loss of stocks is relatively 
large (combination of ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ from the root node), the price variation is above 
the threshold, whereas for large losses of food stocks the price variation is below the 
threshold. This last dynamic is highly counterintuitive and even speculation does not 
come in aid. However intuitive, these dynamics clearly require further research in the 
light of the findings presented above, which highlighted either inaccuracy of reported 
data on food production, consumption and stocks or complex dynamics. 
The ET was fit to data from the Food ABM and its results are presented in Figure 9.4. 
Once again the dynamics were counterintuitive, which led to the choice of presenting 
these findings as work in progress and implement the threshold on the absolute value 
of the FAO FPI in the Food version of the ABM. 
 
Figure 9.4 – ET model fit to data from the Food ABM for the period 2005 – 2013 
using the two-year FAO FPI price variation and the two-year variation in the ratio 
between global food production and consumption of cereals and two-year variation in 
global stocks as predictors (own elaboration).  
